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 i 
Abstract 
 
New Zealand’s national security system is based upon a collection of siloed plans 
and policies. New Zealand has adopted an ‘all-hazards/all-risks’ approach to 
national security that is based upon a reactive system. There does not exist a 
national security strategy that seeks to address emerging security threats. In 
essence, New Zealand’s approach is oriented to ‘wait for the crisis to occur before 
acting’. Much of the literature relating to national security is overly theoretical, 
which does not assist in the development of a New Zealand national security 
strategy. This research examines academic theory and New Zealand’s policies and 
plans that relate to national security in order to identify the gap between theory 
and policy. It is recommended that New Zealand develop a national security 
strategy that is based on a concept of the protection of a citizens ‘normal way of 
life’. This concept provides the strategy with ‘what should be protected’. By 
successfully focusing on this concept, it will allow New Zealand citizens to go 
about their daily business free from fear. Building upon this concept, a national 
security strategy is proposed that would take a forward-looking risk reduction 
approach to five emerging security threats facing New Zealand. These are: The 
Cyber threat, the Terrorist threat, Climate Change, Biosecurity, and threats to 
Territorial Security. This would enable the New Zealand government agencies 
responsible for supporting national security the ability to develop capabilities to 
meet these threats. Although New Zealand articulates a whole-of-government 
approach to national security, the individual plans and policies relating to national 
security are not connected. There is a deficiency in collaboration and 
commonality between government agencies within the national security 
framework, which could be improved with the implementation of a national 
security strategy that is focussed on emerging threats and allowing New 
Zealanders to live free from fear.   
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Chapter One: Introduction 
 
Much of the contemporary narrative surrounding national security identifies the 
need to approach security from a whole-of-society perspective. Barry Buzan 
argued that security has three levels: security of the individual, of the state and of 
the international system (Buzan, 1991). Donald Snow presented the concept that 
there are two core elements of national security: physical security and the sense of 
security for the population (Snow, 2016). Philip Bobbitt argued that states should 
continually rethink the way that a state secures itself, to ensure that security is 
offered to all (Bobbitt, 2008). The government’s requirement to provide its 
citizens with not only a physical state of security, but also a mental state of 
security highlights the fact that the topic of national security is a highly contested 
one. Buzan, describes how the concept of security is a contested concept, as it is 
characterised by ‘unsolvable debates about its meaning and application’. The 
contest involves what priorities the government will focus national security on 
and how it will allocate national resources for security. The traditional concept of 
security considers under what circumstances will the State employ violence to 
protect the safety of its citizens. However, if what is being secured is not specified 
by the State, then the concept of national security can be ambiguous.  
 
Although Wolfers (1952) argued that the State must decide what values it is 
willing to secure, Baldwin (1997) added that within the State, individuals and 
other social actors will have many different values that they want protected, that 
go beyond the traditional security objectives of ensuring political independence 
and territorial integrity. In addition to this, the State no longer has the monopoly 
on the control of many of the institutions that support national security and the 
State as a whole. Institutions such as banks, education providers, medical services 
and national transport fleets are some of these ‘out-sourced’ responsibilities. This 
shift to what Bobbitt calls the ‘market state’ (a State where core parts of the 
economy are not run by the State) will have an impact on how national security is 
conceptualised and approached. With the emergence and deepening of 
globalisation, characterised by interconnected global supply chains, trading 
networks and economies, and expansion of communications and migration 
systems, New Zealand is at a point where it needs to determine if the lens through 
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which it defines its national security is accurate enough to establish appropriately 
calibrated strategies and policies. 
 
The primary question for this research project is: Is the current approach to 
national security effective in providing a whole-of-society framework? To answer 
this question, this dissertation will analyse the national security framework of 
New Zealand to determine if it achieves a whole-of-government approach to the 
security for the whole-of-society. The dissertation considers what should be 
protected by the New Zealand government to provide a basis for the development 
of a national security strategy. Contemporary commentary on New Zealand’s 
national security is overly theoretical, which does not discuss the practical  
development of security policy. There is a need for research that will establish a 
framework for the development of a national security strategy. This will enable a 
cohesive approach to be adopted across government agencies in the development 
of security policy.   
 
This dissertation is focussed on bridging the gap between academic theory in 
relation to national security and the current national security policy and plans of 
New Zealand. It is acknowledged that International Relations theory and 
geopolitics have a significant influence on national security, however, these topics 
go beyond the focus of this research project.  
 
Drawing on literature examining the creation of national security strategies, this 
research will review the different schools of thought to determine if there is an 
approach that best fits New Zealand’s requirements. It develops a concept of what 
it means to have a normal way of life for the citizens of New Zealand. This is 
achieved through a historical review of the evolution of the State constitutional 
order to determine what elements of the State enable people to go about their daily 
business free from fear. The security policies and plans of four nations are utilised 
as case studies, including: the United Kingdom (UK), the Republic of Ireland, 
Singapore and Australia. This comparative review provides a benchmark to 
determine if New Zealand’s national security framework is similar to that of some 
of New Zealand’s partners and allies. It also offers examples for possible 
utilisation in the development of a New Zealand national security strategy.  
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Examining current New Zealand security related policy and plans will determine 
the appropriate architecture upon which to develop a whole-of-government 
approach to provide security to the whole-of-society.  
 
Literary Review 
 
Barry Buzan in People, States & Fear (1991) asked the question: security of what 
to whom, and security and what costs? Buzan took Kenneth Waltz’s concept, that 
there are three levels of security that need to be addressed and expanded on them. 
These are: the security of the individual, the state and the international system.  
Buzan argued that national security should be holistic and incorporate all three 
levels of security and aim to converge security studies, foreign policy and 
international relations. The key contribution of People, States & Fear was to 
identify key elements that should be taken into account in the development of a 
national security policy. Buzan also provided worthwhile analysis of how smaller 
States can use international and regional alliances and formal security 
arrangements to support national security. However, Buzan’s conclusions dance 
around the topic of how to develop a national security policy in a practical sense 
and unfortunately, did not provide the detail to support the development of a 
national security strategy.  
 
Donald Snow offered a comprehensive overview of national security theory in 
Thinking About National Security: Strategy, Policy and Issues. Snow’s 
commentary commenced with an overview of the concept of national security. 
Snow argued that the most basic national security question is under what 
circumstances will a nation use armed forces to ensure its safety and well-being 
(Snow, 2016). The strength of this book is the breakdown and definitions of the 
different components of national security. Snow offered a comprehensive and 
straight-forward description of strategy, policy, risk and threats. Snow’s argument 
that security has two elements: physical security and the sense of security was 
significant because it raised the important point that security is more than just the 
protection of the borders, a point that this research takes on board. Snow 
explained that security can be subjective and not everyone in the State will be or 
feel affected by a threat and that political influence and individual opinion will 
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influence how national security is viewed. The second part of the book largely 
focused on the impact of the changing environment on the United States (US) 
military. It discussed the impact on the composition of the armed forces as well as 
on military capabilities in the new threat environment. Additionally, like Buzan, 
the book skirts around the idea of national security policy development, failing to 
provide any great insights into this process. Despite these shortfalls, this book 
provided a straightforward approach to understanding the concept of national 
security and its core components. 
 
Philip Bobbitt published two books on the development of the State and the 
emergence of terrorism as a threat to States. The Shield of Achilles (2002) 
discussed the concept of the evolution of the constitutional order, from the 
princely states in the 15th Century, through to the contemporary nation state, that 
emerged on the international stage in the late 19th Century in Europe. Bobbitt 
explained that there was a connection in the changes that took place to the 
constitutional order and the innovations that took place in warfare. Bobbitt offered 
the concept of the market state, where the role of the State is to allow the citizens 
to maximise the opportunities enjoyed by the members of society. Bobbitt 
proposed that the market state had evolved from globalisation, the outsourcing of 
government functions, advances in communications and more open borders to 
individual travel. The Shield of Achilles advanced the idea that previously, only a 
State could destroy a State. However, due to advances in international 
communications, rapid computation and the proliferation of Weapons of Mass 
Destruction (WMD), this is no longer the case. This idea contributed to one of the 
themes of this research, which is that the nature of the international environment 
has changed since the Cold War, therefore, New Zealand must recognise the need 
to re-evaluate how it seeks to provide national security.  
 
The Shield of Achilles discussed the evolution of the State and the relationship 
between the constitutional order and the evolution of society. Bobbitt continued 
this investigation in Terror and Consent: The Wars For The Twenty-First 
Century. Written after the terrorist attacks on the US mainland on 11th September 
2001, Bobbitt argued that terrorism mirrors the State. Terror and Consent is an 
extension of the discussion on the evolution of the State constitutional order from 
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the 15th Century and although Bobbitt does reuse his work on State evolution, the 
focus is the relationship between the State and terrorism. Bobbitt argued that there 
existed two types of States. A state of consent, that believed in the rule of law, 
human rights and open government and the state of terror, where groups seek to 
establish a State based on fear and repression. Bobbitt also argued that natural 
disasters can have as much impact on the normal daily functions of the State as a 
terrorist attack. Terror and Consent’s main contribution to this dissertation stems 
from discussion about how States must continually rethink the way wars are 
fought and how they provide national security.  
 
It is necessary to adopt a wider examination of the State’s evolution and to view 
this from another approach. This was conducted during this research project so 
that the analysis of the evolution of the State was derived from different ideas and 
not just those related to International Relations theory. In order to move further 
beyond Bobbitt and Snow’s approach that considered national security through an 
International Relations lens, Hilton L. Root’s Dynamics Among Nations: The 
Evolution of Legitimacy and Development in Modern State (2013) offered a useful 
perspective. The purpose of this book is to examine the partnership of 
Modernization Theory and Liberal Internationalism and to contrast these with the 
evolutionary theory of Complexity. Root argued the necessity to expand the study 
of complex systems in order to understand the interactions of economic, cultural 
and political networks. Root challenged the idea of the success of Liberal 
Internationalism and argued that there is a redistribution of economic and political 
power to emerging nations such as China, India, Brazil and Russia. These 
emerging nations challenge the traditional Western view of collective security, 
where like-minded States join together to provide security. The emerging nations 
benefit from trade and economic growth, but contest the Liberal Internationalism 
ideals of ‘democracy, labor and human rights and an open domestic democracy’ 
(Root, 2013, p. 5). Root’s discussion of the changing of the State constitutional 
order and the impact of this on national security, supports the contention of this 
research that it is necessary to analyse the context of New Zealand’s environment 
by moving beyond traditional security ideas. Root extends the historical 
description of the evolution of the State and focussed on how the State’s 
interaction with the population evolved as the State demanded more resources of 
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money and manpower in order to achieve its ambitions. Root’s Dynamics Among 
Nations provided analysis of the challenges faced by a State as a result of growing 
interconnectedness and also argued that western states may no longer hold 
decisive sway over the international system, it’s rules and major institutions. 
 
A contemporary analysis of New Zealand’s national security framework is 
provided by Negar Partow in her contribution to the edited proceedings of Massey 
University’s National Security Conference 2016. Her chapter Rethinking National 
Security: A new conceptual framework? (2017), Partow provided a brief overview 
of the traditional conception of national security in which the State is the main 
referent object of security and the main producer of security. The chapter also 
discussed the global ideational changes taking place and their significance to 
nationalism. In essence, being a member of a nation is non-voluntary and this, 
Partow explains ‘is an important security challenge for today’ (Partow, 2017, p. 
127). Citizen’s allegiances are increasingly less tied to the State in which they 
were born. Citizens can now easily travel, live in multiple countries throughout 
their lives and connect with micro-communities in distant lands through the 
internet. This is where Partow offered a refreshingly different view of the security 
discourse reviewed. Although she argued that national security continues to focus 
on sovereignty and national identity, the concept of Human Security better suits 
the challenges faced by liberal democracies in providing national security in an 
increasingly complex and globalised environment. As such, Partow influenced the 
use of human security as a philosophical theory for the development of a national 
security framework.  
 
Review of New Zealand’s national security framework 
 
The focus of this research project is to establish a framework for the establishment 
of a New Zealand national security strategy. It is necessary to review, in 
conjunction with academic material related to national security, the various 
policies and plans of the New Zealand agencies that contribute to national 
security. The key documents relating to New Zealand’s national security are 
examined in more depth in Chapter Four. In New Zealand, the Department of the 
Prime Minister and Cabinet (DPMC) is responsible for the coordination of the 
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National Security System (NSS). Published in 2016, the National Security System 
Handbook (NSS Handbook) detailed the arrangements for the governance of 
national security as well as the response to potential and an actual national 
security crisis. The NSS Handbook provided the strategic context and the 
objectives of New Zealand’s national security framework. The bulk of the NSS 
Handbook provided an overview of the different government agencies 
responsibilities in the event of a national security crisis. What is absent from the 
NSS Handbook is a forward-looking approach to New Zealand’s national security. 
New Zealand has taken an ‘all-hazards/all-risks’ approach to national security, 
based on an adaptable and reactive national security system, rather than a 
forward-looking approach to risk reduction (Department of the Prime Minister 
and Cabinet, 2017). There is no explanation or rationale for not wanting to 
develop a forward-looking approach or a strategy to develop capabilities to 
address emerging challenges and to review current assumptions relating to 
national security. Examples of other nation’s national security strategies are 
reviewed in Chapter Three.  
 
The ‘all-hazards/all-risks’ approach detailed in the NSS Handbook is supported by 
a reliance on developing resilience in New Zealand. This includes resilience of 
infrastructure, institutions and communities. There is little detail on what the 
expectations are across each of these elements in relation to resilience. 
Furthermore, there is significant difference between building resilience for a key 
piece of infrastructure and developing resilience for a member of the community. 
The NSS Handbook does not address this issue. As a document that provides 
information on the structure that is in place for the response to a national security 
crisis, the NSS Handbook provided a clear guideline.     
 
Complementing the NSS Handbook is the National CDEM Plan 2015. Civil 
Defence and Emergency Management (CDEM) coordinates the operational 
activities for the response to a security related crisis. The response to a crisis is 
focussed on the ‘4 R’s’: Reduction, Readiness, Response and Recovery. To 
support this the National CDEM Plan 2015 set out the objectives for CDEM and 
provided details of how the response will be coordinated at a national level. It also 
detailed how the coordination with regional CDEM agencies will occur. Much of 
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the National CDEM Plan 2015 is a guide to the roles and responsibilities of each 
agency in the event of a crisis. There are details of the associated legislation that 
provides the legal authority for each agency to act in an emergency and what 
additional powers the agencies will be granted in a crisis. The strength of this plan 
is that it provided information on how welfare services will be supported during a 
crisis. This demonstrated that there is consideration about a person’s every day 
needs and their sense of security. The National CDEM Plan 2015 is an 
operational document. It provided coordination information for agencies and their 
responsibilities and is not intended to be a strategic, forward looking document.  
 
The most recent Defence White Paper 2016 (DWP 2016) is a continuation of 
white papers published by the Ministry of Defence (MOD). The purpose of the 
DWP 2016 was to set out the government’s objectives for the New Zealand 
Defence Force (NZDF) out to 2030. The content of the DWP 2016 provided 
information relating to the strategic outlook, the likely threats that New Zealand 
could face, as well, as how the NZDF connects to the wider New Zealand national 
security framework. Much of the DWP 2016 discussed the roles of the NZDF and 
what outputs are expected from each individual service. The discussion contained 
within the DWP 2016 on capability development, workforce generation, the 
regeneration of the defence estate and organisational change, are brief statements 
providing conceptual information on the desired outcomes. There is little 
contained within the DWP 2016 that provided a forward-looking strategy that sets 
a pathway for the achievements of the governments objectives out to 2030. The 
DWP 2016 is also very similar in content to that of the previous defence white 
paper released in 2010. As a document that has the purpose of setting priorities for 
the next 25 years, it was assumed that the DWP 2016 would provide a strategy for 
future defence capability development. However, upon review, the DWP 2016 
lacked a forward-looking approach and is limited to statements informing the 
public what has been achieved previously.  
 
What is evident in the review of the literature on national security, both academic 
and New Zealand government policy, is that neither provide a practical 
framework for the development of a national security strategy. Although the 
academic writings reviewed, place an emphasis on academic theory that will not 
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substantially help in the development of policy, they did contribute to the 
development of what the State should focus on securing in Chapter Two. These 
writings also provided the basis for the development in identifying the emerging 
threats facing New Zealand’s national security. Many of the reviewed writings 
discussed the need for the development of effective national security policy, 
however, they avoid making practical suggestions of how this can be achieved. In 
contrast to theoretical statements are the national security related policy and plans 
of the New Zealand government agencies responsible for contributing to national 
security. These documents are predominately operational plans that detailed what 
the response will be in the event of a crisis. They provided an outline of the 
coordination between government agencies and the legislation that authorises the 
agencies to act on behalf of the government.  
 
The review of New Zealand’s national security framework has identified that 
there lacks a central national security strategy. The overall concept of a national 
security strategy is that it should address the basic security needs of the citizens. It 
should address external and internal threats and convey how these threats will be 
responded to. A national security strategy would articulate the nation’s security 
objectives and goals and marry these to the means and resources to achieve them. 
As New Zealand takes a whole-of-government approach to national security, a 
centralised strategic document would enable commonality between the different 
government agencies in the development of their own strategies and plans.   
 
Purpose of the research and chapter outline 
 
Although New Zealand occupies a relatively benign location in the world 
(Brownlee, 2016), New Zealand interacts with other States that live in 
increasingly contested security environments. New Zealand needs to be actively 
engaged in the world, and therefore, should have a security strategy that operates 
a framework for protecting the State against current and emerging threats. 
Possible threats to New Zealand’s security can originate domestically or from 
external sources. As New Zealand’s global interconnectedness grows, then so 
should its security policy evolve. New Zealand does not have a published national 
security strategy, instead it relies upon a number of individual agency policies and 
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plans to achieve security objectives and develop security capabilities. The aim of 
this research is to recommend that New Zealand should develop a national 
security strategy that seeks to bring about a cohesive framework rather than a 
series of bullet-point action plans, as is the current case.  
 
Chapter Two will examine the evolution of the State to determine what 
components of the State require protection. These components are based on what 
constitutes a State and how these elements contribute to a citizens normal way of 
life. The examination is a chorological review from the foundation of the State 
constitutional order in Europe and how the evolution of the State was connected 
with the evolution of warfare. The Peace of Westphalia is used as a historical 
marker and through the examination of States in that period, it is concluded that 
the focus of a State’s security was primarily the protection of the Realm and 
religion. As States developed and as the State’s ambitions grew, so did the need to 
extract more resources from their citizens. States required a population with 
greater skills, that would build, manufacture and develop new technology. With 
this development the citizens of the State demanded more in return from their 
rulers and in turn the State was required to ensure the wellbeing and security of 
their citizens. By the end of the 19th Century, the State was providing health, 
education and welfare support to the population and in return the State received 
economic benefits and an educated population to use for the realisation of its 
ambitions. Chapter Two concludes by establishing what elements of the State 
should be protected. This provides the basis for the concept of the normal way of 
life. This concept is used as a base for the review and development of a State’s 
national security strategy and for the development of a national security strategy 
for New Zealand. 
 
Chapter Three reviews the national security framework of the UK, Republic of 
Ireland, Singapore and Australia. The chapter provides an examination of what 
other nations have developed in relation to their specific national security 
requirement, with the intent of identifying elements of their national security 
frameworks that New Zealand could adopt in the development of its own national 
security strategy. New Zealand has a long and close history with the UK and as a 
former colony of the British Empire, much of New Zealand’s government 
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institutions were developed using the British model. Britain has a national 
security strategy and this strategy provided this research with an example of how 
a security strategy can be created and used within a national security framework. 
The Republic of Ireland is a nation similar to New Zealand in population and in 
military capability. Like New Zealand, Ireland relies on global trade for economic 
prosperity and requires a secure region. The review of Ireland’s national security 
framework concluded that, like New Zealand, Ireland had no national security 
strategy and also relied on individual agency policy and plans relating to national 
security. The review of the Singaporean national security framework discovered a 
security architecture that was based predominately on the threat of a terrorist 
attack and the contribution of the population towards the concept of ‘Total 
Defence’. Singapore provided a good example of how to communicate the 
expectations of the government to the population in relation to national security. 
Singapore uses a range of communication methods aimed at different levels of 
society to place security into the narrative of the population’s daily life. New 
Zealand’s closet ally, Australia, is used as the final review. Australia does not 
have a national security strategy and like New Zealand, relies on white papers and 
individual agency plans relating to national security. What the review of the 
Australian national security framework did discover is the publication of a 
Foreign Policy White Paper, which linked domestic security to foreign policy.  
 
New Zealand’s national security framework is reviewed in Chapter Four. The 
New Zealand government has adopted an ‘all-hazards/all-risks’ whole-of-
government approach to national security that is primarily a reactive system rather 
than a forward-looking risk reduction strategy (DPMC, 2016). There are two 
documents that provide the framework for a nationally coordinated response to a 
crisis event in New Zealand: the NSS Handbook and the National CDEM Plan 
2015. These two documents provide an overview of the response and the roles 
and responsibilities of government agencies for the provision of support to a 
national security crisis. Chapter Four reviewed key pieces of legislation, policy 
and plans of other New Zealand government agencies that contribute to national 
security. The policy and plans that were reviewed were all released before the end 
of 2017 and did not consider recently released documents this year (2018). The 
research concluded that there exists a number of different formats and styles of 
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policy and plans published on national security. There is very little connection or 
consistency in information and format between these national security documents. 
The assessment is made that the agencies that contribute to national security 
produce plans that are siloed and not connected into an over-arching strategy. 
 
Chapter Five developed a concept for a New Zealand National Security Strategy 
based on the assessments made in Chapter Four and from the concept of the 
normal way of life developed in Chapter Two. In its current form the New 
Zealand national security framework is unconnected and siloed. The strategy this 
dissertation proposes would include a coordinated framework for the 
development, publication and review of government agencies national security 
documents and policies. This would address the current siloed approach and 
unconnected method in which national security plans are developed. From the 
analysis of New Zealand’s strategic environment, it is recommended that New 
Zealand develop a national security strategy based on five emerging threats. These 
threats cut across all parts of society and require a whole-of-government approach 
to a response.  Additionally, it is recommended that Human Security be used as 
the theoretical basis for the development of a New Zealand National Security 
Strategy. This theory corresponds with the current New Zealand national security 
objective of ensuring citizens can live ‘free from fear’. The recommended strategy 
would provide coherency to the current New Zealand national security framework 
and enhance the whole-of-society approach to national security.   
 
This is a practical research project that aims to close the gap between academic 
writing in the theory of national security and the national security operational 
plans that have been developed in New Zealand. As such, given this focus, this 
research does not utilise or position International Relations theory as a core 
component in the research. The provision of New Zealand’s national security is 
through a whole-of-government approach to the whole-of-society. Yet the policy 
and plans of New Zealand’s national security architecture is constituted by a 
series of isolated documents with little or no connection to each other. There 
exists no overarching New Zealand national security strategy that could be used to 
inform and direct the development of the individual agency national security 
strategies and plans. In addition to proposing a New Zealand national security 
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strategy, this research will determine the threats against which the strategy will be 
developed.  
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Chapter Two: The evolution of the State and the development of the normal 
way of life concept.  
 
The Evolution of the State 
 
This chapter will examine the evolution of the modern State by interrogating how 
the State order has evolved. It will demonstrate that the focal point of security, 
which was previously the ruler of the State is now the people of the State. 
Additionally, it provides a historical basis for the evolution of the State and 
discusses how, as the State evolved, so did the framework for security. The 
examination of the Pre-Westphalian State discusses how the referent object of 
State security was Realm and religion and how the State used its population to 
achieve security. This provides the basis to demonstrate the evolution of State 
security from a system that was focussed on the protection of a central ruling 
authority through to the protection of the whole of society of the nation state. The 
examination of the Post-Westphalian State discusses how if States wanted to 
realise their ambitions, they needed to increase their extraction of resources and 
people for their military from within the State. This increased extraction led States 
to realise that the population was becoming the referent objective of security, as 
without a willing population, ambition could not be realised. The chapter 
examines how by the end of the 19th Century, the State realised that the population 
needed to have access to welfare support, education, health care and be allowed 
the opportunities to advance in business and in social status. This historical review 
leads into the analysis of what constitutes a State and establishes what are the 
pillars that allow for the citizens to live and thrive. The chapter concludes by 
establishing a concept for a normal way of life, based on six components, that if 
secured, will enable a secure society.  
 
The State came into existence in order to protect its jurisdiction and territory from 
foreign intervention and interference. If a State was unable to protect its citizens 
and homeland then it would cease to exist (Bobbitt, 2002). It is the State that must 
decide under what circumstances violence will be used to ensure the safety and 
well-being of its territory, institutions and population (Snow, 2016). Throughout 
history, States in some form or another have always existed. From the early 
 15 
Mycenaean states of Greece that were governed by kings through a central 
bureaucracy (Parker, 2014) to the populous Romanus and the Dynasties of China, 
a structure and system of protection has been in place and controlled by these 
States. The leadership of the State was based on ancestral legitimacy, which was 
replaced in the 20th Century by a system that transposed the material and legal 
attributes from the person to the State (Bobbitt, 2002). The modern State evolved 
out of the transition from ancestral legitimacy to that of a constitutional order that 
is centralised and has the responsibility to defend its territory and wealth 
(Weisband & Thomas, 2015). It is from this requirement to defend the territory 
and wealth of the State that the security of the State is necessary (Bobbitt, 2002).   
 
Pre-Westphalian State 
 
Territorial boundaries in Europe prior to the 15th Century were mere frontiers, that 
were continually disputed and poorly administered (Birdal, 2004). Europe was an 
assortment of several thousand polities with varying forms of authority and 
autonomy (Reus-Smit, 2011). Self-survival and territorial gain was the motivation 
behind State security, and the model of rule was feudal and ecclesiastical (Vu, 
2010). Religion maintained a stranglehold on the authority of European States, 
with Pope Gregory VII, who claimed authority over every type of polity in Latin 
Christendom and asserted that the ‘secular authority was beholden to the spiritual’ 
(John, 2016, p. 225).  The focus of security (and referent object) was to maintain 
the rule of the sovereign leader and also maintain the sovereign’s religion. Figure 
1 demonstrates how the focus of security was the ruler and religion. This was safe 
guarded by the ruler’s army, as well as any mercenary forces, if the ruler had the 
money to pay for them. There was little consideration for the security of the 
people or society. External threats to a State during this time would come from 
other States invading one’s territory in order to capture the land, the wealth and 
resources associated within. Defence of the State was through the feudal system, 
where the nobility would be obliged to provide military service to the ruling 
family. The nobleman would be required to deliver a certain number of knights 
and troops to fight for the defence of the territory or to capture neighbouring 
lands. As territories grew wealthier, threats to their security would grow and so 
would the need to provide greater security to the population. 
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Figure 1: Pre-Westphalian Security Framework 
 
The Italian Renaissance initiated a significant social and political change that 
signalled the start of the development of the modern state system in Europe. At 
the beginning of the 14th Century, there were more than 80 independent cities in 
Italy (Somaini, 2012). These cities flourished, driven by wealthy merchants and 
investors, the Italian city states prospered, and developed their own political 
system of self-rule. Bobbitt (2002) describes this combination of the dynastic 
conventions of medieval feudalism with a secular constitutional order that created 
an objectified state; the princely state. Internal instability and the inability of 
smaller States to protect themselves, meant that by the end the 14th Century 
approximately 15 princely states in Italy existed (Somaini, 2012). The scale of 
conflict in the 14th Century meant that many of the princely states did not have the 
military capacity, nor the wealth to protect themselves. The protective walls and 
fortifications they had built for their security, no longer afforded them the 
protection they once had. Advances in artillery meant that these fortifications 
were now obsolete (Cowley, 2007). This became a stark reality for Europe when 
the Byzantine Empire fell to the Turks in 1453. Constantinople had relied on its 
massive walls for its defence, but when the Turks employed siege cannons, these 
artillery pieces rendered these walls almost useless (Thackeray & Findling, 2001).  
The reliance on fortifications and the local militia for security was no longer 
suitable. What was required was a professional military organisation capable of 
providing the princely state with protection and a system capable of funding the 
military.  
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The traditional way of defending a city was through local communal militias, 
however, new threats challenged this system. The mobilisation of the citizens to 
raise militias in the defence of the city became entirely inappropriate for the 
threats that were being faced by the princely state (Somaini, 2012). The hiring of 
mercenaries by more prosperous princely states to fight on their behalf had two 
negative outcomes. Firstly, was the cost. Contracts with mercenaries were not 
cheap and would often require a competitive salary for the troops, in order to keep 
them from moving their trade to another higher bidder. There were also costs to 
cover arms, equipment and animals. An example of this cost was the princely 
state of Florence who used mercenary forces in the 14th Century. Even though 
Florence was considered a wealthy secular state, since their war with the Papacy 
in 1375, the cost of maintaining mercenary contracts had meant that by 1450 it 
was estimated that Florence was in debt by 8,000,000 Florins (Braver & Van 
Tuyll, 2008). The second issue was that it was difficult to completely guarantee 
the services of the mercenary company. In 1576, Spanish mercenaries, who had 
been hired by the city of Antwerp sacked the city because of a lack of pay and 
also motivated by outrage against the thriving Protestant merchant community 
(Bobbitt, 2008). It became problematic for a princely state to rely on mercenary 
groups to provide security . There were no guarantees of their loyal service. 
Mercenary captains had very little in the way of loyalty to those they served and 
were often criticised for not prosecuting war vigorously enough (Croxton, 1998). 
They could also turn on their masters very quickly, personal grievances were 
sometimes acted upon. Religious and political opinions would motivate acts of 
violence against those that they were contracted to protect. Only a State with an 
effective system of extracting the necessary resources from its own population 
could maintain a standing army. 
 
The leaders of the princely states recognised the need to provide security from 
within and the need to develop a more centralised administrative framework that 
would enable a larger military of their own to be established. The development of 
accurate small arms and the rise of the importance of the infantry on the 
battlefield, meant that larger numbers of troops were required for a State’s 
military. Gustavus Adolphus of Sweden and Prince Maurice of Nassau led the 
development of these new tactics involving larger armies (Bobbitt, 2002). During 
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the 16th Century, the State’s administrative, tax-collecting and military structures 
were strengthened and centralised in order to support the requirements for a 
standing army (Maarbjerg, 2004). Weisband and Thomas (2015) argued that this 
extraction required a new form of legitimacy, as the rule by blood and ancestry 
could no longer justify war and taxation. This meant that the State needed to 
centralise its political authority. Along with a standing army and a centralised 
bureaucracy, princely states began to develop State policies to promote economic 
wealth as well as an increase in diplomatic representation abroad (Bobbitt, 2002). 
By the start of the 17th Century, the State had taken on the embryonic form of 
what could be recognised as a modern state. This also demonstrated that the State 
was beginning to recognise the necessity to provide security to the whole of 
society. It was the end of the Thirty Years War in 1648 and the subsequent peace 
treaties between the major European competitors that is recognised as 
inaugurating the start of the modern state system.  
 
The Post-Westphalian State  
 
The Peace of Westphalia ended 30 years of war in Europe and ushered in a new 
stage in the evolution of the State system. The Thirty Years War was a highly-
complicated conflict that combined a power struggle between the European 
powers, where the conflict arose from the consequences of the reformation 
(Straumann, 2008). The Peace of Westphalia of 1648 was the combination of two 
peace treaties, the first being the treaty between the Holy Roman Empire and 
Sweden at Osnabrück, and the second between the Holy Roman Empire and 
France at Münster. Croxton (1999) argued that the Peace of Westphalia 
recognised the right of individual States to rule their own territory. Negotiations 
during the development of the Westphalian treaties was an important stage in the 
evolution of the State system towards enshrining and recognising the sovereign 
nature of States. Lesaffer (1997) asserted that the treaties initiated the 
secularisation of the political landscape of Europe, as well as introduced the idea 
that States in Europe are all equal.  The Peace of Westphalia lead to the division 
of the Church and the State. This meant that within the Holy Roman Empire, 
individual Stände could determine their own religion. It also meant that the church 
could no longer control a State’s domestic and international policy. It allowed 
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individual States within Europe to develop their own alliances, and enter into 
international diplomatic negotiations and relationships. This ushered in an era 
where States could determine their own security arrangements and develop a 
framework that suited their own ambitions.  
 
 
 
Figure 2: Post-Westphalian Security Framework 
 
During the Post-Westphalian period, the focus of State security shifted to allow 
the State to focus on their own security without the influence of religion. There 
was an increase in diplomatic relations between States that was based on their 
own State ambitions and not those directed by the Church. Figure 2 illustrates 
these changes and shows that religion is no longer an object of security as it was 
during the Pre-Westphalian era (see Figure 1). During this period the focus of 
security remained the sovereign ruler, however, as the State acquired more 
autonomy from the religious governing body, their ambitions were no longer 
controlled by the desires and priorities of the religious establishment. Permanent 
standing armies now provided territorial security and through diplomacy that was 
aimed at preventing war, security for the State was enhanced. The State 
institutions also improved and through centralised control increased the 
effectiveness, of the State, to extract resources and manpower from the 
population, which was used for the protection of the ruler and the territory.   
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The State Nation 
 
Through the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the system of statehood was 
subject to a competition between the emerging social democratic style of rule and 
traditional dynastic rule (Root, 2013). Bobbitt (2002) termed this evolution of the 
State order as the state nation. It was during this time that political liberalism 
further reduced the political authority of traditional monarchs, as it held that the 
people of the State should be the source of political authority (Fabry, 2010). 
Nationalism would also introduce new concepts of political rule and authority as 
the revolutions in France (1789-1799) and America (1765-1783) gave birth to 
modern nationalism. Civilisation was evolving as a capitalist and industrial 
economic system emerged, that had immense implications for societies. This 
allowed people to break free from traditional and established societal structures 
(Buzan & Hansen, 2009). Yet, the focus of the State remained very much on 
increasing the rulers’ ambitions and acquiring means to wage war (Bobbitt, 2002).  
Bobbitt asserted that this early nationalism ‘focused the will of the nation in 
serving the state’ (2002, p153). Like previous evolutions of the State system, 
concerns related to warfare and conflict played a considerable role in organising 
State structures. Armies became larger, colonies were established throughout the 
world, requiring large naval fleets to support global ambitions and along with this 
expansion came improved government administration. Larger military forces 
meant greater extraction of resources from the State and with rule no longer being 
certain, leaders needed to seek the support of society as a whole.  
 
It was Napoleon Bonaparte (1769 – 1821) who revolutionised military service and 
the way in which the population served the State. For Napoleon’s strategic aims to 
be realised, he needed to have a military force that was conscripted from all parts 
of society, where those that served did so out of national pride. In doing so, 
recruitment for officer posts was done through a merit system and not from a 
certain social class. The levée en masse fought in a decentralised manner, where 
the officers and the enlisted fought alongside each other (Root, 2013). This 
dedication to fight for the State was not enough for the people of the State to 
freely and openly give themselves and their money to wage war. The French and 
American revolutions demonstrated that the support of the people was necessary 
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if the ruler wanted to remain in power. As the State needed to extract more from 
the population, successful leaders recognised the need to protect and provide for 
their citizens. It was necessary for rulers to be concerned with State security and 
social cohesion and this meant broadening security beyond just the military 
(Buzan & Hansen, 2009). The State became responsible for public order and 
social stability. This created a symbiotic relationship between the rulers and the 
people within the State. The State’s rulers needed the citizens for their strategic 
ambitions and the people needed the State to provide them access to opportunities 
for their own personal advancement. For this to occur the people of the State 
needed to serve the State.  
 
The state nation was not only responsible to provide secure borders, but also to 
provide security to the daily lives of the citizens. The 19th Century saw the 
establishment of a modern law and order framework that was centrally controlled 
and resourced. Emsley (2010) argued that during this period, there were three 
types of police forces. The state civilian police were principally responsible for 
law and order within the capital cities and were also used to assist in containing 
mass disorder. The municipal police were resourced by local government and 
provided law and order in the provinces. Finally, the military had established their 
own law and order branch that were responsible for the control of the military. In 
1829, the Metropolitan Police were established in London, England and with the 
formation of a detective service in 1842 (Shapayer-Makou, 2004), this was seen 
as a benchmark for law and order organisations across Europe (Nyzell, 2014). 
During this period, European States established their own modern policing 
organisations that were centrally controlled and provided law and order services 
beyond just ensuring undesirables remained off the streets. By the end of the 19th 
Century, law and order was an essential part of a State’s security framework.  
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Figure 3: State Nation Security Framework 
 
It was during the period of the state nation, that the citizens became a 
consideration for the State’s security framework. The State needed the people to 
willingly participate in its ambitions. The ruling authorities would use the spirit of 
nationalism to gain societie’s participation and in return social services such as 
access to education and welfare were established. Figure 3 shows the changing 
nature of the internal focus of security and how the people and were included with 
the territory and the government as a focus for national security. The framework 
for security was provided by large military forces that protected the territorial 
borders. Large maritime forces were needed to provide some level of protection to 
their colonies. To provide the population with internal security, constabulary 
forces were established that would provide citizens with law and order. The state 
nation confirmed the symbiotic relationship between the government and the 
citizens that would be enhanced with the evolution of the nation state.    
 
The Nation State 
 
In the last decades of the 19th Century, the State order evolved beyond the state 
nation towards the nation state. Like the previous evolutions, it occurred slowly 
and took place at different times for different nations. Prussia lead the evolution 
towards the nation state. Prussia underwent significant social changes to a point 
where it’s leaders understood and embraced the concept of maintaining the will of 
the people. Prussia built a merit based bureaucracy, developed a public education 
system and pursued social security policies to mitigate revolutionary pressure 
(Bobbitt, 2002). The opposite occurred in Austria, as the Austrian Hapsburgs 
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failed to adopt the necessary reforms to protect their empire. Fearful that 
educating the masses would lead to revolution, the Hapsburg Empire fell behind 
in scientific and technical skills. As a consequence, during the Austro-Prussian 
war of 1866, the Hapsburgs were defeated by the Prussians, who used their 
extensive modern rail and communications networks to mobilise faster and more 
efficiently (Root, 2013). Prussia understood that in order for its strategic 
ambitions to be achieved, the population is a vital aspect of the State. The nation 
state now became responsible for maintaining, protecting and improving the lives 
of its citizens in order to strengthen itself (Bobbitt, 2008). 
 
Through the end of the 19th Century and the first half of the 20th Century, the 
evolution of the nation state continued. The Montevideo Convention (1933) 
concluded that a State had four elements: a permanent population, a defined 
territory, a government and the capacity to enter into relations with other states. 
Considering this, Rothgang et al (2006) asserted that the modern State has four 
functions: (1) the Resource Dimension, which involved controlling military forces 
and revenue; (2) the Legal Dimension, requiring it to enforce the rule of law; (3) 
the Legitimacy Dimension, whereby States had to make prudent political 
decisions to sustain legitimacy in the eyes of the populace; and (4) the Welfare 
Dimension, where the State had to provide welfare for the nation. Sørensen 
(2005) discussed how the State must provide its citizens with order, justice, 
security, freedom and welfare. Sørensen’s framework of the State identified the 
need for the State to provide security to the population, something that Rothgang 
et al overlooked. Sørensen (2005) goes further by describing three core elements 
of a nation state. These include: a Government with a centralised system of 
democratic rule; Nationhood, constituted by a group of people that occupy a 
specific territory and that have political and social rights; and a national Economy. 
The elements of the nation state, as Bobbitt (p175) stated, “put the state in the 
service of its people”. Bobbitt’s framework of the State is comprised of: providing 
the citizens with Security, from both internal and external threats; Welfare, that 
includes large scale education and social security services; Law and Order, 
Economic Development; Fair and open elections and equality to all. The views of 
these three writers are contained in Table 1.  
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Rothgang et al Sørensen Bobbitt 
Control of the state’s 
resources 
A National Economy Economic Development 
Provision of Law and 
Order 
Law and Order Law and Order 
Provision of Welfare Welfare Welfare 
Political Decision 
Making 
 Open/fair political 
system 
 Security Security 
 Freedom Equality to all 
Table 1: Summary of State Components 
 
What Table 1 shows, is that there are six common themes that constitute the 
framework of a functioning nation state. These include Economic, Law and Order, 
Welfare, Government, Equality and Freedom, and Security. Rothgang et al did not 
include security, and equality and freedom as part of their framework, and 
Sørensen did not discuss a political aspect. What these three frameworks 
demonstrate is that the State is required to provide a number of services for the 
wellbeing of the citizens and for the State to function optimally. The makeup of 
this framework is displayed in Figure 4. The framework of the nation state shows 
what is needed to be provided to a state’s citizens to enable them to pursue a 
normal and prosperous lifestyle. The focus of a nation state’s security framework 
should be on providing the citizens the ability go about their daily business freely 
and not hindered or impacted by threats.  
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Figure 4: Nation State Security Framework 
 
Normal way of life 
 
The next section examines the six components of a citizen’s normal way of life. A 
normal way of life is achieved when citizens have access to the six components 
presented in Figure 4. These six components will be used as a basis for evaluating 
a national security framework in Chapters Three and Four and establishing a New 
Zealand national security strategy in Chapter Five. It is concluded through the 
research conducted, that it is necessary to base a national security strategy on 
something more detailed than ‘society’ or ‘the State’. By using the six 
components of a normal way of life, it is concluded that a focus for the national 
security strategy can be established and this can also be used for the evaluation 
and review of the strategy to ensure that it is achieving its objectives.       
 
Welfare Services 
 
The industrial revolution of the 19th Century created an environment where the 
welfare of a State’s citizens needed protection and support. As a result of 
industrialism every aspect of life changed. The industrial workforce required new 
skills and many of the pre-industrial craft-based workers found themselves out of 
work (Evans, 1983). Those that were able to retrain did so, but those that could 
not, were left jobless and needing support. There existed a relationship between 
the industrial revolution and the establishment of centralised welfare programmes. 
Support to the poor had existed for at least 300 years prior to the emergence of the 
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nation state. Under Queen Elizabeth I (1558-1603), England had established Poor 
Laws. These were funds provided to support the poor in times of need. These 
funds were controlled by the parish and for those people settled in the parish area 
(Szreter, Kinmonth, Krinznik, & Kelly, 2016). This was not a centralised welfare 
system and driven more by religious institutions rather than the result of 
government policy. Amendments to the Poor Laws in England occurred in the 
middle of the 19th Century. The focus of these changes was to encourage people to 
work harder to support themselves by putting them in State run workhouses. What 
is evident here, is that the State realised that in order to support its ambitions, it 
required an effective workforce. By providing them with welfare support, they 
could utilise the resource of the people more effectively. In Europe, it was under 
Otto von Bismarck (1815-1898) that the German Empire, established a centralised 
State controlled welfare system. A social insurance scheme was established and 
rather than involving a redistribution of wealth through taxation, it was an 
insurance plan paid by workers to the State to cover future payments to the worker 
if they lost their job and needed financial support (Hong, 2014).  
 
Both the English Poor Laws and the German Social Insurance system 
demonstrated the relationship between the needs of the State and the needs of the 
people. The State required a capable workforce and, for this to exist, the 
workforce required to have support in times of need. This support won the loyalty 
of the working class and strengthened the legitimacy of the State’s leaders. 
Welfare support does not directly support the security of a nation, but what it does 
is, prevent the human resources of the State deteriorating to the point that the 
State is unable to utilise them (Wright, 2015).  
 
New Zealand was a colony of Great Britain at the end of the 19th Century when 
the nation state was emerging and although it was an emerging nation with an 
underdeveloped and new economy, it was able to establish its own welfare 
system. During New Zealand’s colonial period, health services and education 
were delivered at provincial levels to its citizens, with the New Zealand 
government providing oversight. This evolved in the first half of the 20th Century, 
as the government centralised the provision of health and education services (The 
Treasury, 2012). Influenced by the Great Depression (1929-1939), New Zealand 
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developed a Keynesian Welfare system that protected families through the 
provision of health care, accommodation assistance, as well as education and 
pensions to the elderly (Tulloch, 2015). Between the 1950s and 1970s, New 
Zealand experienced a period of low unemployment. However, innovations such 
as the unemployment benefit, national superannuation and worker compensation 
for accidents were still established. During this period health services were 
delivered by a separate ministry under the Health Act 1956, and education under 
the Education Act 1964. In 1972, the Royal Commission on Social Welfare 
recommended that the welfare system should be structured so that all New 
Zealander’s were able to enjoy a decent standard of living (The Treasury, 2012).  
 
The Welfare component of the normal way of life provides a range services to the 
population, that can support people in a time of need, care for their health and also 
allow them the opportunities for development. Today the delivery of welfare is 
coordinated through the Ministry for Social Development (MSD). Services 
include statutory care for youth, social housing and benefit payments for those in 
need (Ministry for Social Development, 2017). The State is now responsible for a 
wide range of social services that provides support to all citizens of New Zealand. 
The focus of welfare in New Zealand is to ensure that all persons have access to 
and are able to live without poverty, sickness and with the necessary tools for 
their own success. This is turn allows the citizens of New Zealand to support the 
nation and the State in its ambitions.  
 
Law and Order 
   
The establishment of a modern constabulary force that provides the State with 
internal security has its roots in Europe. During the 19th Century there were three 
types of constabulary forces in these States. A State civilian police, located 
principally in the capital cities and who were responsible for containing disorder. 
These forces were answerable to the central government. Municipal police were 
paid for and appointed by the local government and finally a military police force 
that supported the military with their own law and order requirements (Emsley, 
2012). In France, Napoleon had two forces. The Gendarmerie, that was a 
paramilitary force that controlled the policing of the countryside and also the 
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‘administrative police’, that served as a civilian secret police (Broers, 1999). In 
the UK, the Metropolitan Police Act 1829 established a professional police force 
that was centrally controlled and replaced the system of local forces controlled by 
the parish. This meant that police officers patrolled the streets providing security 
to all members of society. This model of centralised policing established in 
Britain was used as a model for other nations during the 19th Century to establish 
their own law and order forces. Sweden adopted a similar model in 1848, where 
previous to this their law and order was provided by local constabulary forces 
supported by the military (Nyzell, 2014). The shift away from locally controlling 
police forces meant that central government would take a control of how law and 
order was administered and enforced across the State. The role of the police in 
Europe had primarily been on controlling the population and preventing uprisings 
against the government. Now the focus of law and order was to protect all 
citizens.   
 
As a colonial settlement of Britain, New Zealand’s law and order framework was 
derived from British Law. The Armed Constabulary force was replaced by the 
New Zealand Constabulary Force in 1877. This was a period where the New 
Zealand population increased significantly, requiring more resources to prevent 
the increase in public disorder. This saw the establishment of a professional, 
civilian and permanent police force (Hill, 1987). The current law and order system 
is centrally controlled, with a number of different agencies responsible for 
delivering different outputs. Underpinning this framework is the Crown Law 
Office. Formed in 1907 and under the direction of the Solicitor-General, the 
Crown Law Office provides legal advice to government on criminal, public and 
administrative law (Crown Law, 2016). The Policing Act 2008, established 
policing under a national framework, that mandates the police to keep the peace, 
law enforcement, national security, crime prevention and emergency management 
(New Zealand Government, 2008). Supporting the New Zealand Police is the 
Ministry of Justice, who administer justice services through the court system 
(Ministry of Justice, 2017). Law and Order is an essential part of the normal way 
of life. The laws that are established protect the citizens from harm caused by 
others and also provides guidelines for the behaviour of the citizens. By 
maintaining social order, a person can have a normal way of life knowing that if 
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they conduct themselves lawfully, then they will be protected through the law, the 
police and the justice system.   
 
Government 
 
The government of a State is the organisation that has the authority to control the 
resources of the State, formulate public policy and conduct affairs on behalf of the 
State. For the purpose of this research project, the description of government will 
focus on the western liberal democratic form, noting that within this description 
there are a multitude of styles and political systems. The government includes 
individuals who have been elected into the house of representatives or parliament 
as well as the institutions that support the ongoing policy and operational 
functions of the governments, such as ministries and departments. As such, this 
description is used to identify the main purpose of the government and not to 
characterise any particular style of democracy. A democratic regime is one where 
the political relations between the State and the citizens are equal (Tilly, 2007). 
The government is selected through free and fair electoral process, where political 
candidates undergo selection and can be scrutinised by the citizens who vote for 
their preferred candidates/s (Wolheim, 2012). Underpinning and holding a 
democratic government together is a legitimate constitution, or if no constitution 
exists a collection of legislation that protects the rights of the citizens and also 
organises political decision making to ensure that political outcomes are morally 
right (Vinx, 2013). Therefore, the government is responsible for the delivery of 
social services, the protection of its citizens and also allows opportunities for 
citizens to advance themselves. Within a democracy, a government can be held 
accountable by the people when they do not provide the necessary services, 
security and opportunities. 
 
As a colony of Great Britain, New Zealand’s political system was established 
under their control. New Zealand is a constitutional monarchy, where the 
parliamentary system was established as a Westminster style democracy. Local 
representation was first established through the New Zealand Constitution Act 
1852 (UK), after which the first elections were held in 1853. What makes the 
political system in New Zealand extremely unique, is that it has a highly-
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centralised form of government compared with other constitutional monarchies. 
As a unitary state, New Zealand does not have the complexities of power sharing 
and that often exists in federal states and although local government exists, its 
function is the provision of local infrastructure and local public services (New 
Zealand Government, 2002). The Upper House Legislative Council was abolished 
in 1951 meaning the New Zealand parliament has no organisation to act as a 
check and balance to the sitting parliament (Geddis, 2016). Adding to this unique 
system is that New Zealand has no written entrenched constitution, which Vinx 
(2013, p.103) argued ‘protects important values or rights’. Although New Zealand 
operates with no written constitution and has just a single chamber, it effectively 
carries out the functions of a modern democratic government. As a component of 
the normal way of life, Government must function effectively so that it can enable 
the running of the State. The government provides the services to the citizens that 
protect them and allow them to go about their daily business free from fear.  
 
Economy 
 
The State has always desired to retain the control of its resources, whether they be 
natural, or other. As the State developed into the nation state, there has been an 
increase in the importance placed on controlling these resources through 
economic policy. Macroeconomics allows the government to maintain the 
performance of the State’s economy as a whole. It will use variables such as the 
unemployment rate, Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and inflation to develop 
economic policies that will control the economy. This is achieved through 
Macroeconomic policies that are concerned with the workings of the economy as 
a whole and focuses on the causes, cures and consequences of economic policy 
and influence from external forces (Fine & Dimakou, 2016). According to 
Lattimore and Eaquab (2012), the government has three roles; to promote efficient 
allocation of national resources, to ensure fair distribution of income and to 
provide macroeconomic stability. As New Zealand has an open economy that has 
numerous links to the world through its trade, market connections and financial 
flows (Lattimore & Eaqub, 2012), macroeconomic policy developed by the State 
needs to provide those investing in the economy with the confidence that their 
earnings will not be lost through illegal activities.  
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The focus on the production of goods, consumer behaviour and the operations of 
businesses is through microeconomics. Microeconomics considers the behaviour 
of the markets and the relationship with the consumers and individual businesses. 
In a market economy, such as New Zealand’s, the government has little influence 
on the interactions between business and the consumers. The opposite to this is 
the command economy, where the behaviours and the interactions between 
business and consumers is controlled by the State authorities. The open market 
exists where businesses and consumers can trade domestically and globally and 
where capital can easily cross international borders (Thomas & Carson, 2014). To 
prevent inequalities within a market and the development of rapacious 
monopolies to form, a State’s economy needs to be protected in a way that allows 
businesses to operate as freely as the rules would allow and people given the 
freedom as to how they interact as consumers. 
 
Protection of the Economy, from the State, needs to include protecting businesses 
from negative outside influences and economic shocks. To support these policies 
a government also must provide physical security to the State. Security for the 
economy must include a secure environment where business and consumers can 
conduct their daily business freely. This secure environment needs to include the 
systems that are used to conduct financial transactions as well as to the areas 
where trade is conducted. The world’s economy is heavily reliant on the cyber 
domain in order to conduct many of its transactions and interaction, meaning that 
now there is a greater requirement for the State to ensure the security of the cyber 
domain as well as traditional trade routes.  
 
Freedom and Equality 
 
Freedom and equality can be objective or subjective, with both being enshrined in 
international and national law. The idea of freedom and equality is wedded with 
the notion of rights. These rights are founded in the legal processes of the State 
and means that no issue or action is outside of the influence of law (Stivers, 
2008). This extends to the idea of equality, where each citizen has the inherent 
right not to be subjected to any form of discrimination and must be treated equally 
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by other citizens and by the public authorities (Comsa, 2009). The idea of 
freedom and equality within the modern State developed slowly over the course 
of the 20th Century and is enabled by both international and domestic law. After 
the atrocities of the Second World War, the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights proclaimed that ‘All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and 
rights’ (United Nations, 1948). In New Zealand, the Human Rights Commission -  
Te Kāhui Tkia Tangata work under the Human Rights Act 1993, and is 
responsible for promoting and protecting human rights of all people in Aotearoa - 
New Zealand (Human Rights Commission, 2017). A citizen within a State has the 
right to participate in the processes of the community and also has a condition of 
equality protected by the rule of law, both domestic and international. The citizen 
must recognise that the State is entitled to regulate their behaviour in return for the 
provision of these rights and other public goods (Bellamy, 2008). Therefore, a key 
role of the State as part of its relationship with, and obligations to, the people, is to 
provide and protect the citizens freedom and legal equality. An individual’s rights 
and freedoms are protected by law, however, a citizen must act in a manner that 
does not harm another and must accept that regulation by the State is necessary 
for the good of all.  
 
Freedom and equality exists as both an objective concept and a subjective idea. 
Citizens have their individual freedoms protected by law. An individual can enter 
into contracts, move around their national territory and travel internationally and 
participate in political discourse, without being discriminated against. Freedom 
and equality enables each citizen to be protected from discrimination and of being 
treated fairly by both those in authority and also by other citizens (Comsa, 2009). 
This idea of acting with the consideration of others in mind is described in the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) as acting in a ‘spirit of 
brotherhood’. For the normal way of life, the component of Freedom and Equality 
is based on the provision that a citizen’s rights are protected by law and that a 
citizen’s actions must also be within the limits of law. The idea and desirable 
extent of freedom and equality depends on the individual ideas of the person and 
thus is, some respects, subjective. However, in a collective environment, such as 
the State, the idea extends to allow freedom for people to carry out their actions in 
their daily lives on both a personal level, but also must recognise there are 
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implications for the collective (other people) as a result of their actions. To enable 
a person to have a normal way of life, the state must ensure that the freedoms of 
the citizens are protected and that all are treated equally.   
 
Security 
 
The concept of security encompasses not only the traditional notion of protecting 
the territory of the State, but also the security of the whole of society. According 
to Snow (2016), there exists two elements of security. These include physical 
security and the feeling or sense of security. The physical element of security is 
objective and is provided by the agencies and laws of the State that are 
responsible for national security outcomes. This includes the State’s military 
forces, constabulary organisations and intelligence agencies, that have been 
established to protect the territory and the citizens of the State. It is the 
responsibility of the State to protect its territory and citizens from harm and 
therefore, will decide under what conditions to use force for its own security. The 
other component of security is the sense of security, which, as it is a subjective 
element, will mean different things to different people. This idea has gained 
momentum since the United Nations world summit on the ‘Responsibility to 
Protect’ expanded the idea of security to focus on the needs to individuals and 
groups rather than on the State. Partow (2017) argued that the focus of national 
security is still cantered on sovereignty and national identity, however, there is a 
shift towards recognising and focusing on the human element of security. 
Nishikawa (2010, p. 3) identified a shift in the focus of security to one that ‘places 
people as the focal point of security consideration for both analysis and policy’. 
What these ideas have in common is that they all acknowledge that security has 
evolved from the traditional concept, focused on protecting the State, which 
developed during the evolution of the state order, to the notion that protecting the 
population and the conditions in which they live, is of equal importance.   
  
Providing the conditions for  a normal life goes beyond securing the State and its 
people form external and internal threats. It also includes protection against 
natural hazards, which also have the ability to reduce the normal way of life. 
When security is orientated towards securing territory and the State, it is focused 
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on the threats that are able to bring down state structures (Ayoob, 1992). This 
security is developed through the establishment of a State’s security policy which 
is aimed at negating or neutralising the most important threats in accordance with 
the national security strategy (Snow, 2016).  During the Cold War, national 
security strategies were focused on collective defence with allies, now, threats to 
the population’s security go beyond those of conflict and include natural threats. 
For the population to have a normal way of life, a person must have Security 
afforded to them via the State. This will allow them to go about their daily 
business free from fear. It is necessary that security for the State include the 
response to a threat and the quick recovery from a crisis. This would assist with 
an individual’s sense of security, knowing that they will be protected and also 
cared for by the State in the event of a crisis.   
 
Conclusion 
 
There has always existed the desire for a State to have security, to protect their 
territory and their possessions. As this chapter has shown, although this 
fundamental desire for security has not changed, there has been a significant 
evolution in the concept of security in terms of how it was provided and what it is 
that should be secured and protected. The Italian renaissance ushered in an era 
where the princely states sought external support through the use of mercenaries 
to protect their wealth and territory. The Thirty Years War saw the focus shift 
from the unreliable and costly ‘guns for hire’ arrangements to a system that was 
controlled and resourced by the State. This meant that the focus of the state nation 
was to use all its resources in order to provide its nation with security. This 
increased and widened the responsibility of the State, introduced State controlled 
administrative systems, but also increased the worth, value and rights of the 
citizens. In time, it became accepted that the general population should be the 
focus of security and not the sovereign leader. In the 19th Century nationalism 
swept the world and statehood was transformed from dynastic rule, to one of 
popular governance. As the ambition of States grew, this in turn required the 
nation to be mobilised. The industrial revolution enabled this mobilisation through 
productivity, economic and population growth. A population needed to be used 
and the population needed to be educated, cared for and protected by the State to 
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maximise their utility. It was the responsibility of the nation state to provide this 
protection. There has been shift where to the people and not the ruler are being 
incorporated into the focus of security. By using the work of Rothgang et al, 
Sørensen and Bobbitt, it is proposed here that a State is comprised of six different 
yet interrelated components. These components provide the citizens of the State 
with a normal way of life. It is therefore the responsibility of the state to protect 
the conditions that allow normal lives to be pursued. The State is responsible to 
prevent the State and its people from being threatened and to use the State’s 
resources to reduce and recover from any incident. The six components of the 
normal way of life are used to evaluate the national security framework of States 
and also used to develop a New Zealand national security strategy in proceeding 
chapters.   
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Chapter Three: Review of other nations national security frameworks. 
 
Introduction 
 
This chapter examines the national security framework of four nations: the UK, 
the Republic of Ireland, the Republic of Singapore and Australia. The different 
strategies, policies, plans and white papers are then assessed against the concept 
of the normal way of life to establish how effect these different approaches are in 
providing security to their State. Chapter Three will also determine what 
elements, concepts and ideas New Zealand could consider in the development of a 
national security strategy.    
 
The Concept of National Security 
 
The previous chapter explained the notion that as a society evolved, then so did 
the ideas of what was to be secured. It was explained that Pre-Westphalian 
society’s focus of security was on the protection of the realm and territory. This 
concept was expanded to the current idea, that has been developed in this 
research, that security should focus on six elements that make up a normal way of 
life. Through the delivery of security, this way of life and the State is protected. 
This may seem a simple idea, however, the debate on what security means and 
what it is, is still an unresolved debate. Wolfers (1952) believed that ‘the efforts 
for security by a particular nation will tend to vary, with the range of values for 
which security is being sought’. The view of security at the start of the Cold War, 
was very much focussed on territorial protection against the threat of invasion 
from an aggressor. Towards the end of the Cold War, Rothschild examined the 
changing nature of the idea of security. She too identified how the concept of 
security changed at key moments in history, such as the Peace of Westphalia, 
French Revolutionary Wars and the Treaty of Versailles. These key moments in 
history were also similar to the periods where the constitutional order of the State 
changed. Rothschild argued that in the 1980’s public organisations began to put 
forward ‘alternative concepts of national security’ (1995) and identified how in 
the 1982 Report to the Palme Commission, that security should be thought of in 
terms of economic, political and also the societal security of the citizens.  
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The challenge is to get a comprehensive definition of security that can be used for 
the development of a comprehensive strategy. Wolfers (1952) expanded on the 
idea of security in the 1950’s when he explained that security was the protection 
of values. He discussed how it is the responsibility of the State’s decision makers 
to choose the values that are to be protected, to what level and also what means 
are used to achieve them. Wolfers added that the State needed to ‘specify the 
degree of security which a nation shall aspire to attain and the means by which it 
is to be obtained’ (1952, p 499). The concepts of security developed by the writers 
of the 1980’s are very broad. They expanded on the idea that security should be 
for all of society, however, their definition of security is heavily influenced by the 
Cold War and did not consider individual citizen in detail. Buzan (1991) argued 
that there existed an inadequate understanding of the concept of national security 
and that it was a barrier to policy-makers in the development of national security 
policy. Baldwin (1997) explained that security should be examined in terms of 
security for who, for which values, how much, from what threats, by what means, 
and at what cost. This research project has developed the concept of the normal 
way of life that is based on six components. This concept will be used to answer 
Baldwin’s question of who security is for and which values should be secured. 
Establishing a baseline of what is to be secured will allow security policy to be 
constructed around it. This approach would aid in the whole-of-government 
coordination or resources for the provision of national security.   
 
A national security strategy requires the coordination and direction of national 
resources towards the attainment of the strategic political objectives. The strategy 
itself contributes to the pursuit, protection and advancement of the interests and 
ambitions of the State. The idea of a national security strategy is that it should 
prevent as well as reduce the effects of threats against the State. A State will 
therefore be required to make certain strategic choices when it comes to the 
development of their strategy and these will be influenced by the environment, 
both externally and internally. A State must decide: how much risk they are 
willing to take, will they be self-reliant or lean on allies for assistance, decide 
what capabilities they require, and what they are willing to pay for these 
capabilities (Schreer, 2013).  The strategy itself should then be designed within a 
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context of interrelated dimensions: political, socio-cultural, economic, military, 
technological, geographical and historical. The challenge is then for a State to 
develop a national security strategy that deals with the environment and also 
supports their international and domestic ambitions. The proceeding sections 
review the national security frameworks of four nations and review them against 
the normal way of life concept. 
 
United Kingdom – National Security Strategy 
 
In 2007, the research centre Demos published a report titled ‘The Case for a 
national security strategy’. Taken from a series of reports relating to the UK’s 
national security, this report drew information from a series of national security 
seminars (Demos, 2007).  The report made a series of recommendations for the 
UK security strategy: 
 
1. That it should articulate a vision of the current and future security 
environment. 
2. Communicate Britain’s values in the 21st Century. 
3. Develop a framework for collaboration across government on national 
security policy 
4. Prioritise national security policies and the allocation of resources. 
5. Bring together the white papers on security.  
 
The recommendations from Demos could be used by a State for the development 
of a national security strategy. These recommendations will be used to inform a 
model for the development of a New Zealand National Security Strategy. The 
strength of these recommendations is that focused on ensuring that security has a 
framework that centrally coordinates all the departments responsible for security.  
Additionally, it viewed security from a people centric focus and protecting 
national values; rather than just protecting the territory.  
 
National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review 2015 
(NSS&SDSR 2015) is the UK’s national security strategy. Developed by the 
National Security Council (NSC), the NSS&SDSR 2015 articulated the UK’s 
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whole-of-government approach to national security. The NSC, established in May 
2010, under Prime Minister Gordon Brown, was created in order to bring together 
a panel of organisations to advise the government on national security (Lunn, 
Brooke, & Mills, 2016). The council is composed of: the Prime minister, the 
Home Office, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Her Majesty’s Treasury, 
Ministry of Defence, the Department for Energy and Climate Change, and the 
Department for International Development. Other agencies and subject matter 
experts are called in when required.  The NSC is responsible for analysing the 
global strategic context, taking into consideration the current security environment 
and the trends affecting the security situation of the UK, from at home and abroad 
(HM Government, 2015).  The NSC provided a central body whose focus is to 
articulate and understand the strategic context in which security is to be provided. 
It identified that threats to the UK come from both external sources: such as 
invasion, and internal: such as terrorism or civil disorder. It also identified other 
threats exist including instability caused from climatic events or financial crisis 
(Ministry of Defence, 2001). The NSS&SDSR 2015, developed through the NSC 
seeks to provide security to the UK through identifying threats and risks and by 
providing objectives for the achievement of security. 
 
The NSC established two high-level objectives, which informs the establishment 
of the National Security Strategy. These two high level objectives are (HM 
Government, 2015):  
  
(1) To ensure a secure and resilient UK by protecting our people, 
economy, infrastructure and ways of life from all major risks that can 
affect us directly. 
(2) To shape a stable world by acting to reduce the likelihood of risks 
affecting the UK or British interests overseas and applying our 
instruments of power and influence to shape the global environment.  
 
The rationale for establishing two high level national security objectives was to 
embody an integrated, whole-of-government approach, supported by greater 
innovation and efficiency’. (HM Government, 2015) The NSS&SDSR identified 
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that the delivery of the national security strategy will be achieved through three 
National Security Objectives (HM Government, 2015): 
 
- National Security Objective 1 – Protect Our People: at home, in our 
overseas Territories and abroad. Protect our territory, economic 
security, infrastructure and way of life. 
 
- National Security Objective 2 – Protect our global influence: reducing 
the likelihood of threats materialising and affecting the United 
Kingdom. 
 
- National Security Objective 3 – Promote our prosperity: seizing 
opportunities, working with and supporting industry.  
 
The UK government established a system for the development of a national 
security strategy that set out to achieve a whole-of-government approach. This 
was done by the formation of the NSC from across government to establish the 
parameters of the strategy and to set guidelines for its achievement. The 
NSS&SDSR 2015 provided the articulation of the strategic ‘ends’, ‘ways’ and 
‘means’ for the achievement of the UK’s strategic goals, which is common sense 
in the development of any strategic plan. The NSS&SDSR 2015 also identified 15 
risks to the UK’s national security. These were prioritised across three tiers, 
which allowed for the more important risks to be given priority for resourcing.  
 
The UK government reviewed its performance of the implementation of the 
NSS&SDSR 2015 through an annual review. In the First Annual Report 2016 (HM 
Government, 2016), the UK government published its assessment of the 
performance of the different government departments responsible for individual 
parts of the strategy. The document reviewed the security context and identified 
changes in the threats and risks to the UK’s national security. It also reviewed its 
operations against the National Security Objectives.  In doing so, the approach by 
the UK government is to ensure that it has a strategic plan that encompasses how 
it will use its security capabilities and what diplomatic efforts it has undertaken. It 
reviewed how it has dealt with homeland security, including organised crime and 
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how it has ensured a stable UK government that supports a growing national 
economy. The NSC is an independent body that scrutinises the effectiveness of 
the strategy and its implementation and is a framework that New Zealand should 
consider for its own national security strategy.   
 
Established in 2005, the Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy 
(JCNSS) is responsible for the scrutiny of the NSC and the structures for 
government decision making in relation to national security. It brings together 
representatives of both houses, with 10 members from the House of Lords and 12 
members from the House of Commons. The JCNSS includes chairs of the UK 
government’s intelligence and security agencies, defence, foreign affairs, home 
affairs, trade and justice committees (UK Parliament, n.d.).  In July 2017, the UK 
government implemented a review of the NSS&SDSR 2015, due to the recent 
changes in the security environment as well as to ensure investment in security 
capabilities was in accordance with the strategy. The JCNSS report highlighted a 
number of issues and gaps in the NSS&SDSR 2015, that the JCNSS believed 
needed to be changed in order to meet the objectives of the strategy. 
 
The JCNSS review of the NSS&SDSR 2015 has two areas that highlight the 
importance of reviewing strategic plans. Firstly, the review noted a lack of 
strategic clarity, which in itself is a damning failure, since the NSS&SDSR 2015 is 
a strategic document. Secondly, the NSS&SDSR 2015 was criticised for having a 
heavy focus on the role of defence and not the role of other government agencies 
in the provision of national security. This contradicted the whole-of-government 
approach that the NSS&SDSR 2015 is based upon.  It is a failing for a strategic 
document to be criticised for not having strategic clarity. In the inquiry, the 
committee noted that several conceptual shortcomings existed in the NSS&SDSR 
2015. The committee noted that there was no clear definition of security and also 
there was a lack of principles upon which the strategy is built. The report goes 
further stating that there is no identifiable road map by which progress can be 
measured. This lack of strategic clarity will therefore hinder the UK’s ability to 
test the effectiveness of the investment into security capabilities. It is essential for 
any strategic plan to have in place the process by which progress can be 
monitored and the achievements of objectives measured (Porter, 2011). By not 
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having a clear road map on how the strategy is to be achieved, the NSS&SDSR 
2015  is effectively a myopic piece that provides little more than a series of 
‘bumper sticker quotes’ on national security. Another criticism concluded from 
this research project, is that the role of the NSC is to formulate the security policy, 
however, they do not have a similar function to ensure that this policy is achieved. 
Given the experience of the UK, and the findings of its review, the establishment 
of a New Zealand national security strategy should have included within it a 
system that reviews the performance of the strategy’s execution at regular 
intervals.   
 
A criticism of the NSS&SDSR 2015, is that it considered defence as a sperate 
element to the remainder of the government’s security capabilities. The intent of 
the NSS&SDSR 2015 is to deliver an integrated whole-of-government approach to 
national security (HM Government, 2015), yet the separation of defence is at odds 
with this intent. During an Oral Evidence session to the JCNSS, Lord Ricketts 
(member of the House of Lords) noted that for the last 10 to 15 years the 
government was working towards a joined-up approach. He argued to treat 
defence as a separate entity from other national security policies did seem 
illogical, when it was all part of the same continuum (Strategy, 2018). This 
separation of defence contradicts the rationale of bringing other capabilities 
together. Robert Hannigan gives the example of how during his involvement with 
the drafting of the first national security strategy under the then Prime Minister 
Gordon Brown in 2010; cyber was brought under one umbrella as it cuts across 
public safety, security and intelligence. With this rationale, he also believed it 
hard to understand why defence is a separate consideration (Strategy, 2018). This 
criticism is valid. The foreword by the then Prime Minister, David Cameron, even 
stated that the UK must have a ‘full-spectrum approach’ to security (HM 
Government, 2015). So, it is difficult to see how separating defence out from the 
other agencies responsible for security will achieve the whole-of-government 
approach to national security.  
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Assessment of the UK’s National Security Strategy 
 
Although the NSS&SDSR 2015 has been criticised for not having a whole-of-
government approach and having conceptual shortcomings, it should be reviewed 
against the concept of sustaining a normal way life for the citizens of a State, that 
was presented in Chapter Two. The concept of the State and what constituted a 
normal way of life consisted of six interrelated components: Welfare, 
Government, Law and Order, Economy, Freedom and Equality and Security.   
 
The first component; Security, is one that the NSS&SDSR 2015 directly deals 
with. The NSS&SDSR 2015 identified the risks that the UK faced and also set out 
the objectives of how the government will deliver national security. It mentioned 
that the objectives are part of an integrated, whole-of-government approach to 
security (HM Government, 2016). This is the degree of security the UK 
government aspired to attain, which is what Wolfers (1952) argued a State should 
be seeking to achieve. The UK placed significant emphasis on the relationship 
between security and the economy. In his Foreword, Prime Minister David 
Cameron stressed that the UK’s security depended on its economic security and 
vice versa. This demonstrated the importance that the UK places on its economy 
for achieving its ambitions and therefore, articulated how the component of 
Economy, will be secured. The UK, with the fifth largest economy in the world 
and as a trading nation (HM Government, 2016) needs to have a strong economy 
that is supported by effective security. By placing strong emphasis on a secure 
economy, the UK is achieving the three roles that Lattimore and Eaquab (2012) 
outlined that the government has; efficient allocation of national resources, the 
fair distribution of income and most importantly and as identified by the Prime 
Minister, macroeconomic stability.  
 
The NSS&SDSR 2015 addressed the concept of an open and transparent 
government, which is the Government component of the normal way of life. It is 
the responsibility of the government to deliver services to the population of the 
State in a transparent and open manner. The UK espoused its values of democracy 
as having an open and accountable government (HM Government, 2016). As 
Vinx (2013) noted, the protection of the citizens and morally right political 
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outcomes are essential in a democratic government. Part of ensuring the 
transparent functioning of the government, the UK also places importance of the 
international rules based order that enables regional and global security. The UK 
has a very strong outward focus with regards to its strategy and sees the 
importance of projecting its influence globally through the use of soft power (HM 
Government, 2016). The UK places significant emphasis on the need for a stable 
world in order to support its own stability. Therefore, by protecting and valuing a 
secure international order, global security is strengthened. The provision of the 
Government component of the normal way of life concept is achieved in within 
the UK’s national security strategy.   
 
The provision of Law and Order that supports the normal way of life, is how the 
government can protect the citizens. The NSS&SDSR 2015 recognised that the 
UK must strengthen the domestic resilience and improve its law enforcement 
capabilities that impact on their communities (HM Government, 2015). However, 
within the strategy, the provision of law and order is mentioned only twice. For a 
security outcome as significant as law and order and a function that enables the 
normal way of life, law and order should have more emphasis placed upon it. Law 
and order is effectively maintained in the UK through their constabulary agencies, 
however, there is a lack of connection with law and order and the national security 
strategy.  
 
The protection of an individual’s Freedom and Equality is an essential component 
of the normal way of life. Within the NSS&SDSR 2015, the UK government 
discussed the importance of human rights, the freedom of speech, equal 
opportunities and the empowerment of women and girls. Protection of these rights 
and freedoms is provided through the rule of law (HM Government, 2015).  This 
is protecting what the government calls protecting ‘our way of life’, or their 
normal way of life as presented in this research project. The protection of human 
rights is also delivered through international laws and treaties, which the UK 
adheres to, such as the: Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), the 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (1965) and 
the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women 
(1981) . There is no objective that sets out how the NSS&SDSR 2015 will directly 
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protect equality and freedom, however, as it is enshrined within British law and 
therefore, it is concluded that the Freedom and Equality of the UK’s citizens is 
protected.  
 
Of lesser discussion in the NSS&SDSR 2015 is the protection the Welfare 
component of the normal way of life. It is the government’s responsibility to 
provide a range of services from health care, education and the necessary tools to 
live without poverty. The NSS&SDSR 2015 does not directly discus welfare 
services, but it does discuss the response to civil emergencies and the importance 
of protecting the resources of the nation.  By combining this and the protection of 
the ‘way of life’, there can be a very loose linkage to the protection of welfare 
services.  
 
The UK’s NSS&SDSR 2015 provided a comprehensive plan for the achievement 
of its national security objectives. It articulated the values that are important for 
the UK and those that they want to protect. It identified the possible security risks 
faced by the UK and also how the security objectives were to be met. When 
compared to the concept of the normal way of life, the NSS&SDSR 2015 
discussed in depth only the concept Security. The concepts of Economy, 
Government, and Law and Order, were all mentioned in the NSS&SDSR 2015, 
however, no significant detail was provided as to how these elements of society 
will be secured. Additionally, the NSS&SDSR 2015 lacks significant depth of 
discussion on Freedom and Equality and also on Welfare services. It is concluded 
for this research project, that these two elements: Freedom and Equality and 
Welfare services are just as important as the other four components, as they 
contribute to the feeling of security and maintenance of the normal way of life. 
The NSS&SDSR 2015 main focus is on the military’s role in providing security. 
When viewed through the lens of the security risks to the UK, that have been 
identified, it us understandable why there is a heavy emphasis on the military. 
Context is important when developing a strategy and the context for the UK is one 
where there are significant external threats to its security and it is necessary to 
keep an effective military and a strategy that meets these threats.  
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The UK’s approach to its national security strategy has elements that would be 
beneficial for the New Zealand government to consider when developing its own 
strategy. The first element is how the risks that have been identified facing the UK 
have been prioritised into tiers, with tier one risks being the most likely. It is not 
that New Zealand should copy the security risks that are facing the UK, as the 
context for each nation is different, instead New Zealand should look at adopting 
an approach for identifying the most significant risks in light of its own context. 
This would allow for accurate prioritising of capabilities and resources to mitigate 
these risks. Snow (2016) argued that the purpose of a national security strategy is 
to negate or neutralise the most important threats and that the capabilities required 
to mitigate these risks are expensive. Therefore, by focussing on identifying risks 
and having a select few as the highest priority for mitigation, this would allow for 
accurate resource allocation. It would also allow for better capability 
development. New Zealand has limited resources, and therefore any way of 
reducing the burden on these resources would be of  benefit and politically more 
palatable.  
 
The second element that would benefit a New Zealand national security strategy is 
the establishment of an independent body that regularly reviews current security 
strategies, policies and plans. The JCNSS provided an independent review of the 
UK’s approach and takes advice and comment from a wide range of sources. One 
of the principles of business strategy is to ensure that the strategy is reviewed and 
if necessary redefined (Camillus, 2008). This would have to be balanced with 
some caution, as it would be unwise to have reviews that lead to constant changes. 
An example is the development of military capability. Military capabilities are a 
significant investment, both fiscally and in time. There would be considerable 
public anger if there was significant investment in the development of an 
expensive military capability just to discover a few years later, that upon review, 
it was no longer needed. However, if a change in the environment was identified 
that required a change from the current policy, then this action of review would be 
beneficial. It would also open the strategy up to scrutiny. Part of the normal way 
of life concept is to have freedoms and equality protected as well as having an 
open and transparent government. A review would prevent the State from having 
the monopoly over the security strategy (Partow, 2017) and ensure that the whole-
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of-society is engaged in national security. These two elements: the identification 
and prioritisation of risk and the open and transparent review of the strategy 
would be beneficial for the development of a New Zealand national security 
strategy.  
 
Republic of Ireland – National Security Framework 
 
The Republic of Ireland provided a good case study to compare a small State’s 
national security framework. There are similarities between Ireland and New 
Zealand. The population between both countries are almost identical with the 
Republic of Ireland having a population of 4.7 million (Central Statistics Office, 
2016) and New Zealand with 4.8 million (Statistics New Zealand, 2018).  Both 
nations have a parliamentary democratic government that is based on the British 
System, however, Ireland is a republic with a President, a house of representatives 
known as a Dáil Éireann and also a Senate (Office of the Houses of the 
Oireachtas, 2018). As described in Chapter Two, the New Zealand government 
system is very similar to the Westminster system, however, there is no upper or 
lower house. Although there are differences in government, the system of 
democracy is similar.  The GDP of Ireland is greater, with Ireland having $76 485 
USD per capita, and New Zealand having $40 695 USD per capita (OECD, 2018). 
Both New Zealand and Ireland have an open economy that rely heavily on exports 
and require a secure region to enable trade. The militaries of both nations are 
comparable, with a slight difference in that Ireland has maintained for the last 
century a stance of neutrality and is focussed on international peace support and 
peacekeeping missions. The population, economy and government are comparable 
between the two nations. Both nations rely on international stability for trade and 
security and both nations are not considered a world power. In recent years both 
New Zealand and Ireland have provided a small contribution to global security 
operations as part of international efforts. This is due to the small size of the 
militaries of both countries. Additionally, both Ireland and New Zealand would 
rely on allies and neighbours to assist with their own national security. The key 
similarity is that Ireland, like New Zealand, does not have a national security 
strategy. Instead, it relies on individual government agency policies that 
concentrate on specific areas of national security. 
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The main document pertaining to national security for Ireland is the government’s 
White Paper on Defence (2015). The aim of the paper was to supply a 
comprehensive security assessment in order to provide a context for Ireland’s 
defence policy (The Office of Public Works, 2015). With no other strategic 
security document, the White Paper on Defence (2015) is considered the key 
document upon which the Republic of Ireland bases it security policy upon. Three 
other documents provide minor input into Ireland’s national security. These 
include: the National Cyber Security Strategy 2015-2017, the National Risk 
Assessment 2014, and the An Garda Síochána (Ireland’s National Police Service) 
Strategy Statement 2016 – 2018. These documents are not linked in any way, and 
are stand-alone publications, with differing intents and purposes. Contained 
within each document is reference to other security outcomes, such as the White 
Paper on Defence (2015) discussed cyber threats and interaction with the An 
Garda Síochána. However, there is no discussion how each of these documents 
relate to each other or how they are nested under a central policy of national 
security. This means that there exists no clear strategic goals or objectives for the 
achievement of national security.  
 
The context of the White Paper on Defence (2015) is broad and contains a series 
of generic statements relating to Ireland’s national security, rather than providing 
a comprehensive approach to developing a long term security strategy. The 
Foreword provided by the Minister for Defence Simon Coveney T.D. provided 
the overview and intent of the White Paper on Defence (2015). It discussed how 
Ireland is a small State that is dependent on global trade for economic well-being 
and how a broadening range of security threats increased Ireland’s vulnerability. 
Coveney stated that the paper ‘builds on an all-embracing Government response 
and situates defence policy within a state’s broader security framework’ (The 
Office of Public Works, 2015, p. iii). The aim of the White Paper on Defence 
(2015) is to provide a comprehensive security assessment that provides the 
context for defence policy (The Office of Public Works, 2015). The White Paper 
on Defence (2015) discussed how the securing of Ireland concerns a broad range 
of government departments and agencies and how defence, along with the An 
Garda Síochána (Ireland’s national police force) and Civil Defence, contribute to 
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the States security framework. It stated how ‘security is the bedrock on which a 
society’s cultural, social and economic achievements are built (The Office of 
Public Works, 2015, p. 3). The criticism, is that the discourse of Ireland’s national 
security framework is part of a whole-of-government approach to protecting 
society, yet this document only dealt with a small part of the overall national 
security architecture.  
 
The White Paper on Defence (2015) identified four key risks that could cause 
harm to the well-being of its citizens: natural disasters, cyber security, pandemics 
and economic instability. It stated that direct threats against Irish territory are 
possible, however the likelihood of this is very low. The final part of the White 
Paper on Defence (2015) detailed the objectives of defence towards national 
security, however, this concentrated on the development of defence policy and the 
development of defence capabilities. There is no direct link between the risks and 
objectives identified in the white paper. There is a lack of information relating to 
the link between the risks, objectives and the development of military capabilities, 
which is an essential part of a strategic process (De Wit & Meyer, 2010).   
 
The security environment described in White Paper on Defence (2015) is a 
cascading discussion on the global environment, direct threats against the 
Republic of Ireland and offers some assessment of the geopolitical situation. The 
white paper opens with the Overarching Trends. This a list of key challenges and 
threats that are likely to influence the security environment. The list included: 
 
- Descriptions of conflict,  
- Weapons proliferation,  
- Climate change,  
- Globalisation,  
- Migration,  
- Energy and resource scarcity, and  
- Technological advances.  
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Of all of these, only globalisation is discussed in terms of its impact on Ireland, 
with the remainder consisting of short paragraphs comprised of very broad 
general points. The discussion on security threats to Ireland included:  
 
- Conflict,  
- Cyber,  
- Terrorism,  
- Natural disasters,  
- Espionage,  
- Crime, and  
- Strategic shocks,  
 
Like the previous section on the Overarching Trends, the list of threats contained 
a series of short descriptive paragraphs. It offered generic information on each 
subject, however, it failed to relate these threats to the impact on the State and its 
security. Buzan (1991) argued that national security policy can either focus 
inward, in order to reduce the State’s vulnerabilities, or have an outward looking 
focus, to reduce external threats by addressing its source. Therefore, it would be 
practical to frame the security threats and provide detail on their direct impact to 
Ireland. Providing generic statements on the environment, as the White Paper on 
Defence (2015) has done, failed to provide an accurate context from which 
effective policy can be developed. It is recognised that this is a white paper and 
not a national security strategy, however, it should have provided more detail of 
the threats Ireland faces, in order to provide the rationale behind the policy 
decisions made later in the document.  
 
A good example of how the strategic outlook of the White Paper on Defence 
(2015) does not effectively link in to necessary capability development of a 
military service, is with the future plans for the land forces. Chapters 1, 2 and 3 of 
the White Paper on Defence (2015) describe the context for which the white paper 
was developed against. It emphasised that there is an evolving range of 
conventional threats; which it stated to be a low possibility, to irregular threats 
and also natural disasters. In Chapter 6 of the white paper, it discussed the Army’s 
future concept to retain its all-arms conventional military capabilities, based on 
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two Infantry Brigades (Office of the Houses of the Oireachtas, 2018). It appears 
that there is no intention to evolve the structure of the army to meet the evolving 
threats such as irregular threats and natural disasters. Instead the intent is to keep 
the army structured in a manner that is able to counter a conventional threat, 
which it stated as a low possibility. The only detail regarding the future capability 
of the army, discussed the replacement or life extension of its Armoured 
Personnel Carriers. The White Paper on Defence (2015) stated that although there 
are new and expanding threats, there will be no evolution in the structure or the 
focus of the army. It is acknowledged that the white paper is intended to influence 
the development of defence capabilities in the next decade. It is not a national 
security strategy, however, the future development of Ireland’s defence force 
appears to lack any synchronisation with the threats that are identified within the 
white paper, or coordinate with other security agencies.  
 
The White Paper on Defence (2015) discussed a range of technology and cyber 
threats that can adversely impact Irish society. These threats are not addressed in 
any great detail within the white paper but are instead discussed within the 
National Cyber Security Strategy 2015 – 2016 (Department of Communication, 
Energy and Natural Resources, 2015). The National Cyber Security Strategy 2015 
– 2016 identified that the national Information Communication and 
Telecommunications (ICT) systems are critical to the functioning of the State and 
the economy. It also discussed how infrastructure such as electricity, water, 
transportation and health services are all critical and need protection.  The 
operational function of the cyber security strategy is executed by the National 
Cyber Security Centre (NCSC). The role of the NCSC is to co-ordinate the 
protection of national systems, to reduce the vulnerability of critical systems and 
also to respond to cyber-attack (Department of Communications, Climate Action 
and Environment, 2018). The NCSC is responsible for the co-ordination between 
the Department of Defence and An Garda Síochána. The strength of the National 
Cyber Security Strategy 2015 – 2016 is that it sets out objectives and also 
measures for success. One of the key objectives of the strategy is to establish a 
national Computer Security Incident Response Services Team (CSIRT) and have 
this team certified by the European Union Agency for Network and Information 
Security (Department of Communication, Energy and Natural Resources, 2015). 
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It also provided measures of when this objective will be achieved. This is a good 
example of what a strategic document should be. It sets out the context of the 
environment, its responsibilities and more importantly provides clear objectives 
and measures for their achievement. The weakness of this strategy is that it only 
deals with one specific area of providing national security in isolation. Cyber 
security cuts across all areas of society and for it to be successful it needs to be 
nested within an overall strategic plan. This silo approach hinders all departments 
ability to work collaboratively towards national security.  
 
The provision of law and order is an essential part of providing a normal way of 
life to the citizens of the State. Ireland’s National Police Service, the An Garda 
Síochána, provide the domestic constabulary service. In 2016 the Strategy 
Statement July 2016 – 2018 was released with the aim of outlining the main 
priorities for protecting the communities (An Garda Síochána, 2016). Like the 
White Paper on Defence (2015) and the National Cyber Security Strategy 2015 – 
2016 it discussed the evolution of threats, however, it specifically focussed on the 
threat of terrorism and the impact of radicalised individuals returning from 
fighting with terrorist organisations in conflict zones. There is a short statement 
on the increased threat of cyber-attacks, however, there is no link to the National 
Cyber Security Strategy 2015 – 2016 or the CSIRT. It provided an overview of 
the key objectives and the measures for success under the headings of National 
and International Security, Confronting Crime, Roads Policing, Community 
Engagement and Organisational Development. The strategy does cover the key 
aspects of providing law and order to the State and provided a clear statement of 
how this will be achieved. This document is more akin to a corporate brochure. It 
is light on detail and does not discuss how the An Garda Síochána will co-operate 
with other departments and organisations in the provision of national security. For 
public awareness on what the police aim to do, this is a good product. However, 
for a detailed plan for developing a national security framework for collaboration 
across government, the Strategy Statement July 2016 – 2018 falls short. This 
highlights the need for a centralised document that can inform the development of 
individual agency’s policies.  
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One document that should drive the objectives of the three previous documents 
which unfortunately did not occur, is the National Risk Assessment for Ireland. 
Released in 2017, the purpose of this document was to identify the risks which 
might impact on Ireland’s wellbeing (Department of Defence, 2017). The release 
of the National Risk Assessment for Ireland is after the release of the other 
national security related documents. Had the release National Risk Assessment for 
Ireland occurred before the release of the other documents, there would have 
existed a common threat assessment to base their analysis from. The key focus of 
the National Risk Assessment for Ireland is to inform emergency planning. This 
document is like a handbook on how emergency planning is conducted at the 
national level. It details the government’s Task Force on Emergency Planning and 
the key organisations that make up this Task Force (Defence, Health, Revenue, 
Environmental Protection, Information, Civil Defence, An Garda, Public Works 
and Coast Guard). These organisations make up the Office of Emergency 
Planning that is controlled by the Department of Defence (Department of 
Defence, 2017). This demonstrated that this document has utility across 
government and for those organisations that are responsible for delivering aspects 
of national security. The risks that are identified are briefly discussed and some 
detail, although very brief, described their possible impact. It graphically displays 
each risk and its impact in a matrix. This made it easy to read and see what the 
key risks are.  
 
The National Risk Assessment for Ireland stated that the risk assessment is there 
to inform emergency management capabilities in the future (Department of 
Defence, 2017). The fact that this document discussed the risks that face all of 
society, defined the risks and consolidate the risks for use by all departments for 
future development is positive. It recognised that the risks will impact all of 
society and recognised that it is a whole-of-government responsibility for 
responding to these risks. The disappointing part is that this assessment was 
published after the White Paper on Defence (2015), the National Cyber Security 
Strategy (2015) and the An Gard Síochána Strategy Statement (2016). There 
should be a hierarchal and coordinated structure for the release of national 
security documents, based around a document that provides a common list of 
threats and objectives. Ireland’s national security framework has a central risk 
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document, however, it does not have any coordination and connection for the 
release of other national security documents.  
 
Assessment of Ireland’s National Security Framework 
 
When examined against the normal way of life concept, the collection of security 
related documents for Ireland do not address the six elements effectively. The 
combined documents address Law and Order and Security in some detail, the 
Economy to a lesser extent and finally Welfare, Government, and Freedom and 
Equality lacks any specific mention. The White Paper on Defence (2015) 
provided the detail of the roles and responsibilities of the Defence Force in 
providing security, both territorial and domestically. The An Garda Síochána 
Strategy Statement (2016) provided details on the provision of domestic security 
and law and order to the State. Therefore, the two components of the normal way 
of life: Security and Law and Order are discussed and represented within 
Ireland’s national security framework. The importance of protecting the economy 
is mentioned in the White Paper on Defence (2015) and the An Garda Síochána 
Strategy Statement (2016), however, there is no connection between these two 
documents relating to the integration of efforts to protect the economy. The 
National Cyber Security Strategy 2015 – 2016 is the key document that discussed 
security to the economy. It detailed the provision of services that will protect the 
national ICT systems that in turn, protect the financial services of Ireland. These 
documents identify that the protection of the economy is important, however, they 
failed to provide any further detail of how the economy will be protected. The 
final three areas of the normal way of life concept that are not considered in any 
of the documents include: Welfare, Freedom and Equality, and Government.  
 
The documents relating to national security examined in this section provided a 
collection of ‘bumper stick quotes’ on threats and a general corporate brochure 
approach to communicating these threats and how they will be addressed. Finally 
the documents do not appear to be linked to one another. The White Paper on 
Defence (2015), the National Cyber Security Strategy 2015 – 2016 and the An 
Garda Síochána Strategy Statement (2016) should at least nest under the National 
Risk Assessment for Ireland. In doing so, all the separate strategies would use one 
 55 
risk assessment for the development of their own strategies. The siloed approach 
to national security has led to a number of holes in the strategic security plans. 
There should be more emphasis placed on an integrated whole-of-government 
approach to national security. 
 
Republic of Singapore – National Security Framework 
 
Singapore offers a unique case study in relation to its approach to national 
security and the relationship between the State and its citizens. Singapore has 
established itself as a global city, based on liberal ideals such as free trade and 
economic interdependence (Heng, 2013). However, this liberal approach to 
maintaining a global city also contains a strong security dimension, with the 
narrative controlled tightly by the leadership of Singapore. Heng (2013) argued 
that it was necessary for Singapore to develop itself into a global city because it 
lacked a geographic hinterland that would provide some geographic security. It 
had no raw materials and no domestic market, so therefore, it needed strong links 
to the region and the globe. From early in its independence from Great Britain, 
Singapore has maintained a comprehensive view of security that goes beyond just 
physical or territorial security. Although Singapore is perceived as a liberal global 
city, the nation’s leadership do not see it necessary to connect this liberal 
approach to the national security sector (Tan & Chew, 2008). The narrative that 
has been created by the small elite group of Singaporean leaders is one where 
Singapore recognises that it is a small State that is dependent on an open and 
globalised economy. In order to achieve security, Singapore depends on a resilient 
population, a strong and capable defence force able to deter attack and strong 
diplomatic relationships.  
 
The Singaporean approach is not to have a single national security strategy, 
instead have a central organisation responsible for the coordination of national 
security objectives. Formed in 2004 the National Security Coordination 
Secretariat (NSCS) is responsible for the planning, policy and intelligence 
coordination at a whole of government level (Singapore Government, 2018). The 
NSCS is comprised of three bodies that lead and facilitate national security 
objectives. The three bodies include the National Security Research Centre; 
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providing strategic analysis of threats to support strategic planning, policy 
development and capability development. The Resilience Policy and Research 
Centre, is responsible for the coordination of social resilience. The National 
Security Coordination Centre, leads and facilitates programmes that support 
resilience against strategic threats. Figure 5 shows the coordination between the 
different agencies within the NSCS and the control of the organisation provided 
by the Coordinating Minister for National Security.  
 
Figure 5: National Security Coordination Secretariat. 
 
 
The main document released by the government of Singapore regarding national 
security, is A Secure and Resilient Nation: A Networked Government, A Cohesive 
Society, An Engaged People (National Security Coordination Secretariat, 2018).  
Resilience is an important theme for Singapore’s national security, as it places the 
emphasis on the whole of society contributing to national security, and a lot of the 
information released to the public is based around this concept of the population’s 
responsibility in supporting national security. The NSCS is very clear that this 
document is a corporate brochure that provided the mission, history and the 
functions of the NSCS. It set out the framework for the various agencies and 
government ministries that focus on a specific area of national security. It also 
detailed how the NSCS coordinates the efforts and policies of its subordinate 
organisations. The main threat that the brochure identified is that of terrorism. It 
clearly identified that the Asia region has a significant issue with terrorist and 
radicalised groups and that this threat poses a significant risk to Singapore. In 
comparison to the UK’s national security strategy, where risks and objectives 
were clearly articulated, the Singaporean security document provided very little 
detail on what the threat of terrorism will be. The focus of the Singaporean 
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national security strategy is to engage its population in the provision of security. 
This approach is similar to the method of security for the early state nation that 
was presented in Chapter Two, where the population served the State for its 
security. This approach is supported by other documents released by the NSCS.  
 
One aspect that is quite unique with the Singaporean approach to informing the 
public about national security, compared with the other nations reviewed in this 
chapter, is its engagement across all ages of the population. This is an important 
part of the security narrative for the Singaporean leadership, in that security can 
only be achieved when the people are engaged. The NSCS has released two 
cartoon-based documents, one for primary school aged children and one for high 
school aged children. These documents discussed terrorism and national security 
using age appropriate language and in a format that is understood by their target 
audience. The ‘Web of Deception’ is an illustrated monograph in a format for 
primary school aged children that dealt with national security and terrorism. It 
discussed radicalisation and how terrorist organisations can influence young 
people. It also discussed the coordination between the different government 
agencies, reinforcing the networked government message. The messaging also 
centres around national pride and the ‘Total Defence’ strategy of the Singapore 
Armed Forces (SAF). Likewise, the comic aimed at high school aged children; 
‘Fight Terrorism? Don’t Joke!’, contained messages of national pride and the 
duty of the population. It described the different aspects of what organisations do 
in fighting terrorism and uses recent terrorist attacks in the region to reinforce the 
key messages. These documents cannot be used to analyse the Singaporean 
national security framework in any depth or used as a credible source, however, 
they do demonstrate how Singapore is communicating their national security 
approach to the population. Singapore want a ‘cohesive society’ and an ‘engaged 
people’(National Security Coordination Secretariat, 2018) and by introducing the 
ideas of security to the population at an early age and making it an open 
discussion, it becomes part of the way of life and is a method of involving society 
in the idea of security. This community resilience is important in Singapore’s 
national security framework, but it also highlights how the leadership of 
Singapore control the narrative. It is concluded from this research that the 
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government of Singapore want their citizens to be engaged in security, however, 
they will tightly control what they are engaged in.  
 
The SAF are an integral part of national security for Singapore and is part of their 
‘Total Defence’ strategy. There is no white paper on defence for the SAF, or 
similar strategic capability plan. The information regarding national security is 
very much of the ‘corporate brochure’ style. The Singapore defence policy is 
based around two pillars. The first pillar is deterrence, being the establishment of 
a strong defence force based on their concept of ‘Total Defence’. Singapore use 
National Service as a way to develop a resilient nation and one where the whole 
population is involved in defence of the State (Singpore Government, 2018). The 
second pillar of the Singaporean approach to defence policy is the emphasis on 
diplomacy and strong bilateral defence relationships. Singapore realises the need 
for a secure region and views international organisations, such as the Association 
of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) as a mechanism for cooperating to address 
common security concerns (Singpore Government, 2018). The depth of 
information regarding the SAF is similar to that of other nations that publish facts 
about their capabilities on open source platforms. It provides a very generic 
overview of capabilities, information regarding structures and some information 
on operations that units are serving in. The lack of information on the national 
security framework and future capability programmes of the SAF is 
understandable considering the controlling nature of the Singaporean government 
and their control of the security narrative.  
 
Assessment of Singapore’s National Security Framework 
 
In reviewing the Singaporean national security framework it is apparent that it is 
an exercise of reviewing web-pages and glossy corporate brochures and does not 
offer the same depth of information as the UK and the Republic of Ireland. Buzan 
(1991) described how States will construct or securitise their threats and in the 
case of Singapore, the ruling elite have constructed and tightly controlled their 
security narrative. As a weak power but strong State (Buzan, 1991), Singapore 
recognises that it cannot provide the necessary security to its citizens alone and 
relies on cooperation of regional and international powers. Singapore’s narrative, 
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controlled heavily by the State, is an example of effective messaging to reinforce 
their security approach. Singapore needs an engaged population and by targeting 
all age groups with security related messaging, Singaporeans grow up with 
security as part of their way of life.  
 
When it comes to comparing the Singaporean national security framework to the 
six components of the normal way of life, it is evident that the only the 
component of Security is considered. The component of the Economy has a link 
with the ‘Total Defence’ strategy, that articulates the need for the Singaporean 
economy to be protected. Law and Order is provided through their police force 
and is discussed as part of their networked government. The role of the police and 
their contribution to law and order, that contributes to national security, does 
appear within the documents released by the NSCS, however, with very little 
detail. The remaining three components: Welfare, Government, and Freedom and 
Equality, do not feature in any detail within the material reviewed. The 
Singaporean national security framework is heavily controlled by the government 
and they have developed a very narrow discourse on the threats to their security. 
Singapore have established an effective open marketing platform with their public 
information, in order to maintain an engaged population. However, they have not 
developed a security framework that focusses on the State providing security for 
the whole-of-society. Rather, Singapore have taken the state nation approach, 
calling on the national spirit of the population to provide security to the State.    
 
New Zealand has a long history with the security of Singapore. As Britain slowly 
withdrew its influence in the region, New Zealand stationed military forces in 
Singapore to assist in the nations and the regions security. Singapore has 
increased its military capability, however it still relies on security partnerships to 
assist with its national security. Although the strategy for Singapore’s security is 
very much focussed on the threat of Terrorism, it is the way in which the 
government has communicated its strategy to the public that New Zealand should 
take note of for its own strategy development. The narrative regarding the role of 
the population in supporting security has been widely publicised to all ages, 
means that security is in the public discourse, and not something that is discussed 
after a crisis event has occurred. It is not argued here that New Zealand should 
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adopt this model of focussing on terrorism, rather it should develop a robust 
method of communicating security risks and hazards that match the context of 
New Zealand’s security environment. It should also seek to develop a 
communication system that is aimed at different age groups within the community 
and by using different communication platforms and mediums. Business 
discourse explains that effective strategy execution is achieved through effective 
communication of the strategy to all stakeholders (Collins & Porras, 2011). There 
is no reason why this cannot be adopted for the development of a national security 
strategy in New Zealand. If New Zealand intends to deliver security to the whole-
of-society and develop resilience in its communities, then greater discussion 
across society about these issues should take place.  
 
Australia’s National Security Framework 
 
Australia and New Zealand share a unique bond in relation to security. Both 
nations have, for more than 100 years combined military forces in wartime. 
Coalitions were formed during the First and Second World Wars, in the Korean 
War, the Vietnam War, and more recently in operations in East Timor, the 
Solomon Islands and Iraq. The relationship between Australia and New Zealand 
extends beyond the armed forces and experience in conflict. New Zealand’s 
national security is also reliant upon close ties and arrangements with Australia 
(Broad, 2017), and both nations are considered important in each other’s 
territorial defence plans. Australia is New Zealand’s closest neighbour and has 
significant power and influence in the South Pacific and South East Asian region. 
Due to this closeness and unique relationship, the Australian national security 
framework and approach provides a good example of how national security can be 
achieved without an overarching strategic document.  
 
The responsibility for the coordination of Australia’s national security falls to the 
Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet (PM&C). The National Security 
and International Policy Group of PM&C advises the Prime Minister on how to 
respond to threats to the nation’s security. Advice from PM&C also includes 
advice on: the protection of Australia’s border, preventing organised crime, 
defence strategies, the appropriate response to major security crises and also 
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policies relating to national security (Australian Government, 2018). A plethora of 
documents exist in relation to national security, with only one national security 
strategy document that was released in 2013 by Prime Minister Julia Gillard 
(2010-2013). In 2017 Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull (2015 – current) released 
a national security statement, in a parliamentary address, rather than a strategic 
document. Amongst numerous other documents pertaining to national security is 
the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO)  Annual Report 2016-
17, National Counter Terrorist Plan 2017, Australia’s Counter-Terrorism 
Strategy 2015, 2016 Defence White Paper, and Australia’s Cyber Security 
Strategy. Of all these plans and strategic documents, only two of them have a 
hierarchical relationship connecting them. This is the National Counter Terrorist 
Plan 2017, which is nested under Australia’s Counter-Terrorism Strategy 2015. 
Although there is a controlling body for national security, there appears to be a 
siloed approach to the different areas of national security and no recent national 
security strategy has been released. 
 
In 2013 the Australian Labor Led Government, under Prime Minister Julia Gillard 
released a national security strategy titled ‘Strong and Secure: A Strategy for 
Australia’s National Security’ (Department of the Prime Minister & Cabinet, 
2013). This document follows the pattern of all documents reviewed so far. It set 
out the governments objectives for the provision of national security, the risks 
posed to Australia and detailed the priorities for investment in capabilities in order 
to achieve the objectives. The objectives included the protection and 
strengthening of Australian sovereignty, a safe and resilient population, secure 
infrastructure and the promotion of a favourable international environment 
(Department of the Prime Minister & Cabinet, 2013).  The objectives are broad 
enough to cover the territorial security of the nation, securing the population as 
well as its resources and protect its position internationally. This means Australia 
has both an inward and outward security focus. The risks identified include 
espionage, regional instability, cyber-attacks, the proliferation of WMD’s, 
organised crime, state-based conflict and terrorism. To balance these risks, the 
national security strategy has a concept of pillars, or the ways and means that it 
will protect against these risks. What is lacking from this group of risks are 
natural born risks, such as natural disasters and disease. The strategic outlook of 
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the strategy is focussed on traditional security threats. The most recent statement 
relating to national security was released in 2017 as an address to parliament by 
Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull.  
 
Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull addressed the House of Representatives in June 
2017 with an address on defence and national security.  The address differed in 
content from the 2013 national security strategy, in that it did not describe in 
detail the objectives and possible risks and threats or provided any information of 
how the objectives were to be achieved. Prime Minister Turnbull spoke of how 
the number one priority is to keep Australians safe and maintain their way of life, 
their values and their freedoms (Turnbull, 2017).  The Prime Minister discussed 
the investment in law enforcement and security agencies as a result of the increase 
in terrorist threats to Australia. The address focussed on the threat of terrorism, 
which appears to be the main theme of the Turnbull government’s national 
security narrative. The Prime Minister spoke of the implementation of a 
comprehensive cyber security strategy. He discussed how critical infrastructure 
such as power networks, water supply and other systems vital for the national 
wellbeing must be managed to prevent foreign interference. The address 
concluded with remarks on the importance of maintaining a close partnership with 
business and the community for the provision of national security. The address to 
parliament is a different approach to the previous government’s national security 
strategy document and it is that this method is ineffective in providing an 
overarching concept for a strategy. It described in very generic terms the security 
risks and outlined some information on how these risks are to be responded to. In 
the same year as this address, a white paper on foreign policy was released, that 
outlined strategic objectives relating to national security. 
 
The Foreign Policy White Paper (2017) articulated Australia’s Department of 
Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) strategic policy. The purpose of a white paper 
is to set out major developments and major new directions in government policy. 
Released in the same year as the Prime Minister’s Defence and National Security 
address to parliament, the Foreign Policy White Paper (2017) is ‘grounded in our 
national foundations of freedom, equality, the rule of law and mutual respect’ 
(Australian Government, 2017, p. iii). The policy articulated that the foundations 
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for success are Australia’s democratic institutions, open society and strong 
economy that underpins their significant defence and foreign policy, their border 
protection, law enforcement and security capabilities. These foundations could be 
considered the values that Wolfers (1952) stated as being the ‘thing’ that should 
be secured. Many of these foundations listed in the white paper could be 
considered the foundations of a national security strategy. Therefore, it is assessed 
from this research, that this foreign policy white paper considers domestic 
security matters. The five priorities of the white paper include: a prosperous Indo-
Pacific region, global opportunities for business, the safety of Australians, the 
promotion of international rules and the increase of support to the Pacific and 
Timor-Leste (Australian Government, 2017). The Foreign Policy White Paper 
(2017) merges with elements of domestic security when it discussed the 
foundations of the policy. These included: 
 
- Countering terrorism,  
- Secure borders,  
- Tackling organised crime,  
- Cyber security,  
- Guarding against foreign interference, and  
- Assisting Australian’s overseas. (This is the only foundation of the 
foreign policy that has is a non-domestic security focus).  
 
When these objectives are compared with the Strong and Secure: A Strategy for 
Australia’s National Security and the Prime Minister’s security and defence 
address to parliament in 2017, there are some similarities in the associated threats, 
however, they are discussed slightly differently. This highlights the need for one 
central document that articulates the threats that Australia faces. This would 
enable all documents, plans and strategies developed for national security can 
work from a common threat picture and synchronise their objectives and plans.  
 
When the 2016 Defence White Paper (2016 DWP) was released, it was the third 
defence white paper in seven years. The 2016 DWP was released as a way of re-
establishing the credibility of the old white papers as the two previous defence 
white papers were released under the Rudd-Gillard-Rudd years of political turmoil 
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(Edwards, 2016). The 2016 DWP was ‘based on a comprehensive review of 
Australia’s strategic environment’, with the aim to ‘align defence strategy, 
capability and resources’ (Department of Defence, 2016). The strategic outlook 
discussed the ever-changing regional environment, the risks of instability and the 
threats that these risks have on Australia. The 2016 DWP explained that although 
there is a remote prospect of a military attack on Australia, strategic planning 
must go beyond defending borders and focus on attacks from non-state actors 
such as terrorists (Department of Defence, 2016). This threat of terrorism is quite 
prevalent in this document and is the focus of a number of other security policies 
and documents released. The 2016 DWP included detail of the Australian security 
context which drives the development of security capabilities.   
 
The 2016 DWP identified six drivers that will shape the security environment: the 
United States and China relationship, regional fragility, challenges to the global 
rules-based order, enduring terrorism, the pace of military capability development 
and new complex threats. Of these drivers, only terrorism and the instability of 
fragile states were mentioned in A Strategy for Australia’s National Security 
(2013). Terrorism was mentioned in the 2017 Foreign Policy White Paper. 
Therefore, there exists a disconnect between the range of different policy 
documents and what each has identified as key threats to Australia. The remainder 
of the 2016 DWP set out the future of the Australian Defence Force (ADF) and 
the capability’s that will be developed in order to mitigate the threats and risks 
identified. Behm (2016) argued that this white paper did not deal with the use of 
armed forces in the defence of the nation, which is an important factor when 
considering the employment of a nation’s military. The Defence White Paper 
2009 discussed the use of military power as part of the Defence and National 
Security Chapter (Department of Defence, 2009), however, this did not appear in 
the 2016 iteration. Behm also argues that the 2016 DWP failed to address other 
security issues such as global warming, internal migration and Humanitarian 
Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR) operations. These threats would 
contribute to regional instability, which is one of the drivers identified in this 
document. It is concluded that the 2016 DWP is an attempt by the current 
Australian government to establish the credibility of defence white papers, 
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however, in doing so did not nest this document itself within other security related 
documents.  
 
Terrorism appears to be the most significant threat to Australia’s national security. 
Australia’s Counter-Terrorism Strategy – 2015 was released to articulate how the 
Australian government will respond to the terrorist threat. Like the previous 
documents reviewed, this document set out the framework for Australia’s counter-
terrorism arrangements. It articulated how the Australian Government will counter 
the terrorist threat (Commonwealth of Australia, 2015). It identified social 
cohesion as vital, the peaceful expression of diverse political, religious and 
ideological views as highly valued features of Australian life. In order to maintain 
this social cohesion, the strategy detailed five objectives that it will focus on 
(Commonwealth of Australia, 2015);  
 
- The challenging of violent extremist ideologies,  
- Preventing people from becoming terrorists,  
- Shaping the global environment,  
- Disrupting terrorist activity domestically and  
- Having an effective response and recovery.  
As a strategic document, Australia’s Counter-Terrorism Strategy – 2015, 
provided a sufficient base to analyse how Australia will respond to a terrorist 
threat and what the Australian population can expect during a response. This 
strategy is one of the few documents reviewed that informs a subordinate 
document that relates to counter-terrorism.    
 
Nested underneath Australia’s Counter-Terrorism Strategy – 2015 is the 2017 
National Counter Terrorist Plan. This plan outlined the arrangements, governance 
and operational responsibilities of the Commonwealth, State and Territory 
agencies responsible for counter-terrorist operations (Australia New Zealand 
Counter-Terrorist Committee, 2017). What is unique about these two documents 
is that this is a rare case where there exists an over-arching strategy, with an 
operational plan nested below it. It is discussed in the documents where they fit 
within each other and more importantly, they also use the same five strategic 
objectives. Additionally, the Australia New Zealand Counter Terrorist Committee 
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has also released ‘strategies’ that deal with: Protecting Crowded Places as well as 
guidelines for countering Improvised Explosive Devices, Armed Offenders and 
Chemical attacks at crowded places. It is not clear why these three other 
documents could not be contained within the 2017 National Counter Terrorist 
Plan, or why they engage with only one specific threat. However, since terrorism 
is the most common threat identified amongst the documents reviewed it is 
understandable why so much effort is placed on dealing with his threat.  
 
The Australian government conducted a self-review of its national security 
framework, with a focus on the intelligence function. ASIO provides the 
Australian government, various government agencies and Australian businesses 
information regarding threats to security (Australian Security Intelligence 
Organisation, 2017). ASIO released its annual report in 2017, where it reviewed 
its performance against five focus areas;  
 
- Countering terrorism,  
- Countering espionage,  
- Border security,  
- Protective security advice to business, and  
- The collection of foreign intelligence in Australia.   
 
This self-review document provided information relating to each of the five 
threats, described what they were and how they impact on Australia’s national 
security. It described the performance of ASIO against each of these threats, what 
has been achieved and what will occur in the future. Much of the information 
released is unclassified and there would be a lot more classified details that could 
not be released. However, the strength of this document is that it provided clear 
information on the threats and also what they mean to Australia. This 
demonstrated that the Australian security framework is open to review, which is 
an important part of a transparent government. What is apparent through the 
review of Australia’s national security framework, is the lack of commonality 
between the threats listed in this document and the threats listed in the other seven 
security related documents that have been reviewed.    
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Buzan (1991) argued that a major difficulty for the development of national 
security policy is to distinguish between those threats that arise as a result of 
normal day-to-day consequences of life, verses those that constitute a serious 
national security issue. What is evident in this review of the seven Australian 
security related documents, is that there is no common threat assessment or list of 
common threats that Australia is facing. Table 2 below, lists the seven documents 
with their threats. Only terrorism is a common threat amongst all documents. 
There have been a number of terrorist acts in Australia, which would indicate why 
terrorism is assessed as a significant threat. Over the period 2016-17 there were 
six terrorist related events, one was a stabbing of a person in September 2016, the 
killing of four people in June 2017, and four terrorist plots disrupted. Espionage 
and counter foreign interference is the second most common threat and can range 
from external States collecting information through to State and non-state actors 
attempting to damage or interfere with critical infrastructure. What this 
demonstrated is that there are 12 different security threats identified to Australian 
national security and that there has not been a central security strategy for five 
years. Although there are some similarities in the threats identified and that 
security is coordinated under the PM&C, there lacks a clear framework for the 
collaboration across all government departments. A coordinated framework and a 
common list of threats to be guarded against would strengthen the Australian 
national security framework.  
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Terrorism Terrorism Terrorism Terrorism Countering 
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Terrorism  Terrorism 
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conflict 
   Secure 
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Cyber   Cyber Cyber   
Espionage   Espionage Foreign 
interference 
 Espionage 
Fragile 
states 
 Regional 
instability 
    
Organised 
crime 
  Law 
enforcement 
Organised 
crime 
  
WMD’s       
    Assisting 
Australians 
overseas 
  
  US and 
China 
relations 
    
  Challenges 
to the 
global 
rules-based 
order 
    
  New 
military 
capabilities 
    
  New 
complex 
threats 
    
Table 2: Comparison of Australian Security Documents 2013 – 2017 
 
Assessment of Australia’s National Security Framework 
 
Australia is New Zealand’s closest international partner, both geographically and 
in terms of our international relationships. Furthermore, it is New Zealand’s only 
formal ally. There are two aspects of the Australian security framework that New 
Zealand should bear in mind for the development of its own national security 
strategy. One is positive, and the second is something that New Zealand should 
avoid doing. The strength of the Australian national security framework is the 
Foreign Policy White Paper 2017. This document articulates how Australia will 
respond to threats to Australian citizens abroad. Although it is extremely difficult 
to accurately determine, it has been estimated that at any one time there could be 
up to one million New Zealand Citizens living or travelling overseas (Philp, 
2013).  With greater travel and work opportunities, it is logical that there should 
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be some provision for how the State intends to protect its citizens abroad. Recent 
terrorist attacks in Europe, such as the attacks in Paris in 2015 and Brussels in 
2016 have demonstrated that any nations citizens can be caught up in a crisis on 
foreign land and whether these people have confidence that they will be protected 
is a necessary part of the ‘feeling of security’. As New Zealand supports the 
international order and regional and global peace-keeping efforts – efforts that, in 
turn, strengthen the likelihood New Zealand citizens abroad will not be threatened 
– there should be a larger focus of how this will be achieved. The articulation of a 
how New Zealand will protect its citizens abroad should be considered for 
inclusion in the wider national security objectives.  
 
The Australian national security framework also provided a good example of what 
not to do when developing a series of national security planning documents. A 
good strategy will have a clear and coherent plan (Porter, 2011), not a range of 
different plans, strategies, statements and white papers that characterises the 
Australian model. The seven documents that were reviewed in relation to the 
Australian national security strategy were all released within a four-year 
timeframe. There was also a different array of documents, from strategies, to 
plans to white papers and addresses to parliament. The intent of strategic 
documents is to chart the course for the future and in the case of national security, 
allow the agencies and organisations responsible for the provision of security, the 
ability to plan and develop their capabilities to meet the intent of the government. 
Capabilities that deliver national security are expensive and take time to develop, 
especially military capabilities. From concept, to construction through to 
operational effectiveness, military capabilities are significant investments for the 
government, and continually changing or updating the policy surrounding national 
security will lead to uncertainty and confusion, and possibly the purchase of 
capabilities that are not necessary. New Zealand should take note of how the 
Australians have delivered their strategy for national security, and note the 
constant release of documents and with no coherent plan for their release 
timeframe may cause confusion amongst the different security agencies for being 
able to build a whole-of-government security framework. New Zealand should 
look at adopting a coherent system of security strategy policy development that 
contains a hierarchy of policy, nested beneath or within an overarching strategic 
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document, that articulates when other plans and policies are to be reviewed and 
released.   
  
Conclusion    
 
In its simplest form, enforcing or restoring security occurs when a State uses 
violence to ensure the safety and well-being of itself (Snow, 2016). For this to 
occur there needs to be a system in place that articulates what the State will be 
protecting and how. The four nation’s national security strategies and frameworks 
examined in this chapter provide a broad overview of how different States have 
approached this dilemma. New Zealand has a close historical relationship with the 
UK. Our parliamentary system, our police force and military have all been shaped 
by their influence. The UK has a well-established national security framework and 
has faced conventional state on state aggression and terrorist attacks, so their 
framework provides a good example of a system that is based upon an 
overarching strategy that provides a central base for the development of security 
capabilities. The Republic of Ireland has many similarities with New Zealand 
including a small population size, military capabilities and approach to foreign 
policy. Ireland is a ‘small player’ on the international stage, and like New Zealand 
focusses on contributing to the international order of peace and security rather 
than attempting to lead in this area. The manner in which the Republic of Ireland, 
as a small state has taken a collaborative approach between the military and the 
constabulary forces is a good example of how New Zealand can link their 
domestic and territorial security systems.  
 
New Zealand’s involvement in the security of Singapore goes back to when the 
UK withdrew its security influence in South East Asia. Up until 30 years ago, 
New Zealand had a significant military element permanently stationed in 
Singapore. New Zealand is heavily invested in the South East Asian region, for 
political, security and economic reasons, therefore the approach that a regional 
State like Singapore takes to developing their security framework can help New 
Zealand to understand and also to measure its own strategy against. Singapore 
provides a very good example of how to effectively communicate security matters 
to the population. Like Singapore, New Zealand sees resilience in its population 
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as an important part of security, therefore, this needs to be effectively 
communicated.  Finally, Australia as New Zealand’s only formal ally and closest 
international partner, offers an example of how to frame foreign policy and link it 
to national security. New Zealand contributes significantly to regional security 
and therefore a clearly articulated foreign policy will maximise the chances of 
enhancing national security. The recent political turmoil in Australian politics 
with the constant changing of Prime Ministers, both through election and internal 
leadership challenges spilled over into the national security framework process. 
This unsettled time, complicated the policies and resulted in a number of different 
strategies and policies on national security being released within a short 
timeframe. New Zealand cannot just rely on copying other nations strategies and 
policies and its national security strategy and framework should be developed 
within its own context. New Zealand can, however, look abroad for examples, 
both positive and negative, for how to construct an effective national security 
strategy that protects its values and provides robust guidance for security 
capability development.  
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Chapter Four: A review of New Zealand’s national security framework 
 
Introduction  
 
Chapter Four will review New Zealand’s national security framework with the 
intention of establishing how it is structured and what the connections exist 
between the different New Zealand government agencies that are responsible for 
delivering national security. New Zealand has a unique history, albeit a brief one, 
but it demonstrates that New Zealand has a unique place in the world. New 
Zealand’s history is rooted in its early existence as a colony of the British Empire 
and as a loyal servant to the homeland, New Zealand as a young nation 
participated in the Boer War, the First and Second World Wars, as well as the 
conflicts in Asia and the Middle East. None of these conflicts directly threatened 
New Zealand’s territorial sovereignty, however, as a member of the 
Commonwealth and later of the wider global community, New Zealand 
committed its military and other resources in order to provide and assist with the 
establishment of New Zealand’s allies’ security. Throughout the Cold War period 
New Zealand’s national security focus was, like most of the world, predominately 
on territorial integrity and the defence of the borders. New Zealand is a member 
of international and regional agreements and formal alliance agreements that 
deliver regional and international security. Since the beginning of this century the 
world as experienced a rapid changing global environment, with new security 
threats emerging that require a different approach to dealing with them. This 
chapter will explore the evolution of New Zealand’s security environment, how it 
has evolved from contributing to global security to becoming more focussed on 
non-traditional threats, both man-made and natural. Chapter Four will also 
explore New Zealand’s current national security framework and analyse the 
government’s approach in providing security to the population and the nation. The 
chapter will then examine the framework in relation to the concept of the normal 
way of life.  
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New Zealand’s National Security System 
 
The role of the New Zealand Government is to provide security and ensure the 
territorial integrity of New Zealand. The government must protect the institutions 
that sustain confidence, promote the achievement of national goals and through 
providing security, support the pursuit of economic opportunities, the provision of 
international relationships and help to build a sense of community (Department of 
the Prime Minister and Cabinet, 2017). The New Zealand Government defined 
national security as ‘the coordination which permits the citizens of a state to go 
about their daily business confidently free from fear and able to make the most of 
the opportunities to advance their way of life. It encompasses preparedness, 
protection and preservation of people, property and information, both tangible and 
intangible’ (Government of New Zealand, 2017). The government recognised that 
New Zealand’s security is increasingly linked to security in other countries and 
therefore seeks to reinforce its national security through partnerships and by 
supporting an international rules-based order (Broad, 2017). New Zealand’s 
approach national security is provided through an ‘all-of-government’ national 
security system that has tended to react to events, rather than systematically 
bringing a forward-looking approach to risk reduction’ (Department of the Prime 
Minister and Cabinet, 2017). It is a system that emphasises risks and a resilience-
based methodology (Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, 2017). It is a 
reactionary approach with a system centrally controlled by government. New 
Zealand does not have a national security strategy. It is the responsibility of 
DPMC to coordinate New Zealand’s national security framework.  
 
As stewards of New Zealand’s system of government, DPMC is charged with 
advising the government on policy and constitutional arrangements and within the 
seven business units of DPMC, is also responsible for the coordination of the 
National Security System (NSS). One of the founding principles of New 
Zealand’s NSS is the nation’s ability to respond to and recover from shock and 
stressors in a timely and effective way through an integrated system (Department 
of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, 2017). The government identified six threats to 
New Zealand  (Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, 2017): 
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- State and armed conflict,  
- Organised crime,  
- Cyber security,  
- Natural hazards,  
- Biosecurity, and  
- Pandemics.  
 
This list of threats, takes into consideration not only man-made but natural threats, 
including those that will occur within the territory of New Zealand and those 
externally. The New Zealand approach reinforces the New Zealand government’s 
definition of national security as being able to allow citizens to ‘go about their 
daily business’, or as it has been presented in Chapter Two to conduct a normal 
way of life. The broad nature of the hazards and also the complexity of an all-of-
government approach to security, requires significant coordination.  
 
The NSS detailed seven key objectives that underpin the comprehensive “all 
hazards” approach that the New Zealand system takes for national security 
(DPMC, 2016). Included in the hazards are (DPMC, 2016): 
 
- Ensuring public safety,  
- Preserving sovereignty and territorial integrity,  
- Protecting lines of communication, both physical and virtual,  
- Strengthening the international order,  
- Sustaining economic wellbeing,  
- Maintaining democratic institutions, and  
- Protecting the natural environment 
 
This approach to hazards is broad enough to allow for the protection of the 
citizens of New Zealand and enable them to go about their daily business free 
from fear. There exists a danger that this broad approach to hazards identification 
can allow for misinterpretation by agencies responsible for responding to these 
hazards because they are not prioritised. A lack of prioritisation of hazard 
identification could prevent agencies effectively attempting to reduce risk and 
hazards (Johanson, 2017). Therefore, New Zealand should prioritise hazards and 
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risk to prevent this ambiguity. The approach of the NSS is therefore reactionary 
and places a significant amount of emphasis on the ability of the agencies to 
provide a response with little guidance as to what threats they should focus on 
responding to. As it is reactionary, the NSS is a framework that relies upon 
effective coordination at all levels of government, both central and local.  
 
The NSS is designed to ensure that the security architecture performs as intended 
and the details of how it operates is contained within the NSS Handbook. When a 
crisis event occurs that challenges national security, the NSS is activated. The 
response to the crisis is built around the threat that occurs, therefore, its makeup 
will vary depending on the threat and has varying levels of coordination. At the 
executive level, the Official’s Committee for Domestic and External Coordination 
(ODSEC) provides strategic advice to ministers and the Prime Minister on such 
matters as priorities for resource and capability allocation. An example where 
ODSEC provided guidance was during the 2015 terrorist attacks in Paris. ODSEC 
provided advice on possible implications for New Zealand citizens in France and 
also any threats to New Zealand (DPMC, 2016). Informing the NSS and ODSEC 
is the Security and Intelligence Group (SIG). SIG provides assessments to the 
Prime Minister, senior ministers and senior officials on security events and 
security related developments. SIG performs a collaborative leadership role within 
the wider New Zealand intelligence community and with the Intelligence and 
Assessments Bureau, coordinates all the source assessments for response and 
advice decision making. (Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, 2017).  
 
When a security event occurs, the NSS activates and forms a number of sub-
groups in order to coordinate the collective response. For any national security 
event, a lead agency is identified. When a crisis occurs that requires a national 
response, a government agency is allocated the responsibility of taking the lead 
for the planning and coordination of the response. For instance, in the event of a 
natural disaster, the Ministry of Civil Defence and Emergency Management 
(MCDEM) will be identified as the lead agency. Likewise if the event is a Bio-
security risk then the Ministry for Primary Industries (MPI) will lead (DPMC, 
2016). It is important for the effective response to a crisis that that individuals 
who represent their agencies to able to make decision and have the authority to 
 76 
commit resources on behalf of their organisations. In addition to the lead agencies, 
the NSS forms Watch Groups. These are formed in order to obtain situational 
clarity and to ensure that the systems are in place for effective response 
(Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, 2017).  
 
Example of the National Security System activation in New Zealand 
 
On 27th November 2014 the Chief Executives of Federated Farmers and Fonterra 
received anonyms letters stating that infant formula was poisoned with 1080 (a 
chemical pesticide used for the eradication of introduced animal predators). The 
letters demanded that the use of 1080 be stopped immediately, or the 
contaminated infant formula would be released into the public. Once these letters 
were reported, the NSS was activated (DPMC, 2016). DPMC provided its normal 
policy advice role in support of the Prime Minister, with ODESC providing the 
focal point for agency cooperation (Ministry for Primary Industries, 2017). A 
Watch Group was established by DPMC on the 27th November 2014 that included 
government agencies and representatives from Fonterra and Federated Farmers. 
MPI was given the lead agency at the national level role, as MPI has the lead 
agency role under the NSS for a food safety hazard (DPMC, 2016). The New 
Zealand Police was given the lead for the criminal investigation in support of the 
response. ODESC convened a meeting on 28th November to provide a focal point 
for agency coordination, while the Watch Group analysed and developed the 
response. Key to this response was the release of public messages to inform the 
communities of the situation and provide information on how to assist and what to 
do if someone suspects being affected. These messages were released in 
consultation with the New Zealand Police, MPI and the Ministry for Foreign 
Affairs and Trade (MFAT) (Ministry for Primary Industries, 2017). The 
communications plan included information being released to medical services, 
pre-schools, financial markets and business stakeholders. On 15th October 2015 a 
person was arrested and charged in relation to the threats.  
 
The case study of the activation of the NSS is an example of a successful response 
to a threat to New Zealand’s national security. Although this threat can be 
considered a ‘weak’ threat. There was a swift response from DPMC, with the 
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Watch Group formation occurring on the same day as the threat was discovered. 
The following day, ODESC convened a meeting to oversee agency coordination. 
For the duration of the response, regular meetings were held for ODESC and the 
Watch Groups. During the investigation into the threat, the New Zealand Police 
considered over 2600 people, with 60 people interviewed (Ryan, 2015). There 
was more than 150,000 batch tests carried out on Fonterra’s infant formula 
supply. This threat gained international attention and had the possibility of 
damaging New Zealand’s dairy export industry. It is concluded that the response 
to this threat by DPMC and the coordination between government agencies, the 
private sector and the New Zealand public was swift and demonstrated an 
effective NSS. However, this threat was against a small part of New Zealand’s 
society and did not have the ability to significantly impact all of societies normal 
way of life. The purpose of this case study was to demonstrate how the NSS 
activates and the interaction between the government and the private sector.    
 
The NSS and the NSS Handbook are the responsibility of DPMC in the 
management and coordination of responding to a crisis within New Zealand. The 
proceeding section of this chapter will review the different government agencies 
policies and plans that relate to New Zealand’s national security. 
 
New Zealand Defence White Paper – 2016 
 
The New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF) released The Defence White Paper 
2016 (DWP 2016) against the backdrop of changes in the international 
environment. These changes caused the National-led government to reassess its 
defence policy and capabilities that it articulated in the Defence White Paper 
2010. The DWP 2016 articulated the role of the NZDF as part of New Zealand’s 
broader security system and stated that it acts in collaboration with other agencies 
(Ministry of Defence, 2016). A positive aspect of this document is that it uses the 
seven overarching national strategic objectives listed in the NSS Handbook, 
demonstrating a rare link within a central security policy. The DWP 2016 
discussed the strategic outlook facing New Zealand, with the main area of interest 
the security of the Asia/Pacific region and identified newer challenges, such as: 
- Competition for resources,  
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- Increase in natural disasters,  
- Increased interest in the Antarctic region, especially from China,  
- Increase in the cyber threat, and  
- Ensuring the maintenance of a global rules-based order.  
 
The proceeding chapters of the DWP 2016 articulated the roles and tasks for the 
NZDF as well as detailing future capability development. The white paper 
focussed on what capabilities the NZDF currently have and how they are currently 
employed. According to Rolfe (1993), the purpose of a white paper should be to 
articulate policy based on significant changes to the environment and allow for 
capability development. However, what appears in the DWP 2016 is a list of 
current capabilities and a justification for their purchase and how they are 
employed. The DWP 2016 is not a document that is looking forward as it states 
that it is. Instead, it discussed the emerging security threats to New Zealand with 
no connection to the future capabilities required by the NZDF that will meet these 
new challenges. Rogers (2017) argued that the DWP 2016 fails to consider the 
relationships between the State, economic and social factors that shape armed 
conflict and not providing the necessary analysis for the major security challenges 
facing New Zealand. There is a lot of truth in what Rogers asserted, as this 
document is intended to be a strategic look forward in order to develop future 
capabilities. The DWP 2016 discussed current capabilities and their employment 
and not the capabilities that will be developed over the next 25 years.  
 
Intelligence and Security 
 
The documents and policies relating to the collection of intelligence in New 
Zealand is restricted to legislation and information on the intelligence agencies 
contained on their public websites. This is due to the confidential nature of their 
role in supporting national security. The responsibility of providing this 
information falls to the intelligence agencies, which in New Zealand are the 
Government Security and Communications Bureau (GCSB) and the New Zealand 
Security Intelligence Service (NZSIS). The collection of intelligence is conducted 
covertly and through concealed methods, which in a free and democratic nation 
such as New Zealand presents a number of issues. The issue of balancing the 
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requirement for effective intelligence gathering to support national security and 
the basic human right of freedom and liberty was addressed in Intelligence and 
Security in a Free Society Report of the First Independent Review of Intelligence 
and Security in New Zealand conducted in 2015 by Hon Sir Michael Cullen, 
KNZM and Dame Patsy Reddy, DNZM. The review was called for after concerns 
were raised about the legislation that the GCSB and the NZSIS operated under 
(Cullen & Reddy, 2016). The review was primarily focused on the legislation of 
intelligence and security: however, it did make recommendations for changes to 
the role and function of the two organisations.  
 
As a result of the 2015 review into the intelligence and security legislation, new 
legislation was quickly released, amending many of the issues identified. The 
Intelligence and Security Act 2017 established a new legislative framework for the 
intelligence agencies to operate in and also ensured that the intelligence agencies 
performed in accordance with New Zealand law and all human rights laws 
recognised by New Zealand (Parlimentary Counsel Office, 2017). The previous 
legislation that the intelligence and security agencies worked under preventing the 
sharing of information (Cullen & Reddy, 2016). This was considered barrier for 
effective intelligence gathering. Previous legislation came from the Cold War era 
and did not provide the right framework for dealing with the new security threats 
(Cullen & Reddy, 2016). The new act allows for the NZSIS and GCSB to work 
together in order to provide effective intelligence assessment to the government, 
its ministers, to DPMC as part of the NSS, as well as to other authorised agencies, 
such as the New Zealand Police and the NZDF. The Intelligence and Security Act 
2017 recognised that intelligence gathering is a vital part of security, it also 
recognises that the citizens must feel safe that their rights are being protected and 
that the government is operating in a legal, ethical and transparent manner.  
 
Civil Defence and Emergency Management 
 
DPMC state that resilience is ‘the right thing to do’ as an approach to national 
security, as ‘it will create a New Zealand where some risks are less likely to 
eventuate, where responses to events are more effective, where impacts are 
reduced and where recovery is faster’ (Department of the Prime Minister and 
 80 
Cabinet, 2017). This view and the ‘all-hazards/all-risks’ approach recognises that 
threats are not just man-made events but can also come from natural disasters. 
Since 2010 there have been 41 States of Emergency declared in New Zealand 
resulting from earthquakes, severe weather, flooding, cyclones and fire (Ministry 
of Civil Defence and Emergency Magagement, n.d.). Howard Broad pointed out, 
‘national security is the condition which permits citizens to go about their daily 
business’ (Broad, 2017). Therefore a disruptive natural event, which degrades the 
normal way life of the population must be viewed as a threat and be part of the 
national security framework.  
     
The response to natural disaster falls to MCDEM, a business unit of DPMC. Two 
key documents outlines its approach to emergency management: the Civil Defence 
and Emergency Management Act 2002, and the National CDEM Plan 2015. In the 
event of an emergency, such as geological, weather event, or the failure of 
infrastructure; MCDEM will lead the national response and recovery efforts. It 
does this through working with local government and the regional CDEM Groups 
to ensure that the right resources and services are available to the impacted 
communities. The Civil Defence and Emergency Management Act 2002, is the 
legislation that provided the guidance to the national, regional and local 
organisations for their role and authority during an event. It provided details of the 
legislative powers that each organisation is granted as well as the details on the 
declaration of a State of Emergency. It is important to note that MCDEM has no 
formal statutory responsibilities and has more of an oversight role of CDEM and 
ensures the necessary resources are available. This also allowed the CDEM 
Groups to decide their own performance measures and response frameworks 
(Ministry of Civil Defence and Emergency Management, 2017). This approach of 
not involving itself in the performance framework of the regional CDEM Groups 
has been criticised by the Ministerial Review into CDEM operations conducted in 
2017. It found that different standards that existed across the regions Civil 
Defence branches. It is important for a successful framework, to have 
commonality of operational functions within agencies.  
 
An important document that brings the legislation of the Civil Defence and 
Emergency Management Act 2002 into practice is the National CDEM Plan 2015. 
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The plan ‘aims to integrate and align agencies CDEM planning and related 
operational activities at the national level’ (Ministry of Civil Defence and 
Emergency Management, 2015). The National CDEM Plan 2015 is effectively an 
operational execution document providing information to a wide range of 
government departments and businesses for the coordination at the national level. 
It articulated the key responsibilities for each agency, the operational 
arrangements with other agencies and what function they are expected to make in 
response to an event. The strength of the National CDEM Plan 2015  is that it 
provided significant information on the Health and Disability Services, Lifeline 
Utilities (critical infrastructure such as water, power and communications) and 
also for Welfare Services. These are essential components of what has been 
presented as constituting a normal way of life for the population. For a citizen to 
go about their daily business, they should have unhindered access to health 
services, utilities and, if needed, welfare. Of the four other nation’s security 
frameworks reviewed, none of them directly addressed these aspects of the State’s 
services. The National CDEM Plan 2015 recognised that in order to provide 
security to the citizens, that the normal everyday parts of people lives that must be 
protected.  
 
Counter-Terrorism 
 
Recent terrorist attacks in Europe demonstrated how the violent acts of a few can 
have significant impacts on the citizens of the State. The information age and 
globalisation has meant that terrorism is no longer just a state-based threat (Broad, 
2017). The evolution of global terrorism and non-state groups such as Da’esh 
have demonstrated that extremist groups are willing and able to take their fight to 
any part of the planet. New Zealand has experienced some direct terrorist attacks 
over recent years. The Rainbow Warrior bombing in 1985, the bombings of the 
Wellington Trade Halls and the Wanganui computer bombings of the 1980’s, 
were all domestic terrorist attacks (Battersby, 2017). Although New Zealand has 
not suffered an attack such as the Paris attacks of 2015, New Zealand has had 
terrorist organisations attempt to use New Zealand as part of their activities. New 
Zealand has seen individuals with links to terrorist organisations attempt to transit 
through New Zealand or travel overseas to conflict zones like Syria as Foreign 
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Terrorist Fighters (FTF)  (Ministry of Civil Defence and Emergency 
Management, 2015). New Zealand has developed legislation and policy 
surrounding the threat of terrorism, however, these documents are old and have 
not kept pace with the rapid evolution and increase in the terrorist threat to New 
Zealand.   
 
New Zealand’s first counter terrorist policy was developed in 1987 under the 
International Terrorism (Emergency Powers) Act. This was at a time when 
terrorist attacks were mostly limited to state-based groups such as the Irish 
Republican Army, in Great Britain; Euskadi Ta Askatasuna an armed leftist 
Basque nationalist and separatist organisation in the Basque Country; and the 
Palestine Liberation Organization in the Middle East. These groups concentrated 
their efforts on political change within their own State and territory with limited 
attacks being conducted outside of their borders. It was in 2001 when al Qaeda 
backed terrorists attacked the United States killing over 2000 persons, that New 
Zealand reviewed its terrorism policy. The Terrorism Suppression Act 2002 was 
passed as a result of the changing nature of terrorist activity at the time. The act 
itself is the legislative document that allows government agencies to act in the 
event of a terrorist attack or activity and provides the authority and guidelines. It 
defined terrorism and the related activities such as the financing of terrorists, 
recruitment of members and defined what each different act is, such as what a 
terrorist bombing is (Government of New Zealand, 2002). Unfortunately, the 
Terrorism Suppression Act 2002  has proven to have serious shortcomings.  
 
Operation Eight was a series of anti-terror raids conducted by the New Zealand 
Police against a group operating in the Urewera Forest in New Zealand. This 
group was conducting military style training and weapons training to conduct 
attacks against political leaders within New Zealand (Battersby, 2017). Due to the 
technical requirements of what defines a terrorist act, the 16 suspects that were 
arrested by the New Zealand Police were not charged with any of the laws under 
the Terrorism Suppression Act 2002 and instead, only four of those arrested, faced 
arms related charges (Cheng, 2007). It is concerning that with the threat of 
terrorism very real, the framework and the laws surrounding it are unable to be 
used effectively in the prosecution of suspected terrorists. The NSS concerning 
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countering terrorism is light on detail and does not provide what can be 
considered a strong approach to countering this threat.  
 
Under the seven overarching national security objectives contained within the NSS 
Handbook (2016), terrorism is not directly referred to. Instead it comes under the 
objective of ‘protecting the physical security of New Zealand Citizens’ (DPMC, 
2016).  Apart from the Terrorism Suppression Act 2002, there is no other 
document that deals directly with terrorism. There is a section on Counter 
Terrorism in the National CDEM Plan 2015. It articulated how the strategic aim 
of New Zealand’s Counter Terrorist effort is to ensure that New Zealand is 
‘neither the victim nor the source of an act of terrorism’ (Ministry of Civil 
Defence and Emergency Management, 2015). It set out how the Combined Threat 
Assessment Group (CTAG), within the NZSIS, assesses terrorist activities and 
how this is then disseminated to other agencies. There is no single government 
agency that is identified as being solely responsible for counter-terrorism, instead 
CDEM and the NSS appear to be the two agencies responsible for the delivery of 
counter terrorist coordination. In addition, the Ministry of Justice and MFAT are 
the two agencies responsible for administering the Terrorism Suppression Act 
2002 and the New Zealand Police are the lead agency for any terrorist threat that 
emerges within New Zealand (DPMC, 2016). This dispersed nature of 
responsibility between the NSS, CDEM, MFAT, the New Zealand Police and the 
Ministry of Justice is a very messy approach to dealing with any terrorist threat. 
With all these different agencies with different responsibilities, it is difficult to see 
how the counter-terrorist framework can be effective. It has already been proven 
that the legislation surrounding counter-terrorism is ineffective. Therefore, it is 
concluded from this research that there are concerns about the effectiveness of a 
response to a terrorist event.  
 
Cyber Security 
 
The evolution of global trade and communication has increased global 
interconnectedness, where States are now connected through a vast number of 
complex networks. This comes with significant threats to New Zealand’s national 
security. The development of the cyber domain provides those that would threaten 
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New Zealand’s way of life with a new platform in which to attack, subvert or 
conduct espionage. New Zealand relies upon its ability to trade and because of 
New Zealand’s geographic location also relies on its connection with the globe. 
With estimates that cyber-crime cost the global economy USD 6.6 Trillion last 
year (Nelson, 2018), it is vital for the New Zealand economy that New Zealand 
has an effective cyber-security framework. The coordination of cyber security sits 
within DPMC under SIG. The National Cyber Police Office (NCPO) is 
responsible for the development of cyber security policy advice to government. 
NCPO reports formally to the Minister of Broadcasting Communications and 
Digital Media (DPMC, 2018), which is interesting as this broadens the span of 
organisations that have input or responsibilities into the national security 
framework. It would make more sense for organisations that are responsible for 
national security to have tighter reporting lines to only a few ministers, rather than 
the spread that is becoming evident. It is understood that New Zealand has a 
whole-of-government approach to national security, however, this does not mean 
that the whole-of-government needs to be involved with every aspect. There 
should be one organisation responsible for cyber-security that can reach out to 
resources from the whole-of-government and the private sector.  
 
A cyber-attack can occur from anywhere in the world and with no warning. 
Cyber-attacks have the ability to disable and disrupt anything form New 
Zealand’s financial systems, emergency services, energy, communication and 
transport services. The New Zealand government has taken a collaborative 
approach with the private sector, in developing a cyber-security strategy. The 
2015 Cyber Security Strategy has four security goals (DPMC, 2015);  
 
- Cyber resilience – maintaining information infrastructures that can resist 
cyber threats,  
- Cyber Capability – business and government understand threats and 
protection capabilities,  
- Addressing Cyber-crime – the investigation and response of cyber-crime, 
and  
- International Cooperation – through continued investment in international 
cyber-security activities.  
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Part of The 2015 Cyber Security Strategy is the Connect Smart partnership. This 
is a public-private collaboration coordinated by the NCPO, that brings together 
government agencies and private companies such as banks, telecommunication, 
software, social media, education and retail organisations. The purpose of this 
collaboration is to share information and develop cyber-response plans. The 2015 
Cyber Security Strategy recognises that the private sector owns the systems and 
infrastructure that is used and this drives our economy, so therefore, collaboration 
is vital in the securing of the cyber domain. This is one of the few instances in 
New Zealand’s national security framework where it is recognised that the private 
sector has an important role to play in leading the requirements of security and 
demonstrated how important it is for any security strategy to put the needs of the 
citizens at the forefront.    
 
Two organisations from two different agencies are responsible for the operational 
response to a cyber-attack. The National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC) within 
GCSB is responsible for providing protective cyber services and guidance to 
‘organisations of national significance’, as well as taking the lead on cyber 
incidents at the national level (New Zealand Government, 2017). Within the 
Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment (MBIE), the Computer 
Emergency Response Team (CERT) provide a lower level of cyber security 
advice to organisations that do not require the level of specialist skills that the 
NCSC possess. In addition to these organisations, the Protective Security 
Requirements is an organisation that is supported by both the GCSB and the 
NZSIS. Protective Security Requirements sponsors the New Zealand Information 
Security Manual, that sets out the guidelines for the protection of information in 
the cyber domain. There are a number of agencies that provide cyber security to 
different levels of the community, across business, personal, social welfare 
agencies (education, health etc), each with their own level of responsibilities and 
capabilities.  
 
The New Zealand cyber-security framework is quite broad, however, its control 
suffers from being dispersed across many different organisations. There are five 
different agencies that have a cyber security responsibility: NCPO, NCSC, CERT, 
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Protective Security Requirements and Connect Smart. These agencies report to or 
are controlled by five government ministries or departments: NZSIS, GCSB, 
MBIE, DPMC and the Minister of Broadcasting Communications and Digital 
Media. This wide framework aligns to the whole-of-government approach to 
security, however, there should be a more effective system for the control of 
cyber-security. It is the recommendation from this research project that control of 
cyber-security be changed from the current system of the five different agencies to 
one centralised agency. The execution of cyber-security should remain as it 
currently is, decentralised to different agencies responsible for different levels of 
response.   
 
Assessment of New Zealand’s national security framework 
 
With no national security strategy to provide central guidance on the development 
and maintenance of New Zealand’s national security, the framework that is in 
place is a series of policy, plans and legislation that is loosely connected at best 
and often siloed in its development and execution. The framework in place for the 
response to an event that may impact adversely on New Zealand is reactionary. 
The following section compares the six components of the normal way of life 
against the New Zealand national security framework. It will assess how this 
framework protects these components and enables New Zealand citizens to live 
free from fear.  
 
Welfare   
 
Ensuring that the conditions of people’s daily lives is protected and their welfare 
is upheld is a component of the normal way of life concept. Whereas the other 
four nations reviewed in Chapter 3, mention the importance of protecting the 
citizens and their way of life, the New Zealand national security framework 
directly deals with the component of Welfare through the CDEM 2015 National 
Plan. The CDEM 2015 National Plan detailed the range of organisations and 
agencies responsible for the delivery of welfare services, including: the New 
Zealand Police, Ministry of Health, MBIE and MPI. It articulated how, during any 
crisis, it is essential that people have access to shelter, accommodation, financial 
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services and also psychological services in order to strengthen their self-resilience 
(Ministry of Civil Defence and Emergency Management, 2015). Additionally, the 
CDEM National Plan 2015 detailed how health and disability services will be 
maintained during a crisis through the Ministry of Health. The CDEM National 
Plan 2015 also described how attacks on lifeline utilities such as water, transport, 
energy and telecommunications services will be responded to. This is a strength of 
the New Zealand national security framework, as it recognises the importance of 
continuing the provision of these services during an event that impacts on the 
normal way life of New Zealand citizens.   
 
The Welfare component of the normal way of life is also protected through the 
cyber-security and counter-terrorism plans. The New Zealand cyber-security 
framework is to ensure that the online architecture of New Zealand is secure and 
protected from attack, as well as being resilient enough to recover quickly from an 
event (DPMC, 2015). The cyber domain is tightly interconnected and services 
such as banking, health and critical infrastructure are connected within this 
domain. An example of the impact of an attack would be if the computer system 
of the MSD was attacked and the financial support payments to the individuals 
were not completed. There would be a significant impact for those that rely on 
this financial support for their daily survival. Likewise, the protection of New 
Zealand citizens from a terrorist attack is a function of security that allows for the 
protection of the Welfare component. The threat of terrorism against the 
population or against critical infrastructure is an ever-present danger. The result of 
a terrorist attack will not only impact those that are directly involved, but can also 
impact those not involved, causing people to change their everyday behaviour out 
of fear of becoming the next victim (Luhmann & Bleidorn, 2018).  Part of the 
Welfare component of the normative life is protecting the conditions that the 
people live in. Counter-terrorism enables this by protecting the critical 
infrastructure, such as transportation, and allowing the people the ability to go 
where they need free from harm. The importance of access to welfare services has 
been identified in the CDEM National Plan 2015 response plans and there are 
agencies responsible for the execution of operations and protective measures in 
place that protect the Welfare component.   
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Law and Order 
 
The Policing Act 2008 is the legislation that guides the New Zealand Police in 
providing the population with peace, law enforcement and security and therefore 
contributes to the protection of the Law and Order component of the normal way 
of life. The police are supported by the Ministry of Justice in maintaining law and 
order on a daily business, however, it is in the aftermath of a significant crisis that 
law and order is most likely to break down. History has shown that law and order 
can collapse after a natural catastrophe. Large scale looting and civil disorder took 
place in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina in New Orleans in 2005 and in the 
same year after the earthquakes in Pakistan (Bobbitt, 2008). Looting also took 
place after the Christchurch Earthquakes in 2010, 2011 and 2015 (New Zealand 
Herald, 2016). It is during the aftermath of an event that law and order will most 
likely diminish and therefore a national security framework should be able to cope 
with this issue. The New Zealand Police in conjunction with the Ministry of 
Justice provide the protection of the Law and Order component of the normal way 
of life.  
 
Within the CDEM National Plan 2015, intelligence gathering, counter-terrorism, 
and cyber-security contribute to ensuring that New Zealand maintains law and 
order. The New Zealand intelligence agencies are responsible for providing the 
analysis of threats and risk posed to New Zealand (Government of New Zealand, 
2017). This intelligence is used by the New Zealand Police and other agencies to 
protect law and order. This intelligence is used enable the protection of New 
Zealand from a terrorist attack and feeds into the agencies that would respond to 
any terrorist activity. Additionally, the New Zealand Cyber-security framework, 
led by the NCPO, is intended to protect against a cyber-attack targeting key 
national systems and institutions.  
 
The CDEM National Plan 2015 articulated when and how a State of Emergency 
can be initiated as a result of an event. A State of Emergency will provide the 
New Zealand Police and other agencies additional powers to provide law and 
order and ensure public safety. The provision of the Law and Order component 
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within the normal way of life concept is well represented by the New Zealand 
government agencies, legislation and plans. It is built upon by the daily provision 
of law and order that is executed by the New Zealand Police and the Ministry of 
Justice. The current national security framework recognises that in an crisis where 
law and order may be threatened, there are sufficient plans and legislation to 
escalate the powers the government agencies to enable an effective response.  
 
Government  
 
The government of New Zealand has two roles in relation to national security. 
These two roles are: the maintenance of confidence in normal conditions and 
secondly to provide leadership in crisis conditions and to ensure minimal impact 
or disruption in an event (DPMC, 2016). The government maintains the citizens 
normal way of life through a regulatory environment and ensuring that the State’s 
institutions are operating effectively. One of the seven objectives of national 
security is the maintenance of democratic institutions (DPMC, 2016). Recent 
changes and amendments to New Zealand’s laws relating to national security 
indicates that governments (both current and previous) have operated in a 
transparent and open manner. The most significant change has been within the 
Intelligence and Security Act 2017. The independent review of this legislation in 
2016 identified a number of issues with the function of the security agencies and 
recommended changes (Cullen & Reddy, 2016). As a result of this review, the 
legislation was changed, not only to ensure that the rights of the New Zealand 
people were protected from unwarranted intrusion and investigation, but also to 
ensure that national security in New Zealand was maintained.  
 
In addition to maintaining legislation that protects the citizens of the State, the 
government is responsible for ensuring that security related plans are developed 
and maintained. The National CDEM Plan 2015 and the NSS Handbook 2016 are 
both documents that have been recently developed, that articulate the details of 
how security will be provided during a crisis. The 2015 Cyber Security Strategy 
provides a plan for the development of cyber-security capabilities as well as 
providing details of how cyber-security will be conducted upon an attack against 
the national cyber domain. The New Zealand cyber-security framework works in 
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close partnership with the private sector and emphasised the importance of a 
collaborative effort between government and the public for delivering and 
developing security for the whole of society.  The government has the 
responsibility of providing security to the people and in the normal way of life 
concept, government needs to exist in an open and transparent manner to provide 
security, while also protecting the rights of the people. It is concluded form this 
research project that the New Zealand government operates in a transparent 
manner that protects the Government component of the normal way of life 
concept.  
 
Economy 
 
New Zealand has an open economy that relies significantly on international trade. 
With 77% of the country’s export merchandise coming from the primary sector 
(Ministry for Primary Industries, 2015), New Zealand not only relies upon the 
physical ability to trade via safe transport routes, but also being able to protect its 
products from biohazards. The New Zealand economy requires a well ordered 
secure environment that allows people and institutions the freedom to go about 
their economic activities. Some risks to New Zealand’s economic security are 
outside of New Zealand’s control. Global events such as the Global Financial 
Crisis of 2009 and the possibility of New Zealand’s major trading nations 
developing trade agreements that exclude New Zealand, are risks that the 
government have little ability to protect against (Hoadley, 2017). Direct threats to 
the economy of New Zealand can be both man-made, natural or from the cyber-
domain.  
 
Direct threats to the economic security of New Zealand can come from cyber-
attack, terrorist threats and threats to its physical lines of communication. New 
Zealand’s cyber-security framework is based on a collaboration between the 
government agencies of DPMC, NZSIS and GCSB. Through the Connect Smart 
partnership, which is a New Zealand government sponsored cyber-security 
programme. In order to protect against direct terrorist threats and to secure New 
Zealand’s physical lines of communication, the national security framework 
utilises the New Zealand intelligence agencies and the NZDF. New Zealand relies 
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on the ability to export its goods to international markets and customers using air 
and sea transport. Additionally, the nodes including: the harbours, ports and 
airports within New Zealand, need to be protected. The NZDF contributes to this 
aspect of national security by ‘securing the border and approaches…and 
maintenance of New Zealand’s prosperity via secure sea, air and electronic lines 
of communication’ (Ministry of Defence, 2016, p. 9). A terrorist attack is another 
direct threat that could undermine New Zealand’s economic security. New 
Zealand needs to demonstrate that it is a safe nation to trade with, therefore, it 
requires the capabilities necessary to deter and defeat terrorist activities.  
 
Protection of the Economy component of the normal way of life is challenging. 
There exists an extensive network of business, government and personal 
institutions that require protection. The New Zealand government sets out its 
macroeconomic policies that are designed to enable effective management of the 
national economy. The government also influences the national economy through 
microeconomic interactions. Beyond the economic policy, physical security to the 
different economic institutions require protection. The New Zealand national 
security framework has a range of capabilities that provide security to the 
territorial borders, to the cyber-domain and overall security to allow its citizens to 
go about their daily business free from fear. Therefore it is concluded that the 
Economy component of the normal way of life is protected.    
 
Freedom and Equality 
 
The laws that govern New Zealand’s national security protect the freedom and 
equality of its citizens. The Intelligence and Security Act 2017 is an example of 
legislation that not only provide the rules for the security of the State, but also 
protects the people’s rights. This is demonstrated through the declared purpose of 
the act, which is to protect New Zealand as a free, open and democratic society. 
Additionally, the act ensures that the functions of New Zealand’s intelligence 
agencies are executed in accordance with the nations laws and all human rights 
laws, both domestic and international that are recognised by New Zealand 
(Government of New Zealand, 2017). The failed prosecution of the Urewera 16 
showed that the New Zealand judicial system operates fairly in the application of 
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these laws. Although the acts of this group were considered by the New Zealand 
Police to be acts of terror, they were not prosecuted as the Solicitor-General 
deemed the evidence fell short of the requirements of the act. It was the review of 
intelligence and security by Cullen and Reedy, that stated that the government 
cannot trade off security against human rights and in the case of the Urewera 16, it 
demonstrated that the functioning of the New Zealand judicial system protects the 
freedoms of the people.  
 
Securing the component of Freedom and Equality is enshrined within the NSS 
Handbook 2016. Two of the objectives of national security include: Ensuring 
Public Safety and Maintaining democratic institutions and national values 
(DPMC, 2016, p. 8). It is not a direct reference to securing the component of 
Freedom and Equality, however, it is the intent of these objectives which will 
provide this security.  
 
Security 
 
Both Bobbitt (2008) and Sørensen (2005) argued that security is part of what 
makes up an effective State. The purpose of security is to neutralise the most 
significant threats so that the population is protected from harm or at least the 
harm that may be caused, is mitigated as much as possible (Snow, 2016). The 
approach that New Zealand has taken to its national security framework is based 
on an ‘all-hazards/all-risks’ approach (DPMC, 2016). New Zealand accepts that it 
cannot list all possible hazards and be proactive against mitigating them all and 
therefore, will focus on reacting to a crisis when it occurs. This does not mean that 
New Zealand avoids proactively neutralising threats, as its intelligence agencies, 
the New Zealand Police and the NZDF all have proactive security functions. 
However, the major focus is on building resilience throughout the community that 
is supported by an adaptable and responsive NSS (Department of the Prime 
Minister and Cabinet, 2017).    
 
Based on the research conducted on New Zealand’s national security framework 
and its response to recent crisis it is assessed that the Security component of the 
normal way of life is provided for. New Zealand has not experienced any direct 
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hostilities against its sovereignty or terrorist attacks from international terrorist 
groups in recent history, therefore, based on this, security to New Zealand is 
provided. However, the New Zealand national security framework and the NSS 
has not been tested against a significant threat. There is no open source 
information on other events that have occurred that have threatened New 
Zealand’s national security and activated the NSS. The case study of the 
activation of the NSS was against a threat to the production of infant formula. 
Although this threat had significant consequences for New Zealand’s food 
security reputation, it was a threat that only targeted a small section of the 
community; being those that use a specific brand of infant formula. The New 
Zealand national security framework is a reactive system and can only be assessed 
against its response. Therefore, it is concluded that the component of Security has 
been enabled under the New Zealand national security framework.        
 
Benefits of the New Zealand national security framework 
 
Wolfers (1952) provided the most accurate reflection of how national security 
should be developed. He articulated the need for the State to choose the values 
that they want to be protected, what the level of security should be and also how 
the State is willing to achieve it. New Zealand’s national security framework is 
articulated within the seven objectives of national security (DPMC, 2016). These 
seven objectives are used by some government agencies within their own security 
plans and policies. The objectives encompass physical security to New Zealand’s 
borders, territory; including New Zealand’s environment, lines of communication 
and the security of the population. It also encompasses themes such as protecting 
the cyber domain, national values, economic prosperity and the contribution to the 
international order. These objectives then feed into the ‘all-hazards/all-risks’ 
approach that has been adopted by the New Zealand government.  
 
New Zealand’s national security framework provides guidance on how the 
response to a crisis will occur. In contrast, the review of the four nation’s security 
frameworks conducted in Chapter Three identified varying levels of strategy and 
plans. None of the nations had an open source publication that provided the detail 
of what will occur in response to a range of different crisis’. This approach of 
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having well published plans also fits into the whole-of-society approach to 
national security. Although it is not directly articulated as doing so, this method of 
publishing the plans provide the population with some understanding of what will 
occur in the event of a crisis and this allows them to feel ‘included’ in the plans. 
The NSS Handbook and the National CDEM Plan 2015 provide the operational 
guidance to all government agencies on their roles and responsibilities. As a 
reactive national security system, it is concluded that there are the necessary 
documents that support the government’s approach.     
 
Criticisms of the New Zealand national security framework 
 
The New Zealand national security framework is based around responding to 
events and having the measures in place for an effective response, however, it 
does not contain a forward-looking strategy. There are individual agency 
documents that do have forward-looking elements to them, such as the DWP 2016 
and Biosecurity 2025, however, these are not connected to each other or any other 
agency plan. The intent behind a national security strategy would provide 
government agencies with centralised and common direction and guidance, so 
when developing their national security capabilities, they are coordinated with 
other agencies (Johanson, 2017). There is very little in the way of strategic 
thinking when it comes to national security (Rogers, 2017). MFAT has reduced its 
Strategic Policy Division, highlighting that there does not appear to be an 
emphasis for developing strategic direction for national security. The whole-of-
society approach to national security is based around collaboration between 
government agencies and with the private sector. However, there is no strategy for 
how this will occur, or how the government intends to develop a more inclusive 
approach.  
 
The DWP 2016 states that it is a forward-looking document, although this is more 
of an enhanced capability development paper and has much of the same 
information and characteristics of the previous defence white paper of 2010 
(Rogers, 2017). It was noted by Demos (2007) that the boundaries between 
domestic and international politics have become blurred and interconnected and 
therefore it is necessary for the UK to take a networked approach to security 
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strategy. It should be no different for New Zealand. Additionally, a national 
security strategy should include the conduct of a comprehensive review of the 
strategy at regular intervals. At present the reviews are ad hoc and for one 
particular piece of legislation or plan at a time. The Intelligence and Security 
Review was conducted in 2017, yet there has been no review of the Terrorism 
Suppression Act 2002, which are two acts that should be viewed connected in this 
current threat environment. The National CDEM Plan 2015 was reviewed in 
2017, two years after its release, however there has been no identified review of 
the National Security System Handbook that was released in 2016. A national 
security strategy will develop a timeframe for the review of all national security 
documents.  
 
It has been widely acknowledged within the documents and plans reviewed in this 
chapter, that the security environment is evolving and the threats faced are 
broadening. It would make sense therefore to develop a framework that goes 
beyond the current focus of government agencies involved in national security. 
The Cold War era saw security provided by defence, police and the intelligence 
agencies. Now the responsibility for security has been broadened to include a 
range of different agencies that can respond to a wide range of threats, however, 
this is not enough and there is a need to include private business in the national 
security architecture. The population is now becoming the focus of national 
security and for this to be achieved it is necessary to widen the inclusion to the 
private sector for the development of an effective security strategy. The need for 
an increase in the private-public sector dialogue is articulated by Professor 
Rouben Azizian, Director, Centre for Defence and Security Studies, who argued 
that businesses should be more vocal pre-crisis, as at the moment they only 
become involved after an event has occurred (New Zealand Security Magazine, 
2017).  This view is also championed by Captain David Morgan in his recent 
address to the Second New Zealand National Security Conference, where he 
suggested that major companies, such as Air New Zealand and Fonterra, need to 
be actively involved in the national security dialogue (Morgan, 2018). The 
protection of the economy is one of the seven objectives of New Zealand’s 
national security. Therefore, it would make sense to have a more inclusive 
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environment for the private sector to be involved in the development of a security 
strategy and framework.    
 
With the broadening of threats to national security, so have the number of 
agencies that are responsible for contributing to the provision of security. Within 
the National Security Handbook there are 17 identified hazard scenarios with 12 
different government agencies responsible for taking the lead agency role during a 
response, and to support this there is 27 different pieces of legislation (DPMC, 
2016). This broadening of responsibilities can be highlighted by examining the 
response to a hypothetical cyber-security threat. Under the NSS if a major cyber 
incident was to occur, GCSB has the lead for the response. It would fall to the 
NCSC in GCSB for the operational lead, and the NCPO as part of DPMC would 
have the policy lead. This means that during a crisis there are two agencies 
responding to one event. Even though they are separated between policy and 
operational, there is concern that cross-agency coordination could lead to delays 
in response; considering the speed that a cyber threat can occur this would be an 
understandable outcome. In addition to these two organisations, there are two 
other agencies that support cyber security. CERT, as part of MBIE, provides 
cyber security support to agencies and organisations that do not require the level 
of support that the NCSC provide. In addition the governments instructions for the 
protection of the cyber domain are published in the New Zealand Information 
Security Manual, that is controlled by the Protective Security Requirements under 
GCSB. This demonstrates the complicated web that exists for the provision of 
cyber security. The example of cyber security demonstrates that for this type of 
hazard there are three agencies that have an input to some part of the response. It 
is acknowledged that the coordination of the NSS is the responsibility of SIG 
within DPMC, however, with a threat such as cyber that cuts across all aspects of 
society, a centralised system of response within one agency would be a more 
efficient approach.  
 
For New Zealand’s national security framework to be effective it is necessary that 
the ideas of how the State will provide security to the population and what is 
required of them, is effectively communicated. This is not the case for the New 
Zealand security framework. The NSS Handbook is a little-known publication, 
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with one prominent business leader commenting that he ‘didn’t know about it 
until [he] was asked for an interview’ (Durning, 2017). Even the National CDEM 
Plan 2015 suffers from the same anonymity. Although Buzan and Chomsky 
argued that the State constructs their security discourse (Partow, 2017). In the case 
of the New Zealand framework there is little public discussion on the subject, 
meaning that security is hardly in the consciousness of the population. It appears 
that the only time there is a significant public debate on security matters is when 
there is an outcry over additional funding for a security agency such as the NZDF 
(Trotter, 2016) or as a result of an agency conducting an unlawful operation (New 
Zealand Herald, 2018). Although New Zealand has seen an increase in security 
concerns over the last decade (Broad, 2017), the two main security threats that 
New Zealanders fear are Identity Theft and Credit Card Fraud (DefSec Media, 
2017). These are not significant national security threats and risks that have been 
identified in government discourse. There is a balance required when 
communicating security threats and systems to the public. On one hand, the 
government should ensure that the public is kept calm and provide the population 
with the comfort of knowing that they [the government] can provide them with 
security. On the other hand, if the government wants to engage with and have a 
resilient society when it comes to the response to a security crisis, then there 
needs to be an effective communication framework in place that can inform the 
public.  
 
What is evident through the review of New Zealand’s national security framework 
is the irregular publication of security related policy, plans and legislation. Table 3 
shows the documents reviewed in this chapter with the year of their release. The 
only two documents that have a connection are the Report of the First 
Independent Review of Intelligence and Security in New Zealand and the 
Intelligence and Security Act. The report was released in 2016 and was used to 
assist in the development of the Intelligence and Security Act that was released in 
2017. For strategy to be effective, a robust review system should be implemented 
as part of the framework, that will inform the development of policy and plans, as 
well as future strategy. The remainder of the documents reviewed have no 
connection in their release date and no pattern is set. For a coherent strategy, there 
should be a framework where a central document is released, that will then inform 
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and direct the release of subsequent documents. The current New Zealand national 
security framework does not have a coherent structure that connects individual 
government agencies, national security related policy and plans.       
 
 
 2002 2008 2015 2016 2017 
P
o
li
cy
 
Terrorism 
Suppression 
Act 
Policing Act National 
CDEM Plan 
Biosecurity 
2025 
Intelligence 
and Security 
Act 
Civil Defence 
and 
Emergency 
Management 
Act 
 Cyber 
Security 
Strategy 
National 
Security 
System 
Handbook 
 
  Defence 
White Paper 
Report of the 
First 
Independent 
Review of 
Intelligence 
and Security 
in New 
Zealand 
Table 3: Reviewed New Zealand Security document’s release dates. 
 
Conclusion 
 
There is no central New Zealand national security strategy, instead, New Zealand 
has adopted a reactive based system that is centrally coordinated through DPMC. 
Two key conclusions were reached from the review of New Zealand’s national 
security framework. The first key conclusion is that the national security 
framework under the NSS, appears on paper, to be an appropriate system to react 
to a national security crisis. The NSS provides central coordination to ensure 
appropriate agencies and resources are available in the event of a security threat. 
The example used in this chapter, reviewed the activation of the NSS and has 
concluded that the response system was effective in relation to the threat, 
however, the threat was not significant, nor did it effect the whole-of-society. The 
effectiveness of the NSS cannot be completely determined until such time as there 
is a significant national security crisis that impacts the whole-of-society. 
Therefore, the conclusion is that the NSS appears to be structured to provide a 
whole-of-government response to a national security crisis.  
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The second key conclusion, is through the review of the New Zealand national 
security framework, the development of the individual agency policies and plans 
relating to national security are done in isolation. There is no evidence of the 
policies and plans having coordination between them, or informing each other. 
There is coordination between the agencies in the response to a security threat, 
however, there should be a framework that includes a centralised threat analysis 
and a coordinated policy and plan implementation and review system.  
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Chapter Five: Developing a New Zealand National Security Strategy 
 
Introduction 
 
New Zealand should adopt a national security strategy. A strategy that takes into 
account the changing environment, protects the values and institutions of New 
Zealand and protects against evolving and emerging threats. Adopting a national 
security strategy will allow for the effective development of security capabilities 
across all government agencies and should be inclusive of the private sector and 
business. The national security strategy will also articulate how the different 
security policies and plans are nested within each other and guide when and how 
these are to be reviewed and changed. The national security strategy does not need 
to be overly complicated, instead it should provide a basis for enhancing the 
nation’s ability to provide security to the whole of society.  
 
Chapter Five breaks the development of the New Zealand national security 
strategy into four parts. Firstly a theoretical base for the development of a strategy 
is proposed. Based upon the analysis of the current New Zealand national security 
narrative it is recommended that a Human Security approach be adopted.  The 
chapter proposes five threats to New Zealand’s national security. These five 
threats have been identified through this research project that impact the whole-
of-society and would require a whole-of-government response. The third part of 
Chapter Five details the recommendation for the implementation of the National 
Security Strategy and how it would integrate with the government agencies 
responsible for contributing to national security. The chapter will then discuss the 
meaning of the term resilience that is used in current national security discourse. 
The chapter concludes by asserting that New Zealand should adopt a national 
security strategy. A strategy that takes into account the changing environment, 
focuses on the values and institutions that should be protected, which has been 
presented as the normal way of life, comprising of six key components of the 
State and balanced against evolving and emerging threats 
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The Theoretical Base of Strategy Development   
 
There are a myriad of ways of developing strategy and different theoretical 
approaches that can be utilised. There does not exist a system for the development 
of a national security strategy that is widely accepted or proven to be the most 
effective. Instead, it is up to the nation to decide how to develop and execute 
strategy. The idea behind national security is to protect the values of the State, or 
at least identify those values that are important and should be protected. One idea 
taken from a business approach to strategic development is to have the core values 
and purpose fixed while having their business strategies endlessly adapting to the 
changing environment (Collins & Porras, 2011). The first part that New Zealand 
must do is decide what the position that the State will take in the world and what 
core values will be protected. The first step in the process of strategy development 
requires New Zealand to develop its policy and consider what type of approach 
will be taken and what the foundations of strategy are. Secondly, the core values 
must be identified. In this chapter, the development of New Zealand’s security 
strategy is based on the six components of the normal way life outlined in Chapter 
Two. These provide a baseline of the core values and institutions that New 
Zealand should protect.   
 
New Zealand should consider a theoretical approach that it will take in the 
development of a national security strategy. New Zealand had previously adopted 
a strong Realist approach to its defence policy. According to McCraw (2008), 
New Zealand adopted a realist defence policy from the start of the 20th century, as 
it recognised the necessity of military forces for security and the value of having 
larger allies. In contrast, the core priorities of Liberal theory are to provide 
international order, justice and liberty through good governance within the State 
and also between States (Dunne, 2005). New Zealand’s centre-left governments 
have traditionally supported liberalism and the international order and have 
historically maintained an anti-military tradition (McCraw, 1998). Having 
differing views of international relations theory is part of a democracy and 
provides balance to the national political environment. New Zealand has a 
bipartisan approach to national security, where the sitting government and the 
opposition are involved in matters of national security (Broad, 2017). Therefore it 
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is asserted that rather than having differing views that change with the change of 
government is problematic as it continually shifts the focus of security. This 
constant shifting has a negative impact on effective capability development. It is 
asserted that a single common theory be used for the development of a national 
security strategy.  
 
The concept of Human Security that has become part of the security discourse 
since the 1990’s and has shifted the referent object from the State being the 
primary thing that needs to be secured, to the population. The two core principles 
of human security are ‘freedom from fear’ and ‘freedom from want’ (Tow, 2013). 
The concepts of ‘freedom from fear’ and ‘freedom from want’ already exist 
within the vernacular of New Zealand’s security framework. It is one of the 
essential foundations and according to DPMC’s Deputy Chief Executive, Security 
& Intelligence, Howard Broad ‘national security is the condition which permits 
the citizens of the state to go about their daily business confidently, free from fear 
and able to make the most of their way of life’ (Broad, 2017, p. 146). There is 
evidence in the narrative that the focal point of New Zealand’s security is the 
people. The basis for Human Security can be expanded to include (Ministry of 
Defence, 2001): 
 
- The availability of essential commodities such as water, medical aid, 
shelter and food. 
- Broader environmental security. 
- Freedom from persecution. 
- Protecting cultural values. 
- Responsible and transparent government.  
 
These elements demonstrate that the concept of Human Security goes beyond just 
the freedom from fear and want and also presents a list of tangible objects that can 
be secured.  
 
Human Security emphasises the security of the people and communities over the 
traditional focus on securing the territory. The two core elements of ‘freedom 
from fear’ and ‘freedom from want’ are what Snow (2016) described as the sense 
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(feeling) of security. It is therefore necessary to translate the elements of ‘freedom 
from fear and want’ from the subjective to something that is more ‘objective’ in 
the minds of security planners. This will enable a national security strategy to be 
developed and security capabilities built. Developing an objective basis for a 
strategy out of a subjective sense would be challenging, therefore, it is argued that 
the normal way of life concept that was presented in Chapter Two, be used as the 
‘objective’ framework for the basis of strategy development. There needs to be 
something tangible that can be secured and the six components of: Security, 
Economy, Freedom and Equality, Government, Law and Order, and Welfare, will 
be used to provide that basis. What makes up a normal way of life is a person’s 
access to and benefit from these six components. It is argued here, that these six 
components provide a person with the freedom from both fear and want. They 
have also been developed from analysis of what constitutes a modern State and 
therefore the make-up of New Zealand. Strategy needs to be developed from a 
‘Strategic Posture’ – one that defines the strategy relative to the environment 
(Courtney, Kirkland, & Viguere, 1997). By using the concept of Human Security 
and by using the basis of the normal way of life and the six components that form 
this concept, the basis of a national security strategy for New Zealand can be 
developed.  
 
Threats for the strategy development 
 
The environment that the State exists within needs to be understood so that an 
effective strategy can be developed. This will allow for the development of a list 
of threats that New Zealand faces. The responsibility for developing a risk 
assessment lies with the National Risk Unit (NRU) under DPMC (DPMC, 2016). 
However, as New Zealand takes and ‘all-hazards/all-risks’ approach to threats, 
there is no consolidated list, as exists for example under the UK’s National 
Security Strategy and Strategic Defence Review (2015). What does exist is an 
‘Overarching Security Context’ contained within the DWP 2016. It lists the 
security context as (Ministry of Defence, 2016): 
 
- The rise of Asia, not only in terms of economic power distribution, but 
also in the increase in military spending. 
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- The changing characteristics of conflict, with an increase in the 
activities and global reach of well-armed and supported non-state 
groups. 
- Terrorism as an evolving threat. 
- Resource competition and the impact on South Pacific States, in 
particular the demand for fish stocks. 
- The increasing adoption of and reliance on information and 
technology. 
- The proliferation of WMD and the access that non-state actors have to 
these. 
 
For the development of a New Zealand National Security Strategy, one that 
allows all agencies responsible for security to effectively develop their 
capabilities, it is necessary that threats be identified. From the recent Second 
National New Zealand Security Conference, hosted by the Centre for Defence and 
Security Studies, in April 2018, the conference speakers saw the biggest threats to 
New Zealand national security as (Hoverd, 2018): 
- Cyber threats, 
- Terrorism, 
- Major power competition, 
- Climate change, 
- Maritime threats, and  
- Biosecurity.  
 
This argument of identifying threats for the development of a national security 
strategy contradicts the ‘all-hazards/all-risks’ approach that the NSS takes. 
According to DPMC, the ‘all-hazards/all-risks’ approach is the most effective way 
for managing crisis’ in New Zealand (Department of the Prime Minister and 
Cabinet, 2017). This may be considered appropriate given the reactive nature of 
the current national security system, however, it does not provide a platform for 
robust analysis of security challenges. One of the strengths of the UK’s approach 
to their national security strategy is the list of threats and risks that are identified 
as facing the nation. These risks are also prioritised in order of likelihood, 
meaning that agencies are able to prioritise capability development against the 
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most likely Tier One Risks (Terrorism, Cyber-attack, conflict, instability overseas, 
public health pandemic and major natural disaster) (HM Government, 2015). New 
Zealand should adopt this approach and develop a list of the most significant risks 
and threats to national security.  
 
The list does not need to follow the example of the UK, as it needs to reflect New 
Zealand‘s environment. It should also embrace the philosophy of Human Security 
that has been recommended. It is recommended that New Zealand focus on five 
threats in its national security strategy. These would be considered Tier One risks 
and are those that cut across the ‘whole-of-society’ and would require a ‘whole-
of-government’ response. There are other risks and threats to New Zealand’s 
national security. However, for the development of a national security strategy it 
is recommended that there be a focus on those risks that potentially have a 
significant and likely impact on New Zealand. These five risks and threats are not 
prioritised within the list and are collectively considered Tier One risks and 
threats. The five risks and threats are: 
- The Cyber Threat 
- The Terrorist Threat 
- Climate Change 
- Biosecurity 
- Threats to Territorial Security 
 
The Cyber Threat 
 
Cyber threats to New Zealand are growing owing to the increased number of 
global internet connections and the ability for a range of State and non-state actors 
to access disruptive technologies and software. Cyber-attacks can be launched 
from anywhere in the world, with speed and with little warning. In 2017, cyber-
crime cost the globe $6 Trillion in lost revenue, with 156 million phishing e-mails 
sent every day and 7.5 million new malware samples discovered (Payne, 2018). In 
2016 it was estimated that one in five Zealanders were affected by cybercrime 
with an estimated cost to New Zealand of $257 million (Cabrera, 2017). The 
cyber threat cuts across all aspects of New Zealand’s society to include economic 
institutions, stock markets, communications services, homes, government services 
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and critical infrastructure. Virtually everything is connected in the ‘internet of 
things’. What is concerning, is the different levels of cyber infrastructure that 
exists within New Zealand’s critical infrastructure. Much of the computer 
hardware that is in New Zealand’s energy infrastructure is considered legacy 
hardware and software that is extremely vulnerable to attack (Payne, 2018). Much 
of this infrastructure is owned by private companies, therefore, this strengthens 
the argument for more private and public collaboration for national security 
issues. Foreign ownership and investment in the New Zealand cyber-domain can 
also leave New Zealand vulnerable to potential attack. Chinese 
telecommunications company Huawei was involved in New Zealand’s Ultrafast 
Broadband network development. There were considerable concerns that this was 
a cover for Chinese State intelligence to accesses New Zealand’s national security 
intelligence network and also be used as a backdoor into other nations (Vaughan, 
2012). It is unlikely that the level of connection in the cyber domain will decrease; 
New Zealand has just received its second undersea internet cable. There is also a 
significant debate about States having the ability to influence other State’s 
elections, with the most recent and publicly discussed event being the 2016 
United States Presidential Election. With the scale and speed that a cyber-attack 
can be launched and the impact that an attack is likely to have on the whole-of-
society, it is necessary that New Zealand develop a forward-looking strategy that 
enhances the current New Zealand cyber-security framework.  
 
There are a number of government agencies in New Zealand that are focussed on 
cyber-security. However, what is lacking is a strategy for cyber-security that is 
integrated across all sectors of society. The 2015 Cyber Security Strategy does 
have an integrated approach between the public and private sector, however, it is 
very much nationally focussed. The first element of the proposed National 
Security Strategy for cyber-security, should be to simplify the overly complicated 
array of cyber-security policy, plans and agencies. The current system is 
fragmented. The NCPO, within DPMC is responsible for cyber policy and 
responding to cyber threats of national significance.  The NCPO formally reports 
to the Ministry of Broadcasting, Communications and Digital Media. GCSB is 
responsible for the NCSC that responds to high level threats and for Protective 
Security Requirements. Within MBIE the CERT responds to low level threats. At 
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present there are five different government agencies with cyber-security 
responsibilities requiring cross-agency coordination. There is no open source 
information available to describe what constitutes a high level or a low level 
attack. The current approach of multi-agency responsibilities should be changed. 
For a cyber-security framework to be effective, it is recommended that the 
structure of all agencies responsible for cyber-security be reviewed with an aim of 
developing a more centralised system that can provide a framework that can better 
enable cyber-security to the whole-of-security.  
 
New Zealand has a long-standing responsibility for the provision of regional 
security in the South Pacific through traditional means. The increase in all States 
having access to and utilising the cyber domain should become a focus area for a 
cyber-security strategy. Many of the States within the South Pacific are using 
outdated systems and many do not have the necessary tools to respond to a cyber-
attack (Fenol, 2017). These outdated systems can be infiltrated by an attack and 
not only have disastrous effects for the State but can also be used to possibly find 
an access way into the New Zealand cyber-domain. In 2016, the Asia-Pacific 
region saw the largest amount of cyber-attacks globally, with 27% of cyber-
attacks directed at individuals, private companies and government agencies (Tan 
A. , 2017). New Zealand already provides physical support to many of the of 
South Pacific nations through defence cooperation and other measures (Ministry 
of Defence, 2016), so it makes sense for cyber-security to be added to this 
support. The cyber-security strategy should focus on improving the resilience of 
the cyber-domains of New Zealand’s South Pacific partners, not only to prevent a 
significant crisis through cyber-attack, but also to increase New Zealand’s own 
cyber border. The New Zealand cyber-security framework within the national 
security strategy should be aimed at simplifying the cyber-security structures and 
framework, as well as integrating a long term cyber-security policy with New 
Zealand’s existing foreign policy.     
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The Terrorist Threat 
 
The general narrative about terrorism in New Zealand is that although New 
Zealand enjoys a relatively benign environment, the threat of terrorism should not 
be underplayed (Broad, 2017). The threat of terrorism is considered a significant 
threat within the current New Zealand national security framework. The main 
issues that have been identified in Chapter Four with the counter-terrorism 
framework is unworkable legislation and the complicated nature of the structure 
of counter-terrorist capabilities. The legislation for New Zealand’s counter 
terrorist framework has proven to be difficult to use and has been criticised for 
being over-complicated to the point that it prevented counter-terrorism charges 
laid against suspected terrorists (Battersby, 2017). Part of the counter-terrorist 
strategy would be to review the current legislation and amend areas that are 
unworkable or overly-complicated. There is no evidence to suggest that New 
Zealand should not be able to create legislation that provides certainty for the 
New Zealand Police and the justice system to prosecute suspected terrorists. 
Legislation needs to support and enable law and order, therefore the development 
of effective legislation within a national security strategy is recommended. New 
Zealand should look to its allies and international partners for how they have 
described and developed their own counter-terrorist legislation. New Zealand 
maintains a number of defence and intelligence sharing agreements and alliances 
with other nations and it would make sense to develop a national counter terrorist 
strategy that aligns with New Zealand’s strategic partners. It is necessary for an 
effective counter-terrorist strategy to have accurate legislation that enables the 
domestic response as well as complementing New Zealand’s allies efforts. 
 
Terrorism, like cyber-security, cuts across many agencies responsibilities and any 
counter-terrorist strategy needs to be developed with this fact in mind. Terrorism 
is not just a domestic issue and as the world has become more connected through 
globalisation, so have terrorist networks. Organisations such as al Qaeda and 
Da’esh represent the current norm in terrorist capabilities and global reach. These 
organisations are no longer restricted to one geographic area and have the ability 
to ‘export’ their brand of warfare to any part of the world, with the 2015 attacks in 
Europe an example of how damaging this type of threat can be. Counter-terrorism 
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involves New Zealand’s intelligence, police, customs and border security, defence 
and foreign affairs and trade agencies. These agencies have different 
responsibilities and functions, with the coordination of these agencies response to 
a terrorist attack through the Counter-Terrorist Coordination Committee within 
DPMC (DPMC, 2016). Terrorism is a growing threat that has the ability to reach 
out from anywhere in the globe and have significant consequences, therefore, 
New Zealand should have a security strategy that seeks to analyse and prepare for 
future threats and monitor global trends in counter-terrorist activities. There is 
increased terrorist activity in South East Asia, with a number of terrorist groups 
strongly established in countries such as Indonesia, the Philippines and Malaysia. 
Therefore, part of the national security strategy needs to create a framework for 
how New Zealand will respond to this growing regional threat. 
 
Terrorism has benefited from the same technological developments that have 
enabled globalisation. One growing issue in New Zealand is the radicalisation of 
New Zealander’s, with some travelling overseas to become FTF’s. According to 
the Intelligence and Security in a Free Society: Report of the First Independent 
Review of Intelligence and Security in New Zealand, New Zealand has between 
30-40 people within New Zealand on a government watch list. Although New 
Zealand has a small number of citizens travelling overseas to become an FTF 
(Cullen & Reddy, 2016), New Zealand need only to look to Australia to see how 
radicalisation can have a significant impact on the safety and stability of the 
nation. In 2015, it was estimated that there were over 200 Australian citizens 
fighting in Iraq and Syria, with some estimates that at least 35 other citizens had 
returned to Australia (Barton, 2016). Significant research into radicalisation has 
identified that young people have a need to belong and by targeting this 
vulnerability and through the use of social media platforms, recruitment of 
terrorists has increased (Barton, 2016). Part of the counter-terrorism strategy 
needs to look at the prevention of radicalisation and supporting New Zealand 
communities to prevent this from occurring. By targeting this threat, New Zealand 
would have a strategy that prevents terrorism from growing internally and prevent 
foreign organisations from using New Zealand as a base from which to operate 
and recruit from.         
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Climate change 
 
Climate change is one threat to New Zealand’s security that is mostly ignored in 
the current national security discourse. New Zealand has experienced natural 
disasters both nationally and regionally and has contributed significantly to the 
recovery of these crisis events. The effects of climate change will significantly 
increase severe weather events but also cause longer-term changes to the 
environment. Rising sea levels will significantly impact on the physical landscape 
of nations and there are many examples of Pacific Island nations being affected by 
this. Ocean acidification will impact on fish stocks and cause major problems for 
food security. A strategy for climate change needs to look at the climate effects, 
the environmental impacts of these effects and then what the security impacts will 
be. Rising sea levels and acidification of sea water both have environmental 
impacts and consequential security impacts (Hauger, 2018). Rising sea levels will 
impact on the living space of small low-lying islands, especially in the South 
Pacific and Asia. As a security impact, there is likely to be greater climate-based 
migration from these areas, as people seek refuge. With ocean acidification, food 
stocks will be impacted and food scarcity will cause States to take drastic 
measures to secure more food. These issues need to be addressed and a strategy 
developed to mitigate these threats. 
 
New Zealand will be directly and indirectly impacted from security issues relating 
to climate change. A National Security Strategy that addresses the threats of 
climate change will need to have both an internal and external focus. 
Domestically, New Zealand should seek to develop strategies that address energy 
efficiency, food production and water management. These are issues that will 
require significant input from the New Zealand security sector. These three areas 
are essential to the delivery of human security as they contribute to the provision 
of the freedom from want (Matthew, 2014). Beyond the contribution to the 
development of food and energy security, New Zealand should develop how it 
will react to an increase in human migration as a result of people seeking refuge 
from Asia and the South Pacific. New Zealand has already seen an increase in 
asylum seekers attempting to come to New Zealand as Australia clamp down on 
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their refugee intake. Although a difficult journey, there have been an increase in 
the number of refugee boats heading towards New Zealand and it is estimated that 
this will continue to increase (NZ Herald, 2018). There needs to be a robust 
security strategy for dealing with an increase in refugee numbers caused by the 
impacts of climate change. There should also be the development of a security 
strategy that focuses on the protection of New Zealand’s food and energy 
resources.  
 
Biosecurity  
 
One shining light amongst the New Zealand national security framework is MPI’s 
Biosecurity Strategy 2025. This forward-looking document seeks to engage with 
the community, provide open and free flowing information, dispense effective 
governance and leadership, and establish skills and tools for tomorrow’s threats 
(Ministry for Primary Industries, 2016). This strategy recognises the importance 
of a partnership between the whole-of-society and the impacts that a biosecurity 
threat can have on all parts of New Zealand. New Zealand is a trade dependent 
economy and all efforts must be made to protect this. New Zealand is also reliant 
on tourism. With every ship and aircraft arriving in New Zealand, there is the 
possibility of a biosecurity threat being brought in (Hoadley, 2017). Although 
New Zealand has a strategy for Biosecurity, there will be an ongoing requirement 
to continually focus on biosecurity threats facing New Zealand.  
 
Biosecurity is not only vitally important for New Zealand industry, it also 
overlaps with other security threats. With the impacts of climate change likely to 
cause instability in Asia and Pacific, in turn causing an increase in migration, both 
legitimate and illegitimate. New Zealand will need to develop a robust biosecurity 
strategy that can cope with the possibility of people attempting to arrive in New 
Zealand illegally. There is strong evidence suggesting the importance of 
integrating border and economic security beyond policy to physical integration as 
well (Nicklin, 2017). Based on this argument, biosecurity should be integrated 
into the wider economic and border security policy and action. The threats 
identified within the current New Zealand national security framework include 
disease in agriculture, animals and humans. All of these have the ability to 
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severely impact on New Zealand’s primary industry, export and trade industry, 
New Zealand’s domestic food security and also the health of the population. 
Many of these threats and impacts are areas of focus for human security. A 
Biosecurity security strategy would diverge to include wider economic and border 
security threats and consider the impact that climate change will have on regional 
security and what the flow on effect will be for New Zealand.   
 
Threats to territorial security  
 
The protection of New Zealand’s territory and sovereignty is an important part of 
national security. Territorial security is provided by a collaboration of government 
agencies that includes the NZDF, the New Zealand Customs Service, the New 
Zealand Intelligence agencies, the New Zealand Police and Immigration New 
Zealand. Traditional territorial security includes physical security of New Zealand 
territory, territorial waters and the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) (Rolfe, 1993). 
The NZDF contributes to territorial security through (Ministry of Defence, 2016): 
• The promotion of a safe, secure and resilient New Zealand, including its 
border and approaches. 
• The maintenance of New Zealand’s prosperity via secure sea, air and 
electronic lines of communication. 
 
The NZDF has a range of capabilities that provide surveillance of New Zealand’s 
territories and approaches as well as interdiction capabilities if a threat arises. 
Although it is articulated in the DWP 2016 that no direct military threat to New 
Zealand is envisaged in the foreseeable future, there remains the requirement to 
ensure that New Zealand’s territories are secure. The increase in tensions in the 
Asia and Pacific region means that New Zealand must maintain capabilities that 
can protect New Zealand’s territory as well as contributing to regional security 
(Ministry of Defence, 2016). There are emerging threats to New Zealand’s 
territory that would require a whole-of-government approach in mitigating them.   
 
Territorial threats are evolving and include the flow of terrorism, drugs, illegal 
migration and disease. It is argued by Germana Nicklin (2017) that these risks 
have generated a new agenda for border security. According to the New Zealand 
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Customs Service Annual Report 2017, New Zealand has experienced an increase 
in organised crime syndicates importing large quantities of drugs. In 2016, 176 kg 
of methamphetamine was seized by the New Zealand Customs Service. In this 
seizure, the drugs were concealed in the doors of shipping containers sent from 
China (New Zealand Customs Service, 2017). There was also 448kg of 
methamphetamine discovered on an abandoned boat in Northland in 2016 (Feek, 
2016). These seizures required cooperation between the New Zealand Customs 
Service, New Zealand Police, NZDF and the New Zealand Intelligence agencies. 
The importation of illegal drugs is one example of the challenges faced by border 
security agencies. The threats of climate change and biosecurity have identified a 
number of challenges that will be faced by New Zealand’s border security 
agencies, therefore, threats to territorial security should be considered a priority 
threat that should be included in the National Security Strategy.       
 
Objectives of the New Zealand National Security Strategy 
 
A New Zealand National Security Strategy would seek to address emerging 
threats to national security and allow for agencies to effectively develop 
capabilities to mitigate these threats. During the process of creating a new 
National Security Strategy, the existing framework, structures and responsibilities 
should be reviewed and if need be, changed. The emerging five threats identified 
in this chapter, cut across all aspects of New Zealand society and present 
potentially significant impacts for New Zealand’s way of life, should they 
manifest. Through the examination of New Zealand’s national security plans, it is 
apparent that the structures and agencies in place are based on historical analysis 
and threats and have not been reviewed to meet the emerging threats. This issue 
also exists within the number of different plans, policy documents and legislation. 
The proceeding sections provide the details of the objectives of the national 
security strategy.  
  
Increasing public engagement 
 
According to the engagement plan for MPI’s Biosecurity Strategy 2025, New 
Zealand is a team of 4.7 million biosecurity people (Ministry for Primary 
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Industries, 2016).  This is a good example of a public engagement plan that 
publicises how each person in New Zealand contributes to delivering biosecurity 
outcomes. This type of public messaging should be adopted for the formulation of 
a New Zealand National Security Strategy. In Chapter Three, the strength of 
Singapore’s national security framework was identified as their public 
engagement strategies. The security narrative created in Singapore targeted all 
citizens, of all ages and discussed security threats and responses openly. The 
concept of developing a national security strategy is that it should provide security 
to the whole-of-society. As the people are the focal point for security, then they 
need to be aware of the threats facing them and how they fit into any response. By 
using MPI’s example of public engagement noted above, the development of a 
New Zealand National Security Strategy should involve a comprehensive public 
awareness programme that articulates threats, as well as how the security 
framework is structured for a response.  
 
For New Zealand to develop a whole-of-society approach to security, the whole-
of-society must be involved in its development and execution. Azizian argued that 
there needs to be an ongoing dialogue between the private sector and the security 
agencies for the development of the national security framework (DefSec Media, 
2017). There should be more than just ongoing dialogue. It is essential for the 
development of a whole-of-society national security strategy, to have input from 
the private sector. There is a lack of significant examples of this occurring. 
Captain David Morgan of Air New Zealand, attested that all the major national 
corporations should be involved in this activity (Morgan, 2018). It is also argued 
by Rogers (2017) that security intellectuals should be involved in the whole-of-
society discussion on security. The Waikato Chamber of Commerce Chief 
Executive, William Durning was unaware of any involvement of business in the 
development of New Zealand’s national security framework. With these high 
level private sector leaders indicating that business needs to be involved in the 
development and execution of the national security strategy and framework, it is 
surprising that this cooperation is at such a low level. For New Zealand to develop 
an effective whole-of-society security strategy, then the whole-of-society should 
be part of its collective development. Increasing public engagement in developing 
a National Security Strategy would include engaging with a range of experts from 
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the fields of business, academia, iwi and different government agencies. 
Workshops would be used with these experts to assess, analyse and then 
formulate the National Security Strategy.  
 
Establishing the National Security Strategy framework  
 
Once the National Security Strategy has been developed (using a Human Security 
approach, based on the five most significant risks), the execution of the strategy 
needs to be robust. The strategy should be used as the basis for the government 
agencies to develop their own strategies and operational plans. The National 
Security Strategy should be the lead document in the hierarchy of national 
security documents. It will provide the overall guidance for the agencies and 
provides the framework for them to base their strategies upon. It is essential for 
effective strategy development that the government agencies responsible for 
national security nest their own strategies within this overarching document. 
There needs to be a logical sequence and over-arching structure in the way in 
which the different agency strategies are produced. The National Security 
Strategy should articulate that each government agency is responsible for 
producing a strategic plan that provides details of their capability development 
and how it will achieve the objectives of the National Security Strategy. The 
National Security Strategy should also provide a timeframe for when each agency 
is required to release their own strategies and operational plans. The irregular 
manner in which agencies develop their plans demonstrates that the current 
national security framework is haphazard and does not have a coherent approach. 
By establishing a plan within the National Security Strategy, that provides clear 
details for each agency about their responsibilities for their own strategic and 
capability development, will mean that the development of the national security 
architecture will be coherent.   
 
In the uncertain environment that national security exists within, it is necessary 
for a national security strategy to be regularly reviewed to ensure that it meets the 
requirements of the changing challenges. There needs to be a balance in the 
timeframe for the review to take place. The international environment is changing 
fast, however, capability development can be slow. It is recommended that the 
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National Security Strategy be reviewed three to four years after its release. The 
UK’s independent review of their NSS&SDSR conducted by the JCNSS (HM 
Government, 2016) is a good example of an effective process of reviewing a 
strategy. It is very common within the private sector to ensure that reviews are 
done for business strategy to allow feedback and learning takes place, so that the 
strategy can be altered if needed (Kaplan & Norton, 2011). A review system of 
the National Security Strategy would allow for re-evaluation of the security 
context, identify if any changes to the threats have occurred and ensure that the 
operations in support of the security objectives achieve the overall intent of the 
security strategy. This is not a new science and is common practice within the 
private sector and has also effectively been carried out by the UK. It is 
recommended that an independent panel be established for the purpose of 
reviewing the National Security Strategy. This panel would include 
representatives from business, academia, iwi and the different government 
agencies responsible for security. The review of the National Security Strategy 
with the nesting of the different agency plans under the central strategy will allow 
for improved cooperation across the whole-of-government.  
 
For the National Security Strategy to be executed efficiently, the implementation 
of the central strategy, agency strategies and plans, and the review system requires 
a comprehensive structure. Figure 6: New Zealand National Security Framework, 
shows how the National Security Strategy would be implemented. The framework 
is established on a five year cycle. Figure 6 shows the timeline for the release of 
the National Security Strategy and when the subsequent strategies and plans 
should be released by the government agencies. The release of the National 
Security Strategy would occur in Year One. This would allow the government 
agencies the time needed to conduct their own analysis and development of their 
agency security strategy and operational plans. These strategies and operational 
plans would be released in Year Two. At the start of Year Four, the independent 
review of the National Security Strategy and the government agency strategies 
and plans would be conducted. The purpose of this review would be to evaluate 
the threat environment, identify where the strategy needs to be amended to meet 
any changes in the environment. If there was a significant change in the 
international environment, a review of the National Security Strategy can take 
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place before this time. It is necessary for the National Security Strategy to be agile 
and flexible enough to react to emerging security threats.   
   
Figure 6: New Zealand National Security Strategy framework. 
 
Resilience as a concept 
 
A common theme within the current national security framework is the need to 
ensure the resilience of key government structures and the community during a 
crisis. There is a difference between subjective and objective resilience and the 
challenge here is that resilience is objective for physical structures and systems, 
but is subjective for the people.  The resilience of a system or a physical structure 
cannot be subjective. The NSS Handbook describes resilience as:   
 
“Resilience includes those inherent conditions that allow a system to 
absorb impacts and cope with an event, as well as post-event adaptive 
processes that facilitate the ability of the system to reorganise, change, and 
learn from the experience. It means that systems, people, institutions, 
physical infrastructure, and communities are able to anticipate risk, limit 
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impacts, cope with the effects, and adapt or even thrive in the face of 
change” (DPMC, 2016, p. 7). 
 
It is argued by Cretney (2016) during her study into the impacts of the Canterbury 
earthquakes in 2010 and 2011 that there is a danger when governments, both local 
and central, advocate for community resilience as a method to devolve 
responsibility for disaster response with little consideration as to the resources 
required for this to occur. There is a significant reliance on resilience in the 
current national security framework. It is even one of the principle roles of the 
NZDF to contribute to national resilience (Ministry of Defence, 2016, p. 11). The 
description of resilience is broad and arguably covers too many aspects of society. 
It covers national, regional and local systems, infrastructure, communities and 
people. Strengthening the resilience of a local power station is extremely different 
from ensuring the resilience of a community during a natural disaster. One is a 
physical structure that can be engineered to withstand certain levels of physical 
shock. The physical damage can be repaired and be functioning again at pre-event 
levels. The other is a state of mind that is dependent on the abilities and 
experiences of each person. Psychological resilience has been perceived as a trait 
amongst individuals that changes from situation to situation and also changes over 
time, meaning that the reactions of people may change depending on the event 
and their own personal state of mind (Fletcher & Sarkar, 2011).  There should be 
a separation between the resilience of the physical infrastructure and systems and 
the resilience of the community.  
 
The proposed National Security Strategy uses Human Security as its theoretical 
basis and places the individual as the focal point of security. The core value of 
human security is the ‘freedom from fear’, which is a cognitive state rather than a 
physical state. It is therefore necessary to develop a psychological resilience 
framework within the National Security Strategy that is separate from the 
resilience of the physical structures and systems. This will enhance the focus of a 
human security based security strategy. If there is to be a resilient population then 
there needs to be greater collaboration with the population in developing a 
framework. Much of the research into natural disasters articulated the importance 
of community involvement in the development of the response plan, but also in 
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the promotion of the plan (Thompson-Dyck, Mayer, Anderson, & Galaskiewicz, 
2016). This has been identified by Thompson-Dyck et al (2016) as an essential 
component of developing an effective framework that utilises the different groups 
within the community to contribute to a wider understanding of their needs. They 
also encourage planners to think more sociologically about the communities, how 
they are connected and what provides them with their current way of life. This 
will be challenging for New Zealand and would take a significant amount of work 
to involve the whole-of-society in the development of security, however, it is a 
necessary step in providing an effective whole-of-society national security 
framework. 
 
The articulation of the resilience framework needs to be incorporated into the 
wider narrative on national security. In Chapter Three the Singaporean national 
security framework was commended for having a robust public communication 
approach. It provided a range of different methods of communicating the 
objectives of national security, the threats and the responsibilities of the people. A 
New Zealand National Security Strategy that seeks to improve the resilience of 
the population should develop a public communications programme similar to 
that of the Singaporean model that places national security and the threats that are 
faced by New Zealand into the daily conversation of the people. MPI already has 
a similar approach to their ‘biosecurity team of 4.7 million’ (Ministry for Primary 
Industries, 2015), however, this public engagement is not very well known 
(Durning, 2017). There is evidence to suggest that community participation plays 
an important role in building community resilience and instead of hiding the 
expectation of community resilience in the various ‘unknown’ national security 
publications, it needs to be part of communities everyday lives.  
 
Conclusions 
 
New Zealand needs to develop a National Security Strategy. One that articulates a 
national vision for the future of New Zealand’s security. It should reflect the 
unique national values and how, as a nation, New Zealand will act on the world 
stage. It is vital for a successful whole-of society approach to national security 
that a whole-of-society approach be taken in the development of the strategy. It is 
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necessary to bring together the different policy and plans that currently exist and 
have one central strategy that is able to provide overall direction on national 
security. It should provide a framework for the government agencies that have a 
responsibility for the delivery of national security outcomes, to develop their own 
strategies and plans. The national security framework should include a review 
system that considers the performance of the strategy against the context of the 
security environment, to identify if the strategy needs amendment. The 
centralisation of the National Security Strategy would allow agencies the ability to 
develop their own capabilities for the achievement of security objectives, as well 
as challenging the structures and opinions that are the basis for the current 
security framework. The proposed New Zealand National Security Strategy would 
have the following characteristics: 
  
- Using a theoretical base of Human Security to develop a strategy. The 
core values of human security fit within the current New Zealand 
narrative on security and also the idea of the normal way of life. 
 
- The strategy should be based on five threats: 
 
o Terrorism, 
o Cyber Security, 
o Territorial Security, 
o Biosecurity, and 
o The impacts of Climate Change. 
 
- The objectives of the national security strategy would be to increase 
the collaboration with and participation of the whole-of-society. This 
is essential if the strategy is to deliver security to the whole-of-society. 
 
- The strategy would also articulate the framework of how individual 
agencies would be responsible for the development of their own 
internal strategies, capability development plans and operational plans.   
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- The National Security Strategy would also provide a framework for 
the implementation and review of the national strategy as well as the 
individual agency strategies.  
 
- There should be a separation between physical resilience in systems 
and infrastructure and the populations psychological resilience. 
 
The current New Zealand NSS that is coordinated through DPMC and the 
management of emergencies through CDEM should remain in place. There is no 
evidence to prove that this structure and framework is ineffective and to date, has 
responded effectively to recent crisis’ in New Zealand. The purpose of developing 
a National Security Strategy is to bring together all the various documents that 
relate to national security (but that are currently in a siloed environment) and 
provide a central focus for meeting the most prevalent and challenging threats to 
New Zealand’s security.    
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Chapter Six: Conclusion 
 
The purpose of this research was to examine New Zealand’s national security 
architecture to determine if it provided security to the whole-of-society. It could 
be argued that as New Zealand has not been invaded by another State, 
experienced a major terrorist attack on its territory, or had a cyber-attack that 
crippled the nation, that New Zealand has an effective national security 
framework. Snow (2016) argued that they key question of national security is that 
under what circumstances will a nation use its armed forces to ensure its safety. 
However, national security is more than the use of the armed forces. National 
security is about the protection of the State, its values, its institutions and its 
citizens. In the contemporary setting, national security for New Zealand is the 
‘condition which permits the citizens of the state to go about their daily business 
confidently, free from fear, and able to make the most of the opportunities to 
advance their way of life’ (Broad, 2017, p. 147). This dissertation has argued that 
delivering effective national security requires a framework that should be capable 
of responding to a crisis that enables the citizens to return to a normal way of life 
as quickly as possible and is one that addresses emerging security threats. In order 
to be forward-looking, a New Zealand National Security Strategy should be 
developed that coordinates the strategies and plans of the government agencies 
that have a role in national security. It is essential to understand what should be 
protected, what elements of the State require the focus of the national security 
sector and how New Zealand should approach the development of a national 
security strategy.  
 
Chapter Two explored the evolution of the State to determine what constitutes a 
State and what should be protected. This chapter used this analysis to develop and 
present the concept of the ‘normal way of life’. This was developed from a review 
of the evolution of national security and its relationship with the State and was 
used to answer the question ‘what exactly should be protected by the national 
security framework’? From this review, it was determined that for a citizen to 
have a ‘normal way of life’ they should have access to and benefit from six 
components of the state: Welfare, Government, Security, Freedom and Equality, 
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Economy, and Law and Order. This concept provides a tangible focus for the 
development of a national security strategy. 
 
Chapter Three examined how other nations have developed their own national 
security frameworks, which can inform how New Zealand could approach the 
development of an over-arching national security strategy. The review of the UK, 
Ireland, Singapore and Australia provided examples of different approaches to a 
national security framework. Each nation has an approach based on their own 
specific context and assessment of their strategic environment. Each provided 
examples that New Zealand could adopt but also things to avoid. Only the UK had 
a formal national security strategy and although it was described as a whole-of-
government approach, an independent review assessed that this was not the 
reality. New Zealand should adopt the method of an independent review of a 
national security strategy similar to what was carried out in the UK. A review 
system would identify gaps in a security strategy that would be rectified and 
amended if needed. Ireland and Singapore both have different environments and 
their approach to security is viewed through different lenses. The result of the 
review of these two nations national security framework concluded that there is 
only one main point that is useful for a New Zealand national security strategy, 
which is that New Zealand should develop a robust communications plan that 
discusses national security to the population. This would increase public 
involvement in national security issues that would have positive effects for 
improving public resilience. The review of the Australian national security 
framework suggests that the inclusion of foreign policy into the national security 
strategy would enhance the whole-of-government approach.   
 
After considering the core research question (‘is the current approach to national 
security effective in providing a whole-of-society framework?’) a number of 
conclusions have been reached. The first conclusion is that New Zealand should 
base its national security strategy upon the theory of Human Security. Human 
Security fits within the current national security narrative of New Zealand citizens 
‘living free from fear’ (Broad, 2017). The research led to the conclusion that a 
national security strategy is needed, as the current approach has the government 
agencies responsible for contributing to national security siloed in their policy and 
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plans. The NSS Handbook and the CDEM National Plan are two documents that 
contain information on the Government’s response to a potential crisis. Neither 
document has a forward looking approach that provided detail on how to develop 
national security capabilities. The NSS has on only a few occasions been 
activated, with the majority of events a response to a natural disaster or a food 
security threat. From these responses, there is no evidence to suggest that the 
system failed, therefore, it is concluded based on the success of the response to 
these events, that the system is effective. The system has not been tested against 
significant direct threats to New Zealand’s national security. Much of the 
contemporary narrative on national security in New Zealand focuses on traditional 
threats. However, recent academic debate identifies emerging threats such as 
cyberattack, terrorism, climate change, biosecurity and border security as the 
largest threats to New Zealand’s national security. These threats can affect the 
whole-of-society and would require a whole-of-government approach when 
responding. From this evidence, it is concluded that the development of a 
National Security Strategy should be based on these five threats. The rationale of 
focusing on the five threats is about prioritising the most significant emerging 
threats to New Zealand’s national security. It is these five threats that are likely to 
have the greatest impact on the six components of the normal way of way and 
therefore require a whole-of-government response. Other threats, outside of these 
five are not excluded from the NSS and would be responded to if they occur.  
 
The National Security Strategy also needs an implementation plan that allows for 
regular review and amendments of the strategy if needed. A National Security 
Strategy would allow for connections between the whole-of-government and the 
whole-of-society. The National Security Strategy would operate as the central 
document from which other New Zealand government agencies analyse and 
produce their own individual strategies. This would provide commonality across 
identified threats as well as common objectives of national security. This is only 
evident in some of the New Zealand security related documents reviewed in this 
dissertation. The National Security Strategy would provide guidelines for the 
production and review of agency strategies. This would ensure that the 
government agency strategies and plans are achieving what they have been 
directed to do within the national strategy.  
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One key issue identified in this research is uncertainty surrounding the term 
resilience that is often used in New Zealand’s national security discourse. The 
foundations of New Zealand’s NSS is to have a resilience-based approach. The 
term is referring to resilience in the infrastructure, institutions and communities of 
New Zealand (DPMC, 2016). Arguably, this can be more readily achieved for 
infrastructure and institutions, as these are physical structures and systems that 
can be repaired, however, using the term resilience when dealing with 
communities is referring mainly to psychological resilience. Cretney’s (2016) 
research on the resilience of the community after the earthquakes in Canterbury in 
2010-2011 found that there is a significant issue when policies rely on community 
resilience. This is devolving responsibility down to the community without 
effectively contributing to this resilience. This is evident within New Zealand’s 
national security discourse. Evidence that suggests resilience is a trait that is 
different between individuals and can also change within a person (Fletcher & 
Sarkar, 2011). While physical and psychological resilience are different they are 
not mutually exclusive. Having infrastructure and institutions that can respond 
quickly in order to lessen the suffering of the community, would assist with the 
psychological aspect of community resilience. Therefore, a New Zealand National 
Security Strategy would need to address resilience and have an appropriate 
separation between the concept of physical resilience in infrastructure and 
institutions and building psychological resilience within the individuals of the 
community.   
 
The intention of this research project was to determine if New Zealand should 
adopt a national security strategy and provide practical policy-relevant 
recommendations. Based upon the research, it finds that for New Zealand to adopt 
a whole-of-government approach to improving the security of the whole-of-
society, that ensures that people live free from fear, that New Zealand should have 
a National Security Strategy. This research was based upon reviews of academic 
literature on the topics of national security and international relations, as well as 
national security related policy. What is evident from this research is the need for 
greater collaboration with the New Zealand government, security agencies and the 
private sector. This is a subject within New Zealand’s national security that could 
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benefit from further research. The private sector has greater influence on the State, 
with many of the traditional government operations now out sourced to the private 
sector. Banks, power distribution, the postal service and airlines are just a few of 
the operations that the private sector are now running, that were previously the 
responsibility of the government. For this reason, it is important to have state-
private sector coordination for the development of a National Security Strategy. 
There is also an opportunity to develop a deeper understanding of the needs of the 
private sector in relation to national security and for the private sector to have a 
greater awareness of how the government provides national security.  
       
Donald M Snow asked the question, ‘what good is a government that can’t protect 
its citizen’s (2016, p. 8). There is a significant body of academic literature on the 
subject of national security and there are numerous policies, plans and legislation 
relating to New Zealand’s national security. What is missing is the piece in the 
middle that brings together the academic theory and the policy into a collaborative 
and forward-looking national security strategy. A National Security Strategy 
would provide a platform for New Zealand to ensure that it has the necessary 
framework and capabilities to provide security to the whole-of-society. 
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